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The theme of this thesis is the contradictory character of labour and employment as
it occurs in modernity. In this respect the thesis starts with the phenomenological
reading of labour as it is expressed in its relation to property in the employment
relation. The point that the thesis makes is that employment in capitalism is a
dialectical relation of conflict and interdependence that cannot be reduced in terms of
exchange. This relation despite the efforts to the mutation of its substance by the
market and the suppression of its conflictual character by the welfare state persists in
its ambivalent character and is expressed as a paradox in the complexity of its practice
in modernity. The thesis suggests an understanding of employment that recognises it
as power relation that creates relations that are very similar in their normative logic to
those of a political community. The aim is by unveiling the complexity of the relation
to strive for a legal understanding that whilst socially tames and conditions
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The subject of this thesis is labour. The first question that confronts us is why the
issue of labour should invite us to theorise about it. There have been theories that tell
us that the question of labour is obsolete and that in the post-modern, post-industrial
society that we currently live in the significance of employment has been diminished1.
Although these positions purport to describe actual social transfonnations that are
occurring in late modernity and affect the structure of employment they do not take
into account what employment actually is. They talk about the transformations of
labour and employment without thinking what these concepts actually represent.
Normative interpretations although autonomous in the development of their logic and
to their field of application have to be based on a solid cognitive basis if they are to be
relevant . In this respect we have first to understand what we are dealing with before
we apply any normative solutions to it. In order to understand labour and employment
will go back to discuss the intimate/constitutive relation between labour and the self.
We then proceed to look at how this relationship is (mis-) investigated in law.
Our starting point is that that labour will always be fundamental and socially
relevant as it expresses an invariable constitutive factor for human society. This thesis
assumes that labour creates a fundamental relation between humanity and nature that
subsequently plays a major role for the creation of the terms of human symbiosis. As
such this relation cannot be 'surpassed' or diminished since it expresses a
fundamental way through which we, as humans, relate both to nature and with to
ourselves. Our other main point is that labour in modernity is conditioned by its
relation to property, a relation that detennines the substance of employment within the
context of capitalist property relations. What I am going to argue is that this relation is
a relation that cannot be sublated within capitalism. It is a structural relation that
detennines the substance of the relation of employment, a substance that finds no
expression in the dominant legal paradigms of our time.
1 Rifkind (1997), Bell (1974) et al.
The dependence of the normative to the cognitive does not in any way deny their existence as
distinct, irreducible to each other discursive genres. As we are going to argue further on their relation is
one of interaction and not of determination. For an influential account on the relation between
cognition and normativity see Gadamer (1975) pp. 324-341.
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The thesis will start with the analysis of the basic components of the employment
relation. This means that it starts with the questions of what is labour, what is its
relation to property and what is the role of this relation for the creation of the social
institutional order. Our guiding thread will be the antithetical ways this has been
understood by Locke and Hegel. The reason for this is that these two thinkers have
provided us with two opposing paradigms as to the understanding of employment; one
that puts emphasis on the result of labour as property and one that emphasises its
"X . r>
character as an attribute of the social self. And despite the opinion of theorists like
Chatelet and Pisier-Kouchner who have said the two paradigms are complementary
rather than opposed to each other as rational systems of authority in modernity4, we
are going to see that in what concerns employment they substantially differ both as to
their understanding of the relation and as to its normative regulation. In this respect
we will see that Locke's logic subsumes labour under property whereas Hegel's
although it does not deny it, subsumes it under the overarching control of the state.
This creates two different normative logics, crudely, the one focusing on the
economic dimension of employment, the other on its social dimension. It is for these
reasons that we focus on Locke and Hegel and not so much on Marx. Marx was
undoubtedly the greatest philosopher of labour in modernity. However, although
Marx building on Hegel was the first to advance the idea of labour as the most basic
element for the constitution of both man and society, he mainly focused his critique
on the issue of labour domination and its revolutionary overcoming. And it is exactly
because of this 'revolutionary overcoming' that this thesis will not discuss Marx
except in passing, as it locates its inquiry within capitalist property relations. We thus
look for a plausible understanding for the ambiguities and tensions of employment in
capitalism and not beyond. In this respect he provides us with a valuable instrument
of critique that sheds light into the ambiguities that the relation between labour and
property creates.
The analysis of these two models in the light of Marx's critique will show that
employment is a multileveled relation. It is a power relation that is based on the
domination of property over labour, a condition that suppresses the substance of
labour as a fundamental expression of human creativity and as a constitutive factor of
3 On the different logics of these two approach in what concerns the modern theory of the state see
Chatelet and Kouchner (1982) pp. 127-130.
4 Ibid. pp. 130-131.
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the social self. Under the paradigm of property and the logic of free exchange of
commodities as sanctioned by capitalist law, labour loses its intrinsic normative
significance. Despite the attempt of Hegel to preserve the integrity of the worker (it
should not be forgotten that it was Hegel the first who analysed the major significance
of labour for humanity) the logic of exchange that underlies the logic of capitalism
cannot possibly be overcome. Exchange in capitalism is exchange of equivalents.
Labour has to be equivalent to property, has to be interpreted in terms of property if it
is to be exchanged at all; and this is a condition that Hegel's safeguards could do
nothing about. However this relation of domination is also a relation of
interdependence in the sphere of permanence. This is why the paradigm of exchange
apart from generating oppression, is also reductive. First of all it assimilates
employment to a simple market transaction. In this respect not only does it disregard
its social character, not does assimilate it to market rationality, it erases its
characteristic as a relation between different principles that have to cooperate under
ambiguous terms under conditions of complexity. However, despite its subsumption
under the logic of exchange the social character of labour cannot be elided or negated.
What are these premises and how are domination and conflict conditioned by the fact
of the interdependence of the parties?
Interdependence is conditioned by the fact of continuous dependence. It is
conditioned by the dependence of property on labour in the act that domesticates
nature and makes it an object of domination and by the need of labour to subsist and
reproduce itself within the confines of a society that understands labour as an
intermediate between itself and the appropriation of externality. Conflict, domination
and interdependence are structural conditions of employment that cannot be grasped
by the reduction of employment to a relation of exchange. They eventually stem from
the substance of labour and as such cannot be elided by any normative paradigm.
They will always reappear as they belong to employment as a structural condition.
Employment as a relation of conflict and interdependence creates a legal impasse, a
relation that our legal concepts cannot contain and handle. It creates notions and
relations that do not fall within the abstractions of freedom and equality as the latter
provide the cornerstones of our legal culture.
The great paradigms of liberalism and welfarism that in a competing way
determine our understanding of employment focus only on certain aspects of the
relation. They do not aim at comprehending it in its complexity. However, as they
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provide us with the main definitions as to the content of employment as a legal
relation we have to address them in order to be able to overcome them.
For this in chapter two we will turn to the liberal tradition (ofwhich Locke is one
of the most prominent forefathers) and to its recent revival in neo-liberalism. There
we are going to address the development of the first strand of the perceptions of
employment in modernity, namely the one that understands it as a relation of
economic exchange. Liberalism is a not just an ideology. It is a deep-seated
perception that departs from the relation ofman to nature as one of domestication and
has as a result its commodification. Capitalism eventually wants to own nature so that
it can buy it and sell like any other commodity. In this respect the successors of the
early, radical liberalism provide us with a paradigm of employment that is based on a
series of abstractions that stem from a supposed rational primacy of the economic
orientation of social action. What I am going to argue is that this perception is based
on ideological assumptions that totally ignore the substance of employment as an
ambivalent relation. Neo-liberalism subsumes all social relations under the notion of
free, competitive exchange, as it perceives it as the primary vehicle of social
evolution. In this respect we have to deal with not merely a perception of employment
but more generally with a social perception that situates employment within a certain
social and anthropological understanding. What we are going to argue is that this
understanding is strongly ideological and morally unjust. The neo-liberal model of
employment not only disregards its ambivalence and the ambiguities and tensions that
it creates, it violently suppresses them. Under its precepts employment is solely a
market relation; its complexity is mis-recognised. Our final point will be that despite
its increasing influence this paradigm has to be rejected on the basis of the
unacceptable results that its nonnative approach creates.
After dealing with the strand of the liberal and neo-liberal currents of thought in
chapter two, in chapter three we will turn to a tradition that in the last instance derives
its legitimation from the same source that sees the State as the overarching principle
that encompasses in its rationality all social relations. Under this perception
employment is no longer perceived as a private economic relation between
individuals but is rather recognised as a relation of paramount social significance and
as such is placed under the legal aegis of the State. The welfare state did not try to
understand employment as a relation of domination and alter its character. What it
rather did, was to try through the medium of law to control its social consequences. In
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assessing the model we can say that the intervention of the welfare state while
undeniably beneficial to the improvement of the condition of the working class came
at the cost of suppressing the conflictual aspect of employment and of subjecting the
dynamics of social action as expressed through labour movements to the authority of
the State.
In the last chapter we deal with the way that these ambiguities and tensions and
these competing definitions and perceptions are expressed in the actual legal practice
of employment in modernity.
In this respect we deal with the social organisation of labour as expressed in the
paradigmatic fonn of the modern corporate phenomenon. Under the competing yet
complementary notions of contract and organisation we see employment as a relation
of conflict and interdependence between labour on the one hand and property and
technological knowledge on the other. In it we can see the ambivalence of
employment unfolding creating ambiguities and tensions as they are expressed not
just in the relation between property and labour but as they are translated in relations
between social forces, rationalities of action and discursive genres that compete on the
basis of the imperative of their cooperation. This relation creates an institutional
pattern that in a sense reproduces the structure of the relation not through the medium
of exchange but rather through the assumption of a rationality that is political in its
substance. This means that our suggestion does not offer a magic formula that its
application would solve the problems of employment. Instead we can unveil and
unfold these paradoxes and try to discover a normative approach that recognises their
multiplicity. An approach that socially conditions the aspect of property domination
over labour and finally allows the dynamics of the relation to express themselves and
not to be heteronomously determined by the authoritative definitions of organised
systems of power such as the market and the state.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE NATURE OF THE RELATION OF
EMPLOYMENT
Political economy starts from labour as the veritable soul of




The purpose of this chapter will be to explore the nature of the relation of
employment as it exists in modernity, try to demonstrate its ambivalent character and
eventually attempt to bring to the fore the underlying tensions and ambiguities that
this ambivalent character creates. In order to do this, we will first have to probe the
basic philosophical principles that provide the groundwork upon which the modern
understanding of labour is constructed.
Our first task will be to delineate the main components of the employment relation
as they exist in modernity. Through an analysis of the work of Locke and Hegel we
will look at how the concept of labour is constitutively linked to that of property in the
first instance, and in the second instance how it is mediated by the concept of the
contract of employment. As we are going to see this schema creates the groundwork
for the institutional development ofmodern societies.
The structure of this first chapter reflects the logic of these various conceptual
linkages. We begin by asking 'what is labour' with the aim of attempting to elucidate
its meaning as a human predicate and as a form of action that mediates the relation of
humanity to nature. Throughout this analysis we will be contrasting Locke with Hegel
but taking the latter as our main guiding point.
1
Marx p. (1977) p.85. The excerpt as all references to this particular work is from the 1844 economic
and political manuscripts. All references to this particular work are taken from Karl Marx Selected
Writings (ed.) D. McLellan (1977).
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After addressing the question of 'what is labour' we will return to Locke and see
how one of the most influential forefathers of the modern liberal understanding of
labour perceives its relation to property. Our main point will be that despite the fact
that it justifies property through labour, property eventually acquires moral primacy
over labour. The main consequence of this view is that labour becomes assimilated to
an object of the external world that exists in the service of property that from then on
has the right to command it. As a result of this we have the legitimacy of the
subjugation of labour to property. It should be stressed that we are not attempting to
analyse the historical evolution of the relation of property and labour. The point is of
interest to us only in what concerns the logical consequences of the early liberal
understanding of labour, since on the one hand it has been ever so influential to the
structure of the modern system of labour as it has provided the basis upon which the
predominant contemporary neo-liberal views on labour have been developed. We will
contrast this view of Locke's with Hegel's understanding of labour. And crucially we
will look at how the idea of the contract (of employment) mediates the constitutive
link between property and labour in both theories.
The reason for the analysis of the positions of these two great philosophers is that
in a sense they represent the basis upon which two divergent paradigms of the modern
understanding of labour and employment in modernity have developed. In a sense we
can say that Locke represents a liberal understanding of labour that eventually gives
primacy to its economic dimension, whereas Hegel represents an understanding of
labour that focuses on its social dimension without however, denying its economic
character.
It is only natural that our next step will be a brief detour through Marx to pick
up a point of critique. Given the momentous transformation that the emergence of
capitalism brought to the relation of humanity to its labour and the consequent
transformation in the social perception of labour, Marx's denunciation of the
dehumanisation of labour through its subsumption to the technical economic logic and
imperatives of capitalism remains hugely important.
In the last section of this chapter and building on the analysis of the above
mentioned theorists we will challenge the predominant in modernity understanding of
labour as an economic function and employment as an economic relation, susceptible
only to the rules of economic exchange. In this respect we will examine whether the
understanding of employment as a contractual exchange relation can capture the
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complexity of the mutually defining yet ambivalent relation between property and
labour. Our point against this particular approach will be that the economic perception
of labour and employment is one-dimensional and silences significant aspects of the
human and social dimension of labour.
What we are going to argue is that the relation of humanity to its labour is an
ontological condition that cannot be altered in its essence through the structure of the
capitalist system of labour. This is so since capitalism cannot circumvent labour's
essential human character. Capitalism may abstract labour in the form of raw
undifferentiated labour power that becomes an object external to the labourer but it
cannot eliminate the person of the labourer as the subject of labour from the economic
system. The ontological relation as it exists between man and labour may be muted in
capitalism but it cannot be abolished. The ambivalence remains alive and the
subsumption can never be complete. As we are going to see this dual character of
labour as an economic action and as a human and social creating force makes the
relation of employment a relation that is characterised by the constant conflict of two
interdependent parties. It is this ambivalent character as a relation of conflict and
interdependence that defines the character of employment in modernity. As we are
going to see we have a conflict that is conducted according to the diverging
rationalities that guide the parties in their respective strategies in reference to the
balance of power between them within the relation. The factor of interdependence
between the parties stems from the fact of the indispensability of each for the
successful pursuit of the interests of the other, a condition that cannot be transcended
within the horizon of capitalist property relations. Underlying this argument is the
urgent need to demonstrate that the employment relation is not an economic relation
of exchange but rather a political relation that is constantly negotiated between a
dominant and a dominated part.
1. Locke and the Early Liberal Approach on Labour
and Property
Our analysis will start by addressing the intellectual origins of the
liberal understanding of labour that became predominant in modernity. The
purpose will be to describe the basic concepts that underpin our modern
understanding of labour under the liberal paradigm. These concepts are those
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of property and labour and what is of great significance under the liberal
model is their mutually constitutive relationship.
The seminal work of liberal thought on the issue of the relation between property
and labour is the Second Treatise of Government by John Locke , a book that was
written when liberalism had the impetus of a radical and revolutionary movement that
was in intense conflict with the antiquated political and economic institutions of the
17lh and 18th century.
Locke in this book developed the basic premises upon which a liberal society
based on the protection of private property should be structured. Of course the whole
range of the issues that are dealt with in Locke's project far exceeds the narrow
confines of this thesis. For this reason our analysis will focus on Locke's work only in
what concerns the relation between the concepts that concern us here, namely
property and labour, as it is developed in the text of the Second Treatise .
For Locke the right of property upon things starts from the right of property to
one's own person. 'Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in his own person'4. The excerpt introduces the
principle of self-ownership that to a wide extend has provided the fundamental axiom
upon which the liberal theory of property and labour, both in its classic and modern
versions5 has been built. The content of the principle seems to be quite simple and
straightforward: The person has an inalienable right of property to itself. This is a
principle whose implications regarding its political and normative applications have
been proved extremely controversial and complicated6. It should however be stressed
that the principle of self-ownership is in a sense the founding concept of liberalism.
For our purposes it is important to stress that through it Locke states the position that
the integrity and inviolability of each one's person should be respected as of a matter
of natural law. On another level this principle expresses the right of the individual to
its self-determination. It is exactly this principle of self-ownership that leads Locke to
the second stage of his argument. ' The labour ofhis body and the work ofhis hands,
2 Locke (1980)
3 In other words we will not deal with Locke's theory of property per se but only in what it concerns
the justification ofproperty through labour.
4 Locke (1980) p. 10
5 For the influence of Locke's theory ofproperty on modern neo-liberalism, see particularly Nozik
(1974).
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Amongst others see particularly G. A. Cohen (1995), M. J. Sandel (1980) etc.
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we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left in it, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined it to
• • • • • 7
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property' . If we accept the
validity of the principle of self-ownership, then the logical content of the proposition
seems to transpire quite logically. I own myself, 1 own my body and therefore I own
whatever belongs to it, including its labour and its work. We will not linger here on
the distinction between labour and work, as it has been put forward by Hegel himself8
and brilliantly analysed by H. Arendt9. For the purpose of this thesis the terms work
and labour will be used as more or less interchangeable since our topic is not the
various forms of labouring activity in modernity and their nuances, but the legal
understanding of the employment relation. To return to Locke, what should be
mentioned at this point is that the notion that labour is an inseparable part of the self is
projected here in an unqualified manner. Locke here does not deploy an argument, he
states a fact. ' The labour of his body and the work of his hands are his\ For Locke
this assertion does not seem to be in need of further justification. The absoluteness of
the assertion and its strong connection to the principle of self-ownership makes one
say that for Locke my labour is not just mine, but as it is an inseparable annexation of
myself, it is me. The fundamental properties of the self are present in its labour. The
second proposition of the excerpt raises the issue of the acquisition of property by the
individual. How does the individual achieve this? Through the mixture of his labour
with external nature. Since in the action of labour the self is inseparably present then
the action of labour is the action of the self. In other words the individual through the
action of labour appropriates the thing from the state of nature where it originally
belongs, thus negating its alien and external character and makes it its own. In other
words through labour nature as externality loses its character as alien and becomes
domesticated. The thing through the action of labour upon it exists for the self. We
will return to this a bit later, but for the moment we will leave the famous text
continue exactly from where we left it ' ...It being by him removedfrom the common
state nature hath placed in it, it hath by its labour something annexed to it, that
excludes the common right of other men: for his labour being the unquestionable
property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined
7 Locke (1980) p. 19.
8
Hegel (1971) pp. 419- 438.
9 Arendt (1958) pp. 79-174.
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to, at least where there is enough and as good, left in common for others'10. The
assertions of this most famous passage that are of interest in our inquiry could be
summarised as follows:
We have already said that through labour the thing loses its character as alien
externality and becomes man's own. But my view is that in this sentence Locke
makes an even stronger suggestion. The annexation of labour to the thing not only
changes its character as external but additionally transposes it to another sphere,
namely the sphere of human power and control. It does not belong to nature anymore,
or to put it more strongly it is not just a thing of nature anymore, it is a thing that has
been transfonned through human praxis. It is under this perspective that the
tremendous transformative power of labour can be perceived. It is the power that
through the domestication of nature annuls its externality and annexes it to the human
world and makes it an object of value. In Locke's words: for it is labour indeed that
that puts the difference of value on everything'11. And he went on to say that of the
products of the earth that are useful to man the nine tenths were the effects of labour
12
immediately increasing the percentage to ninety-nine hundreds .
However as labour belongs to the self, the individual does not only extract the
thing from the state of nature, from the common right of all, it also excludes it from
the individual sphere of power of other men. In this instance we have the true
justification of property as private property. This extraction, this transformation does
not happen in the name of humanity in abstracto but for each human qua distinct
person. Property as a right belongs exclusively to the certain, distinguishable
individual that perfonns the act of labour upon the thing. Through the act of labour
the labourer introduces it to a sphere that is exclusively detennined by him.
Here we can see the results of the subsumption of labour under the notion of self-
ownership. Labour is always individual labour. As a part of the self it belongs only to
the self. It is a consequence of this understanding that we have the position that
everyone can exclude everyone else from the products of his labour, since labour
belongs only to the self.
though the things of the nature are given in common, yet man, by being
master ofhimselfand proprietor of his own person, and the actions of labour of it,
10 Locke (1980) p. 19
11 Locke (1980) p. 25.
12 Ibid.
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had still in himself the great foundation ofproperty; and that which made up the
great part ofwhat he applied to the support or comfort ofhis being, when invention
and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not
13
belong in common to others .'
In what concerns the 'exclusionary' dimension of the self, labour is the force that
externalises it and makes it visible and palpable for the other through the acquisition
and possession of property. In other words property provides the exclusionary sphere
of the self with a concrete character, since it is now delimited as an externally visible
area that covers the totality of the possessions of the self. Labour thus creates the third
dimension that completes the concept of Lockean property by conferring to it a social
meaning. This third dimension is what Locke describes as estate. The selfmay hold a
right to life and liberty but these rights exist in themselves. For Locke they are
considered as natural properties of the self as stemming from natural right. They are
negative determinations that delimit the sphere of the inviolability of the person as an
individual. Through the acquisition of estate the concept of property acquires a
positive determination that exists alongside the negative one. Acquisition demands an
action that comes from the individual actor; an action that as we have seen comes in
the form of labour. It is the way that property can be legitimately acquired that
delimits the legitimate sphere of action of the individual. This is so since property as
possession upon external things now also defines the limits of the sphere of legitimate
social interaction. The other cannot interfere with the sphere of power of the
individual that is externalised by his/her property rights upon objects and moreover
s/he cannot violate it. And this is not an abstract duty anymore that is oriented towards
the other as an abstract individual, but rather an imperative rule of social symbiosis. In
this sense property becomes a major normative concept, since it provides the rules
that guide interaction between individuals.
This approach has as a consequence a deep change in the understanding of the
relation between man and nature. Nature after labour is not undifferentiated; it does
not exist for the common use of everyone and becomes privatised. As a result the
relation between man and nature loses its immediacy and it is mediated by the
existence of property rights. The objects of nature have names of owners attached to
them and no longer exist as undifferentiated externality. The other cannot till a field
13 Locke (1980) p. 27
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that I have tilled, since through my labour it does not 'belong' to nature anymore. On
the contrary it belongs to my sphere of power and control and according to the logic
of ownership14. I have every right to exclude anybody from it. In other words the field
is not just a field anymore; it is somebody's field that is in the exclusive service of
his/her purposes. On another level we can see that labour has become the medium
through which the dividing line between the exclusionary sphere of power of the self
as this is expressed as power upon nature and the sphere of power of other individuals
is drawn. The importance and the original character of this sphere is emphasised by
the fact that the validity of property rights over external things does not depend upon
the recognition of others15. However, Locke did set some significant restrictions and
qualifications to property, restrictions and qualifications that stem from natural right
and relativise the absoluteness of the concept of property.
These limitations provide a very essential part of Locke's theory of property, as
they set its limits. However, as the point that is relevant to this thesis is the
justification of property through labour and not so much the extent of property in
Locke's theory we will very briefly address the most important of them.
The most important qualification for the acquisition of property is the condition of
improvement and the prohibition of spoilage. In my view it was the biblical notion of
man as caretaker of the earth combined with the Protestant ethic of frugality that
provides the background for the justification of this rule16. In Locke's own words: As
much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much
he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his
share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or to
destroy,]1. At first, the individual is only restrained by the limit that his/her
consumption sets. S/he can acquire as much as s/he can consume because otherwise
the goods of the earth that God has given to man in order to enjoy would be wasted. It
should be noted that as the prohibition is more theological and is not inspired by an
equalitarian notion of justice is that spoilage is completely disconnected with the size
18of property . Nonetheless, this assertion has as a very serious consequence. The other
has a right to the land that I have left unused. He can occupy it and make use of it.
14 On the connection between being and having see Simmel (1978) pp. 306-307. Also 'Possession
forms an extension ofego from which impulses extend to things'. Ibid p. 322.
15 Locke (1980) p. 21
16 See Tully, (1980) p.129.
17 Locke (1980) pp.20-21.
18 See Waldron (1988) p. 209.
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The property right in this case is lost. However, Locke attenuated the significance of
this proviso with the introduction of the money economy. According to Locke the
introduction ofmoney removes the probability of spoilage thus allowing the creation
of large landed properties by disconnecting it from the ability of one person to
cultivate the earth19. Money as a means of objectification of things as values totally
changes the meaning of property. Property becomes something measurable and
objectified through the use of money. It loses its character as a unique object and
becomes a thing that has is measured by its value in money. What money economies
have radically altered of the structure of property of the relation since money
safeguards and makes far more easily exchangeable the value of property20; property
can be converted to money, an objective measure of value and a flexible medium of
exchange that is not amenable to spoilage. When money occurs and the value of
property is safeguarded, then its economic use no longer depends directly on the
labour of the person using it, as it can keep its value without it, the prohibition of
spoilage loses its field of application. It is not the not only the deprivation of the other
from the means of subsistence that underlies the rule but the religious duty as derived
by the protestant ethic of frugality to avoid spoilage and waste.
Relative to the prohibition of spoilage and perhaps the cornerstone in Locke's
justification of property through the theological argument on the improvement of the
earth: For Locke the right of property not only transpires from self-ownership; it is a
divine duty that commands man to exploit and dominate the Earth21. 'God, when he
22
gave the world common to mankind, commanded man also to labour' . As we are
going to see self-ownership, appropriation and labour, in their mutual linkages, are
commanded as a duty by God.
Therefore, the notion of property is mediated by the existence of a divine duty.
God may have given the earth in common to all mankind but this only according to
certain qualifications. Humans may appropriate nature when by acting in accordance
to the divine command to 'subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life and
19 Locke (1980) P. 23, 27-28. See also Macpherson (1980) On the Introduction of the Second Treatise
of Government p. 17, Locke (1980) pp. 29-30.
20 For the transformation ofproperty through the use ofmoney see the classical analysis of Simmel in
Simmel (1978) especially pp 307-312.
21 On the influence of Protestantism on capitalist economy and politics among his other works see
Weber (1979).
22 Locke (1980) p. 21
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23therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour' . The common hold
of humanity upon nature is conditioned by the divine command to 'improve' the
earth. When someone through labour acquires property he does so in accordance with
the divine command, which of course can neither be tested by human reason nor be
defied by the human will. In Locke's words 'He that in obedience to this command
of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed it to somethins
that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without any injury
take from him '24. The other cannot question the validity of the divine command. The
right of property eventually rests on theological justification. Hence we can
understand the absolute character that Locke attributed to the concept. In this extract
we can see the connection of the divine command to the principle of self-ownership.
The other is excluded from what I have improved through work because the divine
command for the improvement of the earth although addressed to the collectivity of
men, can only be obeyed only by each individual separately. In other words the earth
was not given in common to humans as collective humanity. It was rather given to
those individuals of the collective humanity who in obedience to the divine command
accepted to improve the earth through their labour. The act of labour in obedience to
the divine command results to the acquisition of property. In other words, the person
who obeys the divine command for the improvement of the earth acquires property.
For Locke property is always individual property. His/her responsibility is directly
towards God; the relation is directly between the person and God. The limits of
responsibility are drawn by the principle of self-ownership. As the other owns
him/herself as a free individual and therefore has autonomy of action according to
his/her free will no one else can be held responsible for his actions. Consequently we
can see that in the excerpt the labour that annexes the land can be only individual
25
labour, because the self can have control only over its own labour . In Locke's own
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 In this respect we see another dimension in the relation between property and labour, which however
seems to me to be a somehow unclear. The human duty is to enjoy and improve the earth. How do
humans achieve this? Through their labour. What is the outcome of labour? The answer is property.
However, the duty of labour is not unqualified. Man does not have to labour for labour's sake, even if
as a duty it stems from a direct divine command. It has an aim to which labour is instrumental. Labour
has to result to the acquisition of property, which as a principle we may say it expresses the fulfilment
of the duty of the improvement and the enjoyment of the earth. Labour becomes the mere instrument
for the fulfilment of this duty. Its outcome and condition is property. From what we have discovered so
far we can say that for Locke labour is a part of the self through which it exerts its power upon external
nature thus delimiting its individual sphere ofpower and control.
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words: 'So that God by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate:
and the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on,
necessarily introduces private possessions''26.
27Relative to this are the provisions of sufficiency and the right to subsistence . The
right of sufficiency is based in the Lockean expression'...where there is as much and
as good left in common for others' and is based on natural law. These two rights are
far more highly contested as some interpreters of Locke do not accept their validity
and claim that the right of property when we come to the stage of civil society is
virtually absolute28, whereas others insist upon them and claim that not only they exist
but that they also create a series of rights such as the right to the surplus of the other
29, or the tolerance of the hungry who steal in order to subsist themselves as long as
there is as much and as good left for others.
However, as the debate on these issues far exceeds the limits of this thesis we
will avoid discussing it. What we can say here is that according to our opinion Locke
was a visionary of liberalism rather than a theoretician of capitalism. What is for sure
is that Locke's idea of property is one that is conditioned by the satisfaction of the
needs of others. Locke's vision was rather a fonn of agrarian, religious capitalism
with strong communitarian elements based on the small landed property rather than
the large scale, factory capitalism that emerged in the 19th century. It was no accident
that when he spoke about property he spoke about landed property. However, his
importance for the intellectual development of liberal capitalism lies in the fact that
through the notion of self-ownership and the justification of property through labour
he paved the way for the development of two of its main ideological foundations.
Having justified the category of property through the action of labour Locke goes
on to justify the liberal theory of civil society and the state based on the principle of
self-ownership and of the consequent ideal of the autonomous individual free will.
The society and the state according to Locke come to existence through a free
compact of individuals in order to protect their property30 that as we have seen
26 Locke (1980) P. 22.
27
. .men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and
such other things that nature affords for their subsistence.' Locke (1980) p. 18.
28 For example Macpherson holds the position that Locke's limitations on the acquisition of property
are eventually refuted by Locke himself (1962) pp. 203-221. For a similar but more moderate
approach see Waldron (1988) p. 209-218.
29 See Ascraft (1987) p. 127.
30 Locke (1980) p. 111.
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comprises life, liberty and estate. The state is a protective mechanism for civil society,
a construction with a specific role to play. As derivative, the state cannot expand its
jurisdiction beyond the limits that natural law through the founding act of the social
contract has established for it31. While not going into all the detail here, it must be
stressed is that they find their justificatory principle in the concept of property. For
Locke the state is created for the protection of property. Property (in the enlarged
perception of Locke which also includes the notions of what we would in modern
legal terminology describe as individual freedom and autonomy) is the ultimate moral
value that has to be protected by social institutions. An important point to be raised
here is the relation of the right of property to the institutions of civil society. Since
property is in the last instance derived through self-ownership via the medium of
labour it owes nothing to the state. It is a natural right that is not susceptible to
institutional determination and control32. What is interesting to be mentioned here, is
that this limitation of the power of the government and the attribution to the state with
the role of the protection of the well being of its citizens has as a consequence the
their right to rebel against a government that exceeds the limits of its power, becomes
arbitrary and tyrannical and proceeds to actions that gravely deteriorate the well being
of the people33.
It is now time to address the issue whether the Lockean view provides us with a
plausible ground for the understanding of labour and its connection to the self. My
view is that Locke has left a series of aspects of the relation underdetermined and
vague. Some of the questions that emerge in this respect are: Where does this concept
of self-ownership derive from? As far as we can tell self-ownership is not a condition
that existed throughout human history. It may seem to us as self-evident but actually it
was one of the most radical innovations of liberalism, a position that had a
tremendous influence on the modern political and legal culture34. And additionally:
On the basis of which arguments can I justify the claim that I own myself? Does not
the understanding of the self in terms of ownership reduce it to a mere object of
possession, namely to externality35? And further: Why are my labour and my work
mine? And why should my labour without any further qualification justify my
31 Locke (1980) pp. 70-75.
32 See Macpherson (1962) p. 221.
33 Locke (1980) pp. 110-116.
34 See next chapter.
35 See Cohen (1995) pp. 211-213.
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property right? The answers to these questions were not developed by Locke but
rather they were implied as logical facts stemming from the principle of self-
ownership as not in need of further clarification and justification. The indeterminacy
lies in the fact that although Locke justifies this schema in the last instance through
labour he leaves unanswered the most essential question, namely the question of what
labour is. Our point of view is that without valid answer to this question the relation
between property and labour will remain undetermined. Hence it is the issues that this
question poses that we are going to investigate next.
2. Hegel on Labour
For Hegel, writing the major part up of his work in the aftermath of the French
Revolution, in Germany that was in the centre of the Europe of the Napoleonic wars
the stake in analysing labour was altogether different from that of the puritan Locke
who wrote in a an altogether different era. However, although Locke preceded Hegel
for more than a hundred years he was describing a vision of a society that was about
to become industrialised, whereas Hegel although living in a society with strong
feudal elements that again was in the verge of industrialisation had an indirect
knowledge -albeit at a very early stage- of the effects of industrialisation at another
country. In this sense Hegel and Locke experienced very similar in some respects, yet
very different in some others, social, economical and political environments. However
and based on completely different traditions they arrived to very different conclusions
on the issue of the relation between property and labour.
For Hegel labour first and foremost is an inherent characteristic ofman and this is
why he first and foremost deals with the question 'what is labourV in the ontological
sense of the term. For Hegel it is this ontological character of labour that determines it
as a social, political and legal category. According to Hegel labour provides the
justification of the reality of the self in relation to itself, and on this basis he examines
its relation to the institutions of civil society. We will trace Hegel's contribution to the
modern understanding of labour mainly through his classical work 'The
Phenomenology ofSpirit' (1807)36. What we will try to do next is to give at this point
36 Of course has dealt with labour in many more of his texts. We choose here limitation the
Phenomenology as it is generally considered as the most authoritative work of Hegel in what concerns
labour.
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a brief account of Hegel's position on the issue of labour as it was expressed in his
development of the dialectic of self-consciousness, since it is from there that Hegel's
37dialectic development of the concept of labour starts .
2.1 Labour and the dialectic of self-consciousness
Let us cut in at the point where Hegel deals with the problem of the realisation
of the truth of the self namely, with the first form of self-consciousness and its
relation to the external world. Hegel terms this form of consciousness, desiring
consciousness. This is so because its relation to the objects of the external world is
mediated through the drive of desire.
Desiring consciousness views the world as something external, self-existent,
independent of it and moreover as opposed to it. For desiring consciousness, nature as
externality is pure negativity in the sense that it has to be annihilated upon its
encounter with the self in order for desire to be fulfilled. Desiring consciousness is a
consciousness of immediacy. It consumes the object towards which it is oriented in
the instance of its encounter. In this sense its relation to the objects of the external
world cannot be one of permanence, since for it the object is an object of immediate
consumption. Although desiring consciousness through consumption annihilates the
external object and does not thus allow self-consciousness to establish a permanent
38relation to the world, it provides it with the true certainty of the self . It provides it
with the feeling of being alive, with what Hegel described as the 'unadulterated
feeling of the self. In other words, for Hegel the negation of externality through the
satisfaction of desire provides the sentiment of the self39. Through the satisfaction of
desire the self acquires a feeling of certainty and consciousness a feeling of
permanence but not through its relation to the world but rather through its relation to
itself. As Kojeve has put it, desire creates a subjective reality40. In Hegelian
37
Hegel (1971) pp. 228-240. All references to the Phenomenology are taken from the eight impression
of J. B. Baillie's translation of the Phenomenology pp. 228-270.
38 For a similar account, which however tries to establish the beginning of economic exchange on the
immediate satisfaction of desire, see Simmel (1978) pp. 59-78.
39
Kojeve (1969) p. 4.
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terminology, desiring consciousness is a consciousness that is in-itself. In simple
tenns this means that it derives its identity from its relation to itself and not yet from
its relation to the other, to the beyond of it. In other words desiring consciousness is
an unrelated consciousness. Desire, although it provides the condition for the creation
of self-consciousness it cannot become self-consciousness without a relation of
permanence to the world. The desiring self derives its determination from itself as
desire and not from its permanent relation to externality. This is so since desire has as
its end its own fulfilment that as we have seen is instantaneous and negative.
According to Hegel this mode of being goes on in a generative repetitive cycle. By
this he meant that the relation of consciousness to nature is not differentiated through
the identity of the parties. This is so since the identity of self-consciousness is still
incomplete. The reason for this is that desiring self-consciousness is still in itself and
not for itself, it is not yet related to another self-consciousness, in other words it has
not yet been recognised as such by another self-consciousness. It exists as incomplete
in its dialectical unfolding. The term consciousness for-itself here means the identity
of the self through the realisation of its difference to the other. This means that it has
to attain an identity that it derives from its relation to the other. In other words it has
to stop being monological and unrelated and attain recognition of its identity. As a
result the self-consciousness that exists as generative and abstract consuming
consciousness has to be established in the sphere of permanence in its relation to the
world. It has to become permanently recognised by another identity. As H. G.
Gadamer has succinctly put it: 'But the experience which the self-consciousness of
desire inevitably has is, after all, that that alone which by self-negation can give it
self-consciousness, has to be self-consciousness itself. That means, however, that the
second self-consciousness is not only free to voluntarily confirm the self-
consciousness of the first, but also to deny recognition of it' 41 This need of self-
consciousness for recognition introduces us to the famous passage on the dialectic of
recognition better known as the dialectic of the master and the slave. The stake in this
dialectical stage of recognition is the passage from the simple certainty of the self to
the truth and freedom of the self. In other words truth and freedom can only come
through the relation to the other. According to Hegel, self-consciousness can be
attained and be for itself only by the recognition of desiring consciousness by another
40 Ibid.
4] Gadamer (1976) p. 62.
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desiring consciousness, only through a process of negation and domination that was
understood by him as the original ontological condition of recognition. In other
words, the quest for the achievement of true self-consciousness that is in-itself as well
as for-itself is a passage into a state of war where one consciousness subjugates the
other into its will and forces it to serve it. In this respect we have a dominating
consciousness, the one that belongs to the one that has prevailed in the struggle for
recognition, namely to the master, and a dominated consciousness that belongs to the
subjugated part of the struggle, namely the consciousness of the slave. From thereon
the consciousness of the slave does exist in itself as a servile consciousness. The
servile consciousness suffers from the peculiarity that although it is for itself it does
not exist for itself but only through the mediation of another, namely the master42. It
exists to provide for the needs of the master and in this respect it has total disregard
for its own self. But is the self-consciousness of the master a true and free self-
consciousness? According to Hegel it is not since it is not an independent self-
consciousness. First of all the recognition of the slave is not rewarding for the master
since it is the recognition of an inferior consciousness. But moreover, it cannot be for
itself since it has the need of the slave in order to relate to the world. The master
cannot establish an unmediated relation of permanence to the world by himself since
the slave provides for his needs that can only be satisfied through the mediation of the
external world. The slave mediates even the fulfilment of his desires. The master still
consumes what the slave produces for him. The master has no true and immediate
relation to the world. In a sense he is still driven by desire although in a mediated
form since desire is satisfied not through the negation of externality but rather through
the consumption of the products of the slave's labour. The master produces nothing
stable outside of himself. As Kojeve has put it his enjoyment and his satisfaction are
purely subjective. They are of interest only to him; they have no objective reality. His
feeling of self-certainty, the feeling of the self that the satisfaction of desire confers 43
is provided through the relation of domination that he has with the slave. I would
suggest that we should understand the master's consciousness as pure domination that
exists in identity to itself. This means that the master cannot attain self-consciousness
since he is not free as he has a dependent self-consciousness. The determination of the
consciousness of the master is external since it is derived from the relation of
42
Kojeve (1969) p. 16
43 Ibid. p. 24.
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domination with the servant. On the contrary, the consciousness of the slave
according to Hegel is a superior self-consciousness for the following reasons: The
first is that that servile consciousness even if it is not for itself has to face the
contingencies that the powers of nature inflict upon it. Contrary to the master's the
slave's relation to the external nature is one of immediacy. The slave has to work in
order to provide for the needs of the master. This means that he has to battle with
nature since he is directly exposed to its power and to the threat of annihilation that it
imposes upon him. He is exposed to the experience of the fear of death as Hegel puts
it. And in sharp contrast to the master the slave is directly exposed to it. He has no one
to mediate between him and the experience of the external world as the master does.
The fear of death, this most lonely of all human experiences forces the individual to
retreat back to itself. In front of this most primordial of all sentiments the master and
his needs have no relevance44. The slave for the needs of this struggle against nature,
against annihilation, has to develop his abilities in order to survive. How does servile
consciousness achieve this? It is the answer to this question that now returns us to the
issue of labour. Originally labour is the activity forced upon servile consciousness as
the consequence of its defeat in the struggle for recognition. In simple words, the
slave has to work for the master. However labour is also the practice through which
servile consciousness experiences the world, the world that as we have seen is
threatening its existence and inflicts the threat of annihilation upon it. It is exactly
through work that the slave can negate the fear of death. Through work he subjugates
external nature and this not anymore in the immediate form of desire. His struggle
against nature has to endure in time because the threat of annihilation is permanent.
He cannot annihilate it through a single act of consumption, not even through multiple
acts of consumption. He has to establish a relation of permanence to the world in
which the feeling of fear can be overcome. And he achieves this through work. It is
exactly through this activity that the self can overcome the fear that nature imposes
upon him. Work subjugates and domesticates the same nature that is the source of this
fear. Through work consciousness learns to overcome this fear, since it learns how to
put the source of this fear i.e. nature under its control. The other dimension of
working consciousness is that it is a dialectically learning consciousness. It does not




through consumption but on the contrary it creates a permanent relation to it, since
work does not destroy the thing in order to consume it immediately but on the
contrary it shapes it, it forms it, it puts it in use for its own purposes. These purposes
demand of it to endure in time. It is a lasting relation to the things of the world in the
sphere of permanence. As Hegel has put it work is 'inhibited desire'. It is not
immediate and spontaneous as desiring consciousness was but on the contrary it is
reflexive. It has to lean back on itself in order to plan its strategies in its battle against
nature. Through the working process working consciousness develops its abilities that
now as we have seen are not in use for the master but for itself. It is in this sense that
through labour servile consciousness becomes a dialectically learning consciousness.
Knowledge becomes the dialectical outcome of the cultivation of ability through
labour. In other words working consciousness is a 'cunning' consciousness, the
consciousness of skill, knowledge and ability through the use of reason.
Through the working process servile consciousness overcomes itself and becomes
true self-consciousness that it is not only in itself but also for itself. It is freed both
from the domination of the master and from the fear of annihilation that nature
imposed upon it. As we have seen this emancipation is the outcome of the
development of the learning and formative ability that consciousness acquires through
labour. On another level the slave that has become a free man that can now relate to
other free men on the basis of equality and mutuality. In other words through labour
the social realm of freedom is opened up. We can understand now why Hegel
understood labour as something much more than the justification of property. For him
labour was the founding instance and the ontological groundwork of the self. We can
understand now that labour is something more than just a predicate of the self. It
rather inhabits the self as an inherent potentiality of it. Labour is expressed in the form
of a specific action that has a mediating function in its relation both to nature and to
other individuals.
The meaning of labour is now tied to the dialectic of recognition. Labour has
been revealed to us in the following dimensions: We have labour as an emancipatory
and constitutive force for the self, we have labour as an action through which the self
acquires knowledge, skill and ability in its confrontation with the world and finally we
have labour as the force through which the self establishes a permanent relation to the
world and other selves. Under this perspective we can see labour as an inherent
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characteristic of the self, as a constitutive element of universal individuality45 that has
a cognitive, a relational and moreover a formative dimension. It is this fonnative
dimension that in a sense provides us with the essence of labour as action. This is so
since labour does not only fonn nature through the consciousness of skill, ability and
knowledge it also provides the decisive dialectical step for the formation of the self as
a social being and from thereon the basis for the creation of social and political
symbiosis. Labour in Hegel's sense can be seen as what creates the social world
through the negation of the physical world, through the overcoming of the immediacy
of nature. It is this dimension of labour that we are going to examine next.
2.2 The Dialectic of self-consciousness and the system of social
labour
The self after its emancipation from its servitude can now (as a cunning
consciousness of ability) relate to nature and to the other self-consciousness as a free
person. The self after its emancipation from slavery is free to relate, to establish its
contact with the other on the basis of mutuality and pennanence. The first stage for
the creation of the institutions of human symbiosis has been attained. This practical
outcome is achieved due to the general character of labour as an ontological category
(every consciousness can be a consciousness of ability) and through the permanence
of the relation that it establishes to the world. In other words working consciousness is
a universal consciousness. It is upon this level of universality it is that the potential for
the social and political symbiosis is based. As Marx had commented in the Paris
manuscripts on the Phenomenology: 'He (.Hegel) conceives labour as the self-
confirming essence of man... Labour is the means by which man becomes himself
inside externalisation or as externalised man'46. It is exactly this externalisation that
makes humans social beings. Humanity is not just interiorised substance that is in
opposition to nature but rather consists in exactly this externality that as free
externality is in coexistence with other externalities47. Through labour the basis for
the creation of political society has been established.
45
Hegel pp.423-431.
46 Marx (1977) p.101.
47 On the concept of externality see infra.
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We should make clear that in his analysis Hegel never had in mind the liberation
of labour from capitalist domination. What Hegel had in mind was the pre-capitalist
non-alienated labour of the small independent craftsman-producer. His is not a
critique of capitalism; his schema, as it unfolds in the Phenomenology, is conceptual.
On the other hand one could say that it was Hegel's embeddedness in his historical
context that drove him into perceiving the historical struggle between feudal lords and
vassals as the original human condition. 'In his dialectic, he does not describe the
48
wage-worker, but principally the farmer and handworker in bondage' .
Hegel's aim was totally different than that of Marx. Hegel never sought the
social liberation of labour. In the Phenomenology his aim was the understanding of
the system of human knowledge. Labour concerned him primarily as a cognitive
category and only derivatively as a social and a political one. The main aim of Hegel
in this part of the Phenomenology is to give an account of the construction of the self.
The significance of labour for Hegel lies primarily in this. On the other hand the
conceptual construction of the self is effected through a relational dialectical process.
The self does not use labour monologically and in abstracto but in reference to its
relation to the other. Or to be more precise, for Hegel labour is what creates this
relation to otherness, which in the first instance takes the form of external nature and
in the second the form of the other self. It is the universal character of labour as a
category that provides the unity of the world through the development of the 'self-
consciousness of reason'49. Here lies the major social significance of labour as both a
creative and a cohesive factor of human society. This introduces us to the dimension
of labour as a social force. After the process of recognition, it is through labour that
the process of social exchange can be initiated. The self relates to the other self as one
free labourer to another. However, the relation now is one of equality and mutuality50.
The notion of civil society as a society that is based on the interaction of free working
persons finds its origin in the understanding of the human self as a free producer that
is recognised as such by other producers. We can see in this notion the formation of
one of the fundamental principles for the construction of the terms of the human
symbiosis on the institutional level. Hegel had understood that the origins of the
48 Gadamer (1976) p.73.
49 Ibid. p.72.
50 'Thus the relation ofreciprocal recognition, on which interaction is based, is brought under norms
by way of the institutionalisation ofthe reciprocity established as such in the exchange oftheproducts
oflabour Habermas (1973) p. 160.
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political institutions of bourgeois society could be found in the act of the free
exchange of the individual products of their labour. Ego recognises alter as equal in
the act of the exchange of products of labour and converge into the institutionalisation
of the relation of reciprocity and thus create the first form of political symbiosis51. It
is through labour that the ex-slave becomes the citizen. Moreover, labour is a
collective practice at many levels. Not only as it is practiced collectively and requires
52the combination of effort, skills and knowledge of many individuals (work usually
involves the cooperation of people) but moreover since as a practice it uses the
collective knowledge, experience, tradition and memory of a working community53 54.
For example, a worker makes a chair through his labour. However, in order to make
the chair he has to use the skills that s/he has learned from others and following a
design that was given to him either as someone else's creation or as the result of a
traditional pattern that has evolved by many creators through history.
Labour in this respect is not only one of the fundamental forces that create society
but moreover a form through which the knowledge and experience of a society are
reproduced as belonging not only to the individuals involved but to a society as a
whole55. Labour in this sense initiates and establishes history as the history of humans
that evolve and progress exactly through their labour56.
A short comment on the dialectic of the master and the slave is necessary at this
point. It should be stressed that in what concerns the dialectical relation of the master
and the slave the dimension of the social structure and of the social system of labour
enter only as a distant implied background that does not belong to the essence of the
relation between them. The stake of this relation is a cognitive one. It concerns the
conceptual construction of the self. The fact that through the dialectic of recognition
Hegel establishes the primary condition for the understanding of human relations, a
51 See ibid.
52 See section 5 of this chapter.
53 Marx (1976) p. 1024
54 We use the term working community here because this collective knowledge and experience does
not necessarily belong to any particular society. Particularly in our days this knowledge and experience
crosses national borders and is mostly reproduced through the actual development of a profession on a
global scale. For example we can imagine the medical profession as an international working
community where a doctor in the United Kingdom may benefit in his/her work from the experience and
knowledge of colleagues from all over the world. This working community has to do with the actual
practice of labour as it takes the universal form of a profession.




primary condition that is based on power and domination in this respect should be
seen as a derivative consequence of its main point.
I should also say that while I find more than insightful the dialectic of self-
consciousness and to the role that Hegel attributed to labour as the crucial instance for
the formation of the true self-consciousness, I am less comfortable with the
presupposition of a relation of domination as the prerequisite as an a priori condition
for the development of the dialectic of self-consciousness. Although some of Hegel's
commentators consider the stage of domination as an imperative condition of human
interaction57, I nonetheless agree with Gadamer when he says that Alter may deny
recognition to Ego, but it is not an imperative condition that it does. It can in fact be
maintained that the process of recognition between Ego and Alter has to come
through an a priori condition of domination. In the instance of recognition we do not
have a real ground of conflict for it to be so. Conflict cannot pre-exist the moment of
recognition. I agree with the interpretation of Hegel that asserts that work is the
decisive instance on the formation of true self consciousness, or as Heidegger has
said, of the objectification of the actual that gives rise to the experience of
subjectivity58, but I do not see why does this have to transpire through a dialectical
process of conflict, domination and emancipation. This position has more to do with
the dialectical understanding of the world by Hegel, his understanding of the
historical experience of evolution of the western world, rather than anything else59. It
has to do with the unfolding of the dialectical thought where concepts exist only as
stages that are to be 'sublated' into more developed conceptual stages. In this respect
it is the dialectical schema that imposes the pre-existence of the stage of domination
so that the latter through the mediation of labour can be dialectically sublated into the
more developed stage of emancipation.
From another point of view we can say that the problematic instance in this
dialectic schema is that the drive of negation as it exists between the desiring
consciousness and the external world has to exist as an imperative in the instance of
the meeting between ego and alter, between in other words two desiring
consciousness. The stake in the two instances is totally different. In the first case I
want through consumption to satisfy my desire. In the second case the stake is not the
57 See for example Kojeve (1969) pp. 10-16.
58
Heidegger (1993a) p.243.
59 For such an interpretation see Kojeve (1969) pp. 62-74.
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satisfaction of desire but the recognition of the self. It answers to the demand of the
simple consciousness to be recognised as such in its truth by others. Hegel has said
that simple consciousness is generative and perceives the existence of the objects of
the external world in the same way, namely as generative and abstract. In this way
consumption is annihilation of the undifferentiated other. However, the other self-
consciousness cannot be reduced to this existence of genus, even if it is yet only in
itself. The fact that it is in itself attributes it with the feeling of individuality, with 'the
unadulterated feeling of the self. It is an individuality even if not as yet recognised as
such. It is externality but not undifferentiated externality. As Habennas has correctly
remarked the other in his/her negativity cannot be perceived as an object. His/her
individuality as externality demands that s/he is perceived as an adversary rather than
an object60. In this respect what Hegel does is to transfer the stake of one relationship
i.e. desiring consciousness-external world, to a distinctly different, i.e., simple
consciousness-simple consciousness, in the instance of their encounter. Negativity
and annihilation is transfonned into adversity and domination. This is not to say that
the relation of recognition between ego and alter cannot pass through the dialectical
stage of domination. On the contrary, human history has taught us that it obviously
can. But this is a practical possibility and not a logical imperative.
What then remains of the dialectic of the master and the slave? Can we still
claim the fundamental link that it posits between labour and subjectivity? The answer
to this question is emphatically yes. The decisive instance here is the dialectic relation
between desiring consciousness and working consciousness, in its dimension as
formative consciousness. Nonetheless, this does not negate the fact that within the
relation of domination, the premises within which the dialectic of the master and the
slave operates are valid. They certainly are. But they do not describe the system of
social labour. As we have seen they have social and political implications but they are
not social and political themselves. Within their field of operation they give us
valuable insights into categories that are social and political and that in a conceptual
and analytical form. For example, the relation of domination is a social and political
relation but in Hegel is not given as such. It is rather given in its conceptual dialectic
fonn.
60
Habermas (1973) p. 163.
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Moreover one could say that Hegel's description is valid as we have said above
for agricultural or artisan work, but cannot apply to the modern division of labour
where the greater portion of the population is employed in the sector of services
where nature in Hegel's sense it is not present. However, it should not be forgotten
that Hegel's theory was that labour was the mediating factor in the relation between
man and externality and demonstrated the universal form of this relation. In this sense
externality is physical nature. The creativity of labour may have changed its field of
application but not its essence as a mediating action between humanity and its
externality. As S. Moscovici has debated61 nature is a category that is formed in a
dialectical relation with human action. Nature in this sense is a social category that is
not static but rather evolves in its interaction with its relation to humanity. Under this
understanding externality is both the social and the physical world with which
humanity interacts through labour. In this broadened concept of nature, labour and
technique play an even more important role, since through labour humanity interacts
with and eventually creates the environment it lives in. Therefore, the modern division
of labour and the fact that the majority of the workforce works in the services sector
does not alter the character of labour as an action that is the medium of the relation
between humanity and the formation of its externality. No one denies the importance
of the professional life as a most important element of the formation of personality. In
summarising and despite the major alterations that it has brought about, the character
of labour as such, as action that mediates the relation between humanity and
62
externality, as one of the 'essential traits of specifically human practice'' has not
changed in modernity.
As we are going to see further on, Hegel's dialectic of the master and the slave
paved the way for the development ofMarx's theory of labour. However, something
that both Hegel but more so Marx oversaw is while labour is a fundamental dimension
of the human personality it is not the only one, nor is it the dominant one. We cannot
attribute everything human to the labouring act. As J. Habermas, has shown, the
equally fundamental dimension of human interaction through communication does
not 'pass through' labour. It is an altogether different relation that does not have so
much to do with the relation of humanity to nature but with the relation of man to
man. In Habennas's words: 'Liberation from hunger and misery does not necessarily
61 Moscovici (1998) chapters one and two.
62 Gadamer (1981) P.75.
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converge with liberation from servitude and degradation, for there is no automatic
z: -5
developmental relation and interaction' . In other words labour is a fundamental
constitutive feature of the social self, but it is not the only one.
3. Locke and the Employment ofLabour
In the previous section we attempted an analysis of the phenomenon of labour
and we established the complexity and the multiplicity of it as an ontological,
cognitive, formative, practical and social category. We will now turn to the contract of
employment as it mediates the connection between property and labour; and with this
we shall return again to Locke64. We have said in section one that Locke was not
interested in an analytic of labour but rather approached it as an instrument for the
acquisition of property and thereupon as the basic legitimating principle for the
creation of the institutions of civil society. What we will see next is whether the
Lockean understanding of labour can grasp its multiplicity as a phenomenon.
We have said that in the Second Treatise of Government labour is given as a
datum. Unlike Hegel for Locke labour is not analysed as a fundamental predicate of
the self but rather it is given as its undifferentiated extension that mediates its
practical relation to the external world. When Locke says ' ...for his labour being the
unquestionable property of the labourer'65, is it because Locke understood the
inherent relation of labour to the self and considered it as an essential inseparable
characteristic of it? Or is this relation contingent and instrumental and has as its only
end the legitimate acquisition of property? In other words in the Lockean doctrine
does labour have any meaning outside property?
Let us pick up the thread again from Locke here. He says: '...Thus the grass my horse
has bit; the turfs my servant has cut and the ore that I have digged in any place,
where I have the right to them in common with others, become my property... the
labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath
63 Habermas (1973) p. 169. On the relation between labour and language see also Gadamer (1981) pp.
75-76.
64
Generally for the discussion of Locke on property see Waldron (1988) pp. 137-252. For a critique see
Macpherson (1978) pp.199-207and Macpherson (1985) 21-34 and 86-91.
65 Locke (1980) p. 19.
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fixed my property in them.' 66 What is of interest from this excerpt in respect to our
analysis is the action of the servant. The turfs that the servant cuts are not his
property, which he later exchanges with the master on the basis of free exchange, i.e.
in market terms, but they belong directly to the master. Any notion of a relation of
slavery by virtue of which the servant and therefore his labour belong to the master is
totally out of the question. Locke's expressed views on slavery totally rule this out67.
Moreover, the axiom of self-ownership that provides the basis of the whole
construction of Locke's theory is totally incompatible with any notion of slavery. For
Locke the principle of self-ownership is absolute and cannot be negated by anything.
The servant is a free labourer. However, here we have an insoluble problem. In
Locke's theory the person owns itself and consequently s/he owns whatever it mixes
its labour with. But here the servant's labour is mixed with something that comes to
be owned by the master. The servant owns himself but he does not seem to own his
labour since he cannot claim property on the things that he has extracted from the
state of nature. They belong to the master. Are not the principle of self-ownership and
the justification of property negated here? Why does not the servant's labour grant
him the right of property to the turfs that he has cut? The principle of self-ownership
and the notion that the labour is the unquestionable property of the labourer should
immediately grant him the right of property over them. How do we solve this
contradiction? The solution comes through the legal device of contract In this
schema there exists a tacit assumption that the servant has freely agreed to provide his
services to the master, where the latter extracts the products of the labour of the
former in exchange for wages. Through contract the servant sells his services to the
master in exchange for wages, thus conferring him with a temporary power over
68him/her that extends as far as the contract between them stipulates . The schema
should now read as follows: The servant as a free person owns his services since he
owns his labour and therefore he is free to dispose it in the best possible manner he
sees fit. There is no sign of coercion in the schema since the principle of self-
ownership in appearance at least is not violated. The servant as owner of himself
decides to expropriate his labour. Since it is his he can dispose of it in the best way he
considers appropriate for his self-interest. Neither his freedom nor his right of self-
66 Ibid p.20.
67 Ibid pp. 17-18.
68 Ibid. p. 45.
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ownership are negated. This at least stands before the conclusion of the contract.
Contract in this case must be seen as the legal device that has as its function the
regulation of the expropriation of labour. The question that emerges next is which is
the servant's relation to his labour after the conclusion of the contract? Does it still
belong to him? The answer that comes directly from the text is that it does not. He has
assigned it in the form not only of present but also of future action directly to the
master. And if the action through contract 'belongs' to the master so do the products.
Through this realisation we can perceive another dimension of the Lockean
perception of labour. In contrast to what Hegel maintained, for Locke labour has an
indeterminate character. It is not as the case was for Hegel a force through the use of
which humanity forms external reality according to its will and through this, forms the
social self, but on the contrary it becomes an alienable feature no longer inseparable
from the self. In other words the ontological link between labour and personality is
lost. As a result the justification of property through labour loses its coherence. If I
can expropriate my labour, if labour is not an inextricable part of myself that makes
whatever it mixes itself with mine, then the justification of property through self-
ownership no longer stands. It is no longer inherent to and inseparable from me, since
it can be alienated from me. The relation of the self to its labour loses its absolute
character. It can exist as distinct from the person. The assertion that labour is the
unquestionable property of the labourer loses not only its force as the justificatory
notion of property but also its inextricable connection to the self. The justification of
property is thus severed off from labour. Labour from there on loses its connection to
the principle of self-ownership and can be externalised and alienated from the self. In
this respect labour becomes a thing external to the self, a thing that can be
appropriated, manipulated and disposed of as every other thing of the external world.
As a result, it becomes groundless, contingent and hetero-determined by property.
It is in this respect that we can say that we have the emergence of the contract of
employment as the predominant form for the use of labour. Through contract labour
can be freely alienated from the labourer and be employed for someone else's
purposes. We will see the full implications of this when we examine in detail the
notion of the contract of employment but at this point the only comment that can be
made is that this understanding of labour and its eventual disassociation from property
underpins the development of the modern doctrine of labour as it is understood neo-
liberalism and its market expression of the economy. As we are going to see in
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chapter two this perception of labour provides the basis for the construction of the
modern capitalist system of social labour.
But we are moving too fast. Let me summarise the schema so far: We have a
problematic vacuum in regard to the justification of property. It is the passage by
Locke that betrays how problematic the relation between labour, property, and
contract is in modern societies. We can see both the justification of property through
labour but also the negation of this justification as it occurs through contract. In this
schema the temporal linearity that the modern liberal doctrine of property adheres to,
is turned on its head. Contract in what appears to be a linear and straightforward
relation between labour and property enters as an antecedent factor that radically
changes its character. I say antecedent because in the schema that we analysed about
the servant's labour, contract pre-exists the labouring action of the servant and
becomes the only determining factor in the relation between his labour and the right
of property that it creates. In this respect the relation between self-ownership, labour
and property loses its primordial justificatory character. Property is no longer a logical
outcome of labour that stems from the concept of self-ownership. It is rather the
outcome of a prior agreement between a master and a servant, or in modern terms
between an employer and an employee that on the basis of a contract decide the price
for the assimilation of the servant's labour to the master's property. This is so since
contract not only justifies the master's property right on the servant's work, it totally
assimilates it to his own. The servant's and the master's labour are legally perceived
as one and the same thing. In this respect the justification of property as it was
originally expressed by Locke totally changes its meaning. The original maxim should
now read: The labour ofhis body the work ofhis hands and the labour power he has
purchased through contract are properly his. The notion of the contract of
employment as the legal use of paid work for the purposes of its buyer in exchange
for a wage comes about for the first time69. At a second level and with a somewhat
far-fetched metaphor we can say that we have through the assimilation of labour we
have in a sense the assimilation of the self of the labourer to the person of the master.
The labourer exists through his work for the purposes of another...
We can see now how, labour loses its significance as the sole and immediate
justification of property. This does not mean that labour loses all of its importance in
69 For the difference between contractual employment and traditional forms of employment see next
chapter.
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the liberal doctrine of labour. As the legitimating instance of bourgeois society it
cannot. But labour now has become the distant legitimating factor of an abstract
original acquisition. This is so since any property right should actually be traced all
the way back to a first labouring act. The system of civil law regulates the legitimate
70transference of property rights mainly through inheritance and contract . For these
rights to be transferred they must have been legitimately acquired. And the primary
form of acquisition is labour. However, the original labouring act that creates the first
property right is lost somewhere in time. From the point of view of the legal
recognition of property rights the original act of possession through labour loses its
significance. If the property right has been legally recognised as valid then its source,
provided that it is a legitimate one, becomes legally irrelevant. In this sense labour has
a function as a legitimating source of property until its official legal recognition. From
that moment on property becomes independent of it. When in the sphere of contract
property meets labour it confronts it as a legal category that is totally independent of
it. From there on property becomes the dominant force in its legal relation to labour.
Property rights from now on are not derived through the property-holders labour but
on the contrary through the contract for the labour of their servants. The property right
that is going to be created through the servant's labour has already been fashioned in
advance by the contract between the master and the servant. Contract in this respect-
conceptually at least- becomes prior to property rights and prior to the category of
labour. In this respect we have the problematic feature in Locke's schema in the fact
that the exchange of property takes precedence over its acquisition. Whereas
originally at least, in the liberal doctrine labour is an extension of the self and prior to
any form of exchange, here becomes contingent, dependent on property and
determined by a prior act of exchange.
This position has as a result a moral hierarchisation in the relation between
property and labour. Property becomes a higher order value that takes precedence
over labour and retains the right to command it. As a result labour is not self-
sufficient. If we follow the logic of Locke, if labour is to have any meaning it has to
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For example Nozick holds that distributive patterns are just if a holding is acquired according to
principle of justice in acquisition. Any acquisition according to the principle ofjustice in transfer is
also just Nozick (1974) p. 151. In this respect justice eventually in acquisition comes to the observance
of a set of formal rules where the role of labour becomes attenuated just as a possible among others
form of just holding. We should forget property for the created thing goes to the buyer of labour power
and not to the labour him/herself.
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be reflected in the legal recognition of property rights upon things. Property rights no
longer need labour in order to achieve legal recognition.
In this respect, Locke inhabits a totally different world than the one of Hegel of
the Phenomenology. We can see now that for Locke labour is but a logical (but as we
have said not absolute) prerequisite for the intellectual and moral justification of
property. After property has been justified in the institutions of civil society, then
labour becomes redundant. As a result of this we have the political reversion of the
original relation. Labour in this respect functions as a conceptual pretext for the
justification of property. By the moment that property becomes conceptually justified,
the category of labour becomes sidelined and the concept of property, as an
established and moreover totally justified social ideal may unfold its full implications
in the political and economic discourse ofbourgeois society.
We can see now the Lockean relation of labour and property under a new light.
We have seen that Locke starts from labour in order to justify the institutional
arrangement of bourgeois society7'. We can now see that in reality the justification
follows the reverse path. It is not labour that determines what the institutional setting
of bourgeois society should be but rather the institutions of bourgeois society that
determine what labour is. The schema of the justification of property through the
metaphor of the state of nature loses its validity and it is turned on its head. In
bourgeois society labour is determined by contract and by the legal system of
protection of property rights and not the other way round as the legitimating schema
of property would have it. In other words the ideological sanctification of work ends
up in its practical denial. Again what needs to be stressed is that Locke here did not
have in mind the capitalist system of labour for the simple reason that it did not exist
at the time he was writing. On the contrary it describes one basic precondition for its
development, namely the subsumption of labour under the legal instrument of the
contract of exchange.
To conclude: we have seen some fundamental consequences of the Lockean
approach to the relation between property and labour. We could say that in Locke we
have the justification of a relation when the one aspect, namely property is dominant
and the other repressed. In the Lockean schema labour as a category exists for and
through property. Property determines labour by setting it in action for its own
71
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purposes. The instrument for this determination as we have said is contract. Contract
fundamentally transforms the relation by altering the terms of exchange. It is no
longer the products of labour that are being exchanged, but rather labour itself. It is
the principle of self-ownership, the assumption of the self in the logic of property that
allows the labourer freely to dispose his labour in any way that s/he sees appropriate.
However we have said that, as labour is the crucial element for the development the
free self, the act of exchange submits the labourer to the determination of property. In
other words, the result of the Lockean contract is firstly the domination of labour in
the person of the labourer and secondly its determination and assimilation by
property.
It is on these two issues that we are going to turn our attention next and we will
attempt to seek an answer in the way Hegel treated the issue of the integrity of labour
against the demands ofproperty.
4. Hegel and Employment as Exchange
Capitalism, as we have seen, had to put labour in action according to its own
perception of it and according to its own rationality: labour thus becomes a
phenomenon that is primarily determined by its market function. Labour relations are
from this point on market relations and are legally understood and regulated as
relations of exchange. What we will do now, with the help of Hegel - no longer of the
Phenomenology, but of the Philosophy of Right - is to query whether the legal
understanding of the labour as it expresses itself in the relation of employment can
preserve the integrity of labour in its dimension as a human creative force.
Labour, as we have argued with Hegel in the previous section, is not a thing. In
the first instance it is a potentiality that inhabits the being of the person and is an
essential constitutive factor in the construction of her/his personality. In the second
instance it is a form of action that establishes a relation of permanence on a first level
between man and nature and on a second level a relation between Ego and Alter as
social beings. As we saw, labour in principle cannot be exchanged in itself but only
the form of its product. If it is to be exchanged it is imperative that it acquires the
objective form of the thing. What we are going to attempt next is to see how legal
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philosophy tried to work its way around the problem by trying to balance between the
perception of employment as exchange and the personal integrity of the labourer.
To make this more intelligible let us return to Hegel and to another classical text
where he viewed the issue of labour from a quite different perspective than that of the
Phenomenology. In the Phenomenology ofMind (1807) what Hegel tried to establish
was the dialectical development of consciousness and its relation through knowledge
to the world. On the contrary in the Philosophy ofRight (1821)72 he tried to describe
the ethical foundations of legal rights, civil society and the state. In both these efforts
the idea of labour is of paramount importance albeit under a different perception and
with a different role. As we have seen in the Phenomenology Hegel does not deal
directly with the social system of labour but rather with the significance of the
practice of labour for the ontological construction of the self. The Phenomenology
does not operate within the sphere of the political even though as we have seen it
establishes the groundwork for the development of the political. In the case of the
analysis of labour in the Philosophy ofRight we are within civil society. It provides us
with an understanding of the system of social labour in its dialectically derived ethical
terms.
Hegel of course was not Marx. He was not a revolutionary. Moreover, the
authoritarian Prussia where he worked for most of his academic life although in the
very early beginning of industrialisation was a totally different society from the
liberal, industrialised Britain of the same period. This makes his understanding of
social labour even the more interesting since in a sense he tried to derive it from a
conceptual understanding of labour in its almost, but not-yet capitalist form. However,
we have to acknowledge the fact that although Hegel did not live in a society of
advanced industrialisation as Britain was at the time, he was not unaware of the
concept of a market-based economy. He perfectly understood bourgeois society and
its economic interrelation to private law . In other words he understood the
orientation of the legal to the emergent capitalist market economy and the dependence
of the latter on the institutional force of the legal. However, no one could possibly say
72
As the case was with the Phenomenology since the references to the text will be numerous and since
we will refer to paragraphs rather than to pages we will only mention here the specific edition where
they were taken from. The edition was the Elements of the Philosophy ofRight (1991) by the
Cambridge University Press.
73 Habermas (1973) p. 167.
37
that his thought was influenced by the concept of a market-based society as the case
was for his contemporary British liberals74.
Hegel's work is central for the modern understanding of labour because he has
talked about labour per se both in its phenomenological-human and its social-political
dimension. It is in a sense the Hegelian notion that man is the result of his labour that
paved the way for the development ofMarx's critique of capitalism. However, unlike
Marx, Hegel perceived labour in its conceptual rather in its socially concrete form.
For Hegel social relations have an overarching conceptual character that determines
their actual, concrete form. It was always a case of conceptual essence that
overdetermines the material form. Nonetheless, as a consequence of his conceptual
approach Hegel provides us with an understanding of the social role of labour as
influenced but not completely determined by capitalism.
Hegel's justification of property unlike Locke's did not come through labour.
Following a totally different path he derived it according to the following schema:
The first step for the legitimate acquisition of property is the taking of possession by
the self of an object of the external world through an act of free will. This means that
the act of possession is not enough by itself. It has to be accompanied by a certain
disposition of the will. First of all the will has to be free, namely not hetero-
determined in its volition towards the object and secondly it has to move towards the
thing with an appropriative intent. It has to want to make the thing its own. The thing
that before the act of its possession by the free will existed as a negative object in
itself, after the act of possession is possessed by the free will. The consequence of
possession is that the free will determines the external thing in its substance. This
determination of the substance of the thing takes place through the use of the thing.
Through use the will leaves its mark upon the thing that from this point on exists for
and through the free will, in other words it is subsumed in its sphere of power. Use is
an act that is externally expressed as the alteration, destruction or consumption of the
thing. The selfless nature of the thing is thereby revealed as it now takes its meaning
and substance from the individual will that possesses and uses it for its own purposes.
This is so, since the thing is according to Hegel something unfree, impersonal, and
74 For liberalism and the ideal of a market based society see next chapter.
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without rights. The thing is not an end in itself and therefore has no subjectivity (§42
of the Philosophy of Right)75.
After having clarified this we should return to the main line of our analysis. The
conclusive justification of property for Hegel where the above-developed doctrine is
summarised is found in § 61 of the Philosophy ofRight:
Since the substance of the thing for itself, which is my property, is its
externality, i.e. its non-substantiality - for in relation to me, is not an end in itself -
and since this realised externality is the use or employment to which I subject it, it
follows that the whole use of employment of it is the thing in its entirety. Thus ifI
have the whole use of the thing, I am its owner; and beyond the whole extend of its
use, nothing remains ofthe thing which could be theproperty ofsomeone else.
Further into the text Hegel makes a sharp contradistinction between property and
the mere partial and temporary use of the thing, the latter defined as that which does
not touch the substance of the thing (§ 61 & 62)7 . This distinction is of vital
importance to us since as we are going to see further on, Hegel uses it in order to
justify the contract of employment.
What is important for us to keep at this stage is that property is first and foremost
determined by an act of the free will, which has the ability to determine through
possession and use objects that originally are external and non-substantial in their
essence. In a sense we could say that for Hegel the right of property is eventually the
right of determination of externality by the self.
This determination takes place in two stages. In the first instance it takes place
within the sphere of personality where the free will approaches the thing with an
appropriative intent and in the second this intent acquires an externally visible form in
the act of possession and use of the thing. Neither the free will nor possession are
adequate by themselves to confer complete property upon the thing. They are
75 A vital clarification should be made at this point to what it concerns the concept of externality.
Externality can mean as we have seen both in the Phenomenology but also here the undifferentiated
natural sphere that is opposed to man as something that exists on its on account. It is in this sense that
externality is something that has no subjectivity at all. However, externality as we have seen at the end
of section 2.2. can also mean the sphere of interaction of free individuals on the basis of their identity.
In other words the interaction of individuals who are in themselves as well as for themselves. It means
the sphere of social interaction and communication. In this respect we can see the two different
meanings of externality as stages of the same dialectical process. Through labour externality is negated
as the negative existing in itself otherness and becomes a space that derives its determination from
human interaction. In this respect when we talk of property we will use externality in the first sense
whereas when we speak of human interaction in the second.
76 This distinction can also describe the distinction between freehold and leasehold property.
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complementary stages of the same process. The one stage is internally oriented and
expresses the volition of the will for the acquisition of property and the second brings
the thing within the sphere of power of the self. In another sense the act of possession
communicates the volition of the tree will to the others as it removes the thing from
their respective sphere of power77. As Hegel himself has noted in the addition to §61:
A force exists only in so far as it manifests itself
However another qualification is introduced here in what concerns the
acquisition of property. Hegel states that a person is the owner of the thing only if s/he
has the whole use of it. What this means is that property means the full determination
of the thing by the person. A person cannot be the owner of the thing if s/he partially
determines it. In this case we can have use of the thing or even some other legal right
upon it, but not the right of ownership. In view of this I do not believe that we should
view the difference between ownership and use as a mere quantitative difference of
degree but rather as one of substantial as opposed to partial determination. In other
words, the difference between ownership and use should be seen as a difference of
substance and not as difference of quantity. We will see the relevance of this when we
deal with the contract of employment.
Under this perspective externality acquires a new meaning. It is not only the
sphere of the external world as we have seen it in the Phenomenology. Here
externality has lost the 'mystical' character that it had there. It is no longer the
negative unknown that is the source of dangers and fears for the self. On the contrary
nature here has been domesticated and externality now means the sphere of the world
of objects, which is non-substantial in itself and most of all hetero-determined by
humans. The thing now is not what it was before; the use of the thing now determines
what the thing is. It does not have a substance of itself, but it derives it from the will
through and for which it now exists. It is the purpose of the will towards the thing as it
expressed through its use that determines the substance of the latter as a tool,
instrument, object for consumption, object of artistic pleasure etc. As Hegel has said
the 'whole use or employment ofthe thing is the thins in its entirety'.
Therefore, we could say that for Hegel property can be understood as the right of
the free will to determine the substance of things for itself. Determination in this
77 We can see the complementary character of the free will and possession in the case of the mere use
of the thing. Hegel in §62 he suggests that an interpretation like ours can be valid. This is so since he
states that use without being complemented by a free will that wants to appropriate the thing cannot
confer property rights upon it. The reference that Hegel makes in §62 suggests this understanding.
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respect means that the self has the ability to put the thing in its immediate and
absolute sphere of individual power. The sphere of individual power here as the case
was with in Locke is exclusionary. It is always an individual sphere; however, and
this is of vital importance to our argument, as we are going to see further on, for
Hegel unlike the case was for Locke, this sphere is socially determined.
But as we all know the legal concept of property in modernity derives its basic
meaning not only from the right of alteration, destruction or consumption of the thing
but mostly from the right of the owner to the alienation of the thing. This is so, since
property now exists as a legal concept within the free market that is a social and
economic space that operates through the exchange of property rights. In other words
through the emergence of a market economy the social meaning and importance of
the concept of property lies not only in the enjoyment of the thing by the owner but
also upon the possibility of its exchangeability. In a free market economy things
should be able to circulate freely. Therefore the rules for the legal alienation of things
are of paramount importance.
On the subject of alienation of property in § 65 of the Philosophy of Right Hegel
says the following:
'It is possible for me to alienate my property, for it is mine only in so far I
embody my will in it. Thus I may abandon as ownerless anything belonging to me or
to make it over to the will ofsomeone else as possession-but only insofar the thing is
external in natureIn this passage we see the limitation of the right of property as
previously set by Hegel being reiterated here albeit in a less determined fonn. The
qualification of the thing being external in nature determines the boundary between
the self and its externality. In a similar vein as Locke Hegel here is not only
determining the ambit of the legal right of property and of its alienation, but rather
delineates the sphere of the self and what is inherent to it and as a result inalienable in
its substance. A sharp contradistinction is therefore made between the sphere of
inalienability of the self and the sphere of externality, where the latter is determined
by the free will and is therefore susceptible to its power. As the case was in Locke
Hegel draws a sharp line between the human and the natural. Whereas the fonner is
inalienable in its integrity the latter is always potentially an object of property.
However, the object of property not only has to be external to the human but it has to
be external in nature as well. As a result humanity as externality is clearly put out of
the ambit of property, since the object has to be by nature external, it has to be in its
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origins non-substantial in order to be alienated. In this respect as the case was in
Locke the concept of property and consequently the act of its alienation can be valid
70
only to what is related to objective corporeal externality . To summarise this: the self
is inalienable and respected as such but whatever does not belong to the concept of
the self in principle is not.
From there Hegel goes on to continue in § 66:
'Those goods, or rather substantial determinations, which constitute my own
distinct personality and the universal essence of my self-consciousness are
therefore inalienable, and my right to them imperceptible. They include my
personality in general, my universal freedom ofwill, ethical life, and religion.' Here
a sharp distinction is made: Property rights cannot possibly extend either to the person
itself or to any of its constituent characteristics.
Before we proceed to the analysis of the excerpt at this point a comment should
be made. Impliedly Hegel draws a distinction, a distinction that is going to guide us
through our whole effort to analyse his understanding of the relation of property and
labour. We have already seen that Hegel distinguishes between a sphere of personality
that is autonomous and self-determined, a sphere that belongs to the self and is
integral to it, and nature as the objective world that can be domesticated by the human
will. Although we have not encountered it yet it should be said that the idea that
underlines this notion is that of subjectivity, that can be established on the basis of the
social recognition of this individual sphere of power and a sphere of domesticated
externality that is nameless and mute and can derive a meaning only through the
determining action of the human free will. This means that the self of the other also
creates this individual sphere of power for him/herself that has to be absolutely
respected in its integrity. The violation of this sphere ensues in domination. The
freedom and the integrity of the personality as it exists in the doctrine of abstract right
is an absolute presupposition for the next dialectical step that Hegel's builds on
abstract right; that is the moral point of view where the will that in this sphere of
inviolability that we have described exists in itself becomes for itself; something that
'sublates' the person into a subject (§ 105). On the practical level the political and
legal dimension of the notion of subjectivity demands the inviolability of the person if
7S
There is a differentiation to what it concerns property upon products of the intellect, or what in our
terminology would call intellectual property rights. However, even in this case the products of the
human intellect have to acquire an objective external form. See Hegel § 68 of the Philosophy ofRight.
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it is to have any meaning. It should be stressed that at this point we only have the
foundations of the concept of subjectivity. The relation of subjectivity to labour has
already occupied us in Locke and is going to occupy us again further down in this
chapter where are going to analyse it in its full implications. So for the time being we
will leave the issue pending having just introduced it here.
In this excerpt Hegel does not simply describe human personality as inalienable
but moreover he defines what dialectically constitutes the individuality of the
personality as inalienable. This is so since for Hegel the characteristics of the
personality are not just static contingent attributes. Even more than predicates they
rather are constituent conceptual stages that through a dialectical process form the
personality. They are as Hegel put it substantial determinations that constitute the
essence of the person. If such characteristics were alienable then the personality
would be groundless and contingent. The dialectic of self-consciousness would be
incomplete in its outcome. But it was Hegel himself who taught us that labour not
only belongs to the essence of personality, not only belongs to the essence of self-
consciousness it rather is its most fundamental, its most essential constitutive part.
Therefore since labour as a constituent part of self-consciousness, is inherently
inalienable from the self, it should be placed outside the gambit of what can be the
object of property and exchange. It 'belongs' to the core of the inalienable sphere of
personality. The Hegelian analysis shows us that labour cannot be understood through
the logic of property. The principle of self-ownership receives a firm rebuttal here.
Property as a concept is valid only for things of corporeal externality and not in what
concerns the personality. The relation of the self to itself is - as the dialectic of self-
consciousness has shown us - an ontological condition and as such it evades the logic
of the appropriation of externality of nature by man. In other words labour is a
constituent part of the self it does not belong to the self as if it was the possession of
something external. For Hegel man is his labour he does not posses his labour and as
such he cannot prima facie exchange it.
On the subject, Hegel goes on to say in §67.
'7 can alienate individualproducts ofmyparticularphysical and mental skills and
active capabilities to someone else and allow him to use them for a limited period,
because, provided they are subject to this limitation, they acquire an external
relationship to my totality and universality. By alienating the whole ofmy time, as
made concrete through work, and the totality ofmy production, I would be making
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the substantial quality of the latter, i.e. my universal activity and my actuality or
personality itself into someone else'sproperty.'
It is the same distinction as discussed above (§61) between the substance of the
thing and its use; just as use is distinct from the substance only in so far as it is
limited, so does the use ofmy powers differ from the powers themselves and also
from me-only in so far as it is quantitatively limited.'
In this excerpt Hegel tries to set the limits within which the system of social
labour does not violate the freedom and the integrity of the individual worker. After
having defined property as the whole use of the external thing in its totality and
substantiality in contradistinction to its mere use that does not touch the substance of
the thing (§ 61 of the Philosophy of Right), in this paragraph he suggests that such a
distinction can be valid for the expropriation of someone's labour. Here Hegel draws
an analogy between the mere limited use of the external thing that does not determine
it in its substance and the mere limited use of the person's labour that does not
determine it in its substance either. As we have seen it is the determination of the
substance of the thing by the free will that eventually makes it an object of property.
We have seen that property upon the thing has as consequence its existence according
to the purposes and needs of the will. This hetero-detenriination would relegate the
person of the worker to an external object that as we have seen is 'something unfree,
impersonal and without rights' (§42). On the other hand the ground of this particular
analogy makes somewhat obvious (and in spite of what Hegel said in the
Phenomenology) that the intellectual treatment of labour here, is one that does not
differentiate it in its essence from a thing. Labour (but not the labourer) becomes here
something that could be treated as a thing since it is perceived by Hegel with the same
rationality as the conceptual determination of the concept of property. As a result the
integrity of labour is endangered.
On the other hand we can see that Hegel in drawing this analogy tries to protect
labour in the person of the labourer from hetero-determination and therefore from its
relegation to an external object that can be the object of a property right. The
argument that Hegel deploys here is twofold: On the one hand he states that the
worker can alienate individual products of his/her skills and abilities without having
the integrity of his/her personality violated. In this case the person exchanges the
products of its skills, as they are the outcome of its work and hence an expression of
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his/her personality79. We can see no violation of the personality of the worker here
since what s/he exchanges (in the fonn of the product of labour as it takes the form of
an object) is indeed external from the person. The other strand of the argument has to
do with the time limitation of the use of the skills and abilities of the worker. Here the
analogy drawn is quite mechanistic in a sense. Hegel recognises that a person by
alienating the whole of his/her time as made concrete through work, and the totality of
his/her production, would be making his/her universal activity and his/her personality
into someone else's property. This difference for Hegel makes a contradistinction
between the ownership (and hence the hetero-determination) of labour and its mere
use. This limitation can be seen as inadequate on the following grounds: First of all as
it has been explained the difference between ownership and use of a thing has not to
do with the degree of its use but rather with the determination of its substance. If the
free will detennines the substance of the thing then it is its owner. If it does not, but
nonetheless uses it, it may have some legal right upon it but not that of ownership. In
our case the essential element that decides the fate of labour is the source of the
determination of what it is. If this is decided by the free will of the labourer then the
labourer has not lost control over it. Labour has not become external to him/her and
the labourer has not lost anything from her/himself. S/he is free. If it is decided by
another will, then s/he is not. The time limitation is not decisive.
In a sense we could say that what we have in this paragraph we have the
introduction of the idea that labour can be alienated from the labourer. The relation of
the self to its labour now becomes uncertain. Labour is still the inherent formative
force of the self but from now on it stands in an ambiguous position in relation to it.
What Hegel had to battle with was the exactly the fact that labour in capitalism exists
under ambiguous premises. On the one hand it has to be separated from the labourer
so that it can be put in use by the emerging capitalist industry80 and on the other it has
to be inherent to and inseparable from the labourer since s/he is the latter that as the
free subject-citizen creates the social-institutional realm of freedom. What we have
discovered in this passage is the antithesis between the use and the substance of
79 Gadamer (1976) p.71
80 Here we can see the pure conceptuality ofHegel's thought being tainted by the demands of
bourgeois society.
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labour an antithesis that as we are going to see later in the thesis stems right from the
81
nature of labour in capitalism .
This brings us directly to the issue of the exchange of labour and hence to the
issue of contract. Hegel says in § 71 of the Philosophy of Right:
Existence, as determinate being, is essentially beingfor another. Property, in view
of its existence as an external thing, exists for other external things and within the
context of their necessity and contingency. But as the existence of the will, its
existence for another can only be for the will ofanother person. This relation ofwill
to will is the true distinctive ground in which freedom has its existence. This
mediation whereby I no longer own property merely by means of a thing and my
subjective will, but also by means ofanother will and hence within the context of a
common will, constitutes the sphere ofcontract.'
In the remarks to this paragraph Hegel goes on to say:
' Contract presupposes that the contracting parties recognise each other as persons
and owners ofproperty; and since it is a relationship of objective spirit, the moment
ofrecognition is already contained andpresupposed in it.'
In this excerpt we can see the connection between the Phenomenology and the
Philosophy ofRight. What is of significance here is the transposition of the relation of
recognition from the pre-social cognitive sphere into the system of abstract right-
private law. In the case of contract a process of recognition that makes property rights
sl An important clarification should be made at this point. Hegel in an addition to §67 says that the
difference that is introduced in the above mentioned paragraph expresses the difference between a
modern day labourer and a slave, since for the latter 'the entire scope ofhis activity had been alienated
to his master.' I consider that the difference runs far deeper than this. In the first instance and by using
Lockean terms we could say that slavery is the negation of self-ownership. In slavery the power of the
master does not only rest upon his property upon the abilities and the skills of the person of the slave, it
extends to the bodily existence of the slave. For example, in Roman law the slave was a res, an external
corporeal thing that could be the object of ownership like any other object. The slave had no
personality. S/he was considered as human only in the biological and not in the social sense. Through
submission to the condition ofbondage the slave was considered to have lost, to have been deprived of
an essential part of his/her humanity. See Aristotle (1946) pp. 9-18. In other words the relation of
slavery affects the humanity of the slave in a far more fundamental way than the complete
appropriation of his/her skills, abilities and time. In the case ofwage labour the situation is quite
different. The relation is established through an act of consent on the part of the labourer. The free will
of the labourer is not negated. Additionally, the employer has no right over the employee's body. The
free worker in no way loses his/her legal personality. It should however be made clear that we are not
interested here in finding similarities and differences between wage labour and slave labour. This is not
within the purpose of our enquiry. What we are merely saying is that the differences are far deeper and
far more essential than the one that Hegel has described. This allows us to avoid future
misunderstandings about the nature of generalised wage labour. It should be made clear that it cannot at
any point be claimed that wage labour has any similarity to slave labour. The prevalence of the system
ofwage labour in modernity and the establishment of the system of civil rights makes such
comparisons pointless and even nonsensical.
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socially valid takes place. However, recognition here has a distinctly different
meaning than in the Phenomenology. Within this context the process of recognition
between Ego and Alter takes place not as desiring consciousness to desiring
consciousness with the aim of attaining self-consciousness but rather as property right
holder to property right holder with the aim of attaining political subjectivity.
Similarly, as in the first case recognition presupposed the realisation of the identity of
the self through the other, in the second subjectivity presupposes the recognition of
the identity of the person qua property right holder by the other. Exchange for Hegel
is conditioned by the presupposition of recognition. The requirement of recognition
however entails the rejection of property as an inseparable predicate of the pre-
socially existing self. Property as a concept and concrete property rights upon things
do not occur pre-socially as the case was for Locke, but only within an institutionally
organised society. For Hegel, in order for property to have a meaning within
bourgeois society it has to be recognised by another will82. From the moment that
property enters the realm of civil society it acquires an overarching social dimension
and hence an overarching social meaning that essentially detennines it as a social
institution rather than as an individual predicate. Property becomes a social and not an
individual category. It may still belong to the individual sphere of power, but the
crucial factor here is that this individual sphere of power now becomes valid not as a
natural but rather as a social fact. In other words, property means nothing before it is
recognised first as a valid social category and then as a specific legal right upon a
thing83.
82 On this issue Hegel is close to Fichte, who considered the right of property on a particular object as
valid only from the instance of its recognition by the other. Even the more so the validity of the
property right on the specific object for Fichte extends only to those who recognise it as such. See
Fichte (1970) pp. 182-183. It is interesting to mention at this point that Fichte makes a distinction
between the right to acquire property in general that is dependant on the formation of it and on its
subsequent subjection to the person's purposes and ends Ibid. pp. 166-167 and to the validity of the
property right on a specific thing that is dependant upon the recognition of other individuals. We only
mention this here since the science of Rights has been a major influence on the formation of the
Hegelian theory ofproperty.
83 We should not forget that in a society that functions on the basis of general and free exchange of
property rights, property would be meaningless if it was not protected by a general and abstract system
of rights that delimits the legal relation between property holders. Both the notions of exclusion and
exchange presuppose the presence of the other. Even the more so they presuppose the recognition of
the validity of the exclusionary zone of the personality and consequently of the validity of the property
right as this exists within this sphere of the personality. Without this, the property right that is received
in the act of exchange would be groundless. In this respect the introduction of the concept of the
common will in connection to the act of recognition of property rights allows us to see the social
significance of contract. This significance lies in the fact that through contract we have the emergence
of the understanding of civil society as a society that receives its coherence through the mutual
47
We can see now that for Hegel civil society is a condition of mutual recognition of
subjectivity, a subjectivity that is delineated not only by property but also by the fact
of its recognition as a bearer of legally recognised rights in the sphere of
determination of the common will. In this respect contract not only provides a
justification for the alienation of property but also the basis for the justification of the
concept of the legal person, which in its turn provides the basis for the justification of
contract. This is so since it is the legal person as property right holder that enters into
legal relations. In this respect we should see the legal person as a conceptual
abstraction84 that is determined as the subject of rights and duties in the sphere of the
determination of the common will. In other words the legal person derives its meaning
from its legal relations to others as these are recognised and perceived by this
common will. As a conclusion we could say that contract as a form of social contact
in the last instance has an overarching social function and determination.
To return to the issue of the contract in relation to labour we see that when Hegel
tries to define the different forms of contract, he classifies the contract of wages as a
form of the contract of exchange and by following the same reasoning; in §80 (B-3)
he gives the following definition: 'Wages contract; alienation of my output or
• ••• ••• •• 85services for a limited time or some other limiting condition.'
This description allows us to continue our analysis in reference to § 67 of the
Philosophy ofRight where the limits to what is exchangeable in what concerns labour
are drawn.
What is interesting in this case, is that Hegel seems to realise albeit indirectly that
the labour relation is not a straightforward case of exchange. It possesses certain
characteristics that make the imposition of the exchange paradigm problematic. The
concern that seems to come out of the text is that somehow the contract for wages
should be in general limited as a potential threat to the integrity of the personality of
the worker. Apart from the temporal use of labour, the phrase 'or some other limiting
condition'' leaves us with many questions. What could such a condition be? Is not the
limitation of time an adequate means for the preservation of the labourer's integrity?
When dealing with §67 we have seen that it is not. What we have said there was
that the substantial criterion is the right of the determination of labour. Ifwe conclude
recognition and exchange of property rights as products of labour. In summarising this we could say
that contract provides bourgeois civil society with its cohesion.
84 See for example Kelsen (1992) p. 48-49.
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Hegel in the end of the paragraph makes a direct reference to § 67.
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that through the contract of employment labour is actually hetero-determined then the
time or any other limitation whichever this might be is trivial. But before we proceed
to this we have to contextualise our analysis in reference to our findings in what
concerned §67.
The one thing that can be said with relative certainty at this point and having in
mind the comments that we made in relation to §67 is that Hegel realises that the
integrity of the worker is indeed threatened by an unqualified contract for wages. This
may be so since in this case we have an obvious contradiction between the
Phenomenology and the Philosophy ofRight. Ifwe accept the understanding of labour
in the Phenomenology, then labour as a constituent part of the self should by
definition be placed outside the sphere of exchange. Labour cannot be exchanged as a
force but only as embodied in its product. An agreement that would involve the
exchange of labour power as such should be totally unacceptable, as it would relegate
labour to a thing. A contract for wages could not therefore exist. However, if such a
position was to be upheld then the capitalist System of labour could not possibly exist
either. Hegel finds his way out of this paradox by making a sharp definitional
distinction. What the labourer alienates is not his/her mental and physical skills and
active capabilities but rather certain of their individual products and this only for a
limited period (§67). It is not the ability of the self to create what is being exchanged
but rather the product of this ability as it is externalised and embodied in the product
of labour. In this case the inviolability of the personality of the labourer is not
breached, since labour remains his/hers, in the sense that the activity is determined by
him/her. The question that emerges is how adequately this captures the modern
relation of employment. My point is that it does not. This description rather fits to a
modern legal understanding of the contract for the provision of services, particularly
as it applies to highly skilled, highly individualised professions. It preserves the
worker's integrity only to the extent that her/his skills are recognisable and
identifiable as hers/his. In other words, it can be valid only when the worker can
produce identifiably individual products. It cannot apply to a condition of
commodified labour for the individual ability should be reflected and identified in the
individual products. However, as we are going to see commodified labour is by
definition generative and abstract86. The worker does not exchange his/her product but
86 See the next section of this chapter.
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rather her/his undifferentiated and abstract labour power. Moreover Hegel's limitation
presupposes and demands the control of the working process by the worker. However,
as we have said the determination of the labouring act is done by the employer with
the employer having no control over the working process whatsoever87.
To return to our main line of enquiry our objection to the assertion of §67 is that
the limitation of the use of the labourer's skills by someone else does not alter the fact
that even for that limited period the labourer does not have control over his/her
abilities. The contract here is not for the individual product of someone's abilities but
rather for undifferentiated labour power. The worker does not contract for the
exchange of his/her product qua external created thing but rather puts his/her abilities
to the service of another person so that s/he can use them for his/her own purposes. In
this way s/he consigns her/his creative self to the control of someone else. The action
of the labourer, the employment of the labour power is not determined by the labourer
him/herself but by the employer. In this respect we have a loss in what concerns the
integrity and the free development of the employee's personality since this process as
we have seen is largely determined by the free expression of the creative force of
labour. Here this creative force is not freely expressed but rather mediated and
dominated by another will. The self for the worker is no longer 'for' itself but rather
'for' another. In this way the free will of the worker that for Hegel should be
inviolable in its expression by the act of exchange of its labour power is constrained.
We can see now that through the exchange of labour power we have as a consequence
the objectification of labour in the loss of the integrity of the personality of the
labourer. Labour from now acquires neither its meaning nor derives its substance
from itself, but rather through the detennination of another will. It no longer serves its
own ends but rather it is put in use for the ends of someone else88. In other words it
attains the characteristics that Hegel himself has described as pertaining to a lifeless
external thing that is susceptible to hetero-determination. As a result of this, labour
belongs to this sphere of corporeal externality that as we have described above is
opposed to the power of the subjective free will and is susceptible to its power and
detennination. As the case was with the thing, now it is the subjective will of the
87 As we are going to see in the last chapter of this project the conflict for the control of the working
process is one of the most significant features ofmodern work organisations.
88
Although we are going to see in another part of the project that it does so indirectly. As we are going
to see a distinction should be made between the existence of the free will in the act and the motivation
of the act of the free will.
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capitalist employer that determines what labour is. The employer now has the power
to determine whether labour is creative, meaningful, repetitive or mundane. S/he
determines its substance as an activity. And above all s/he determines what the
labourer will do with his/her skills and abilities. In this sense we have a reversion of
the original relation of exchange. Instead of being the skills and abilities as reflected
in the object of labour that determine the content of exchange it is the process of
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exchange that determines the skills and abilities of the worker .
To return full circle to the main stream of our enquiry: The hetero-determination
of labour in capitalism albeit in a totally different dialectical level returns us to the
basic premises of the dialectic of the master and the slave. Through the generalised
system of employment we have a complete reversal of the premises of the dialectic of
the master and the slave but in this time within the confines of civil society. In the
first case the original condition of domination and inequality is reversed when the
slave is liberated by the original condition of domination through his labour. Labour
in the dialectic of self-consciousness is not only a formative force for the self and a
source of knowledge that mediates its relation to the external world; moreover, it is
the force that emancipates the slave from domination. In the second case within
bourgeois society we have an original relation of at least formal equality between
individuals through the general recognition of the status of the legal person for all.
However this condition is reversed when through the system of social labour we have
one will that is in the position to dominate another will. We can speak of domination
in this case because, as we have seen, the subjectivity of the one is detennined by the
other. The labourer is hetero-determined since one most crucial instance for the
formation of his/her personality, namely his/her labour power is hetero-determined.
What should be stressed at this point is that contract is not the source of the
alteration of the character of labour. It was the emergence of the capitalist economy
that was the cause of this transformation. The contract of employment in its present
form provides the legal justification of this new condition. Therefore, before we
proceed to the analysis of the perception of employment under the rule of the legally
mediated exchange we should address the nature and the condition of labour in
It should be mentioned, that through the time limitation Hegel introduced albeit in a rudimentary
form a vital distinction that has existed throughout modernity. This is the distinction between the
sphere of labouring activity that is hetero-determined and suppressive and the private sphere of the
individual that is autonomous and self-regulating. In other words the time limitation that Hegel
introduced expresses the fact that the person despite its subjection to the authoritative form of
employment preserves a sphere of freedom that extends beyond it.
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modernity. Capitalism brought about a fundamental change in the practice and
organisation of labour, a transformation that in late modernity still detennines the
essence of employment as exchange. As it is more than well known the thinker that
best described the transfonnation of labour and employment in capitalism is Marx.
Therefore in order to contextualise our findings so far in reference to the system of
social labour in modernity a brief account of the aspects of his work that are of
relevance to this thesis is absolutely essential.
5. Marx and the Commodification of Labour
As is well known Marx was deeply influenced in the development of his
philosophical system by Hegel. However, and although Marx was par excellence the
thinker that established the significance of labour as a most important form of human
practice, for him unlike as we hold in this thesis, work was the most fundamental
constitutive feature of the human self.
In his own words and in commenting on Hegel
'Therefore the greatness in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final product,
the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle, is on the
one hand that Hegel conceives of the self-creation of man as a process,
objectifiication as the loss of the object, as externalisation and the
transcendence ofthis externalisation. This means, therefore, that he grasps
the nature of labour and understands objective man, true, because real
man as the result ofhis own labour''0.
However, Hegel built on the universal character of labour as an essential trait of
human practice; as such labour exists as an inherent characteristic of the self. What
Hegel has shown is that labour belongs to humanity and exists as inseparable from the





For Marx, labour cannot be perceived outside history, it is inalienably linked to
historical expression. It is a universal condition of the species - being always caught
up in historical expression.
For Marx 'Work is the eternal natural condition ofhuman development ...Hence
the universal features of the labour process are independent of every specific social
development'9I. This means that the character of labour as a universal 'natural
condition of human development' transcends the confines of any particular historical
understanding of labour. In other words, labour as a creative force belongs to the
human species. However, labour as a natural human attribute receives its actual and
concrete form in an actual mode of production; its character may be transhistorical but
its expression is always historical.
The question then is in how is this character of labour realised within any actual
form of relations of production. The gigantic task that Marx assumed was to analyse
how the relation between man and labour is realised in the capitalist organisation of
production. What Marx eventually proved to us was that the capitalist treatment of
labour -its commodifcation- eventually ensued in the divestment of its power as a
creative force. In other words, what Marx showed to us was that capitalism through
the commodification of labour managed to put a price on something that by its nature
cannot be subsumed under the logic of price setting. It is the trace of commodification
that we are going to follow next.
We have seen in the previous sections that through the contract of employment
we have the first instance of the objectification of labour. Labour can be externalised
from its original 'owner' and be voluntarily exchanged per se and not in the form of
its product. The basic idea that underlies the schema of exchange is that labour in
capitalism is treated as if it was any other commodity that is freely exchangeable in
the market
On another level we can see that one of the most important contributions ofMarx
to the understanding of capitalism was the contradistinction between on the one hand
of the use value of an object and on the other its transformation to a commodity that is
economically determined and realised as an exchange value in circulation in the free
market92.
91 Marx (1976) p. 998.
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Amongst his other works see Marx (1976) pp. 125-177. Moreover and it is quite interesting, the
distinction between exchange and use value was not a discovery ofMarx. On the contrary it had been
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In what concerns our enquiry since labour itself has become a commodity it
exists not as a producer of objects that are of use to humanity but of commodities that
are exchanged for the benefit of their capitalist proprietor in the free market. Labour
for the labourer like every other commodity in capitalism is realised as exchange value.
This means that labour may exist as a use value for capitalist production (in the sense that
s/he has an actual function for the production of wealth) but for the labourer it is just an
exchange value since the wealth that is produces is realised as an object for the market
and as such is external to him/her93.
The main characteristic of the capitalist understanding of labour is its reduction
from a most important predicate of the self to an object of exchange. What we are
going to argue next is how through this transfonnation capitalism deprived labour of
its human-social character and subjected it to a logic that degraded it to a simple
object by attaching a price to it.
What should be stressed at this point is that our objection is not guided towards
the economic dimension of labour. Labour as the producer of social wealth94 will
always have an economic dimension attached to it. The degradation of labour is not a
result of economic action -such an assertion would contradict the nature of labour
itself, with Marx being the first to denounce any such position- but the use of labour
by the capitalist economic system. The problem with capitalism is that under capitalist
conditions the economic determination of labour under the guise of legally mediated
free exchange of property rights overdetermines its human-social character and
incorporates it in the rationality of the free market exchange.
Marx described this process under the notion of the subsumption of labour under
capital. Subsumption for Marx first of all exists as formal subsumption in the sense
that is the 'takeover by capital ofa mode of labour developed before the emergence of
capitalist relations,95. Fonnal subsumption in other words denotes the expansive
tendency of capitalism to absorb non-capitalist forms of labour and submit them to its
logic.
developed for the first time by Aristotle in his Politics [Afa xphmjg as distinctfrom afa avTcMaytjg).
This apparent 'similarity' in my view has mostly to do with the development of a capitalist form of
economy in ancient Athens based primarily on maritime trade and then on the development of a
sophisticated system of banking operating under capitalistic rationality. On capitalist modes of
production in non capitalist societies see Marx (1976) p. 1022-1023 f.
93 Marx (1973) p. 305-306.
94
Hegel (1971) p.520.
95 Mara (1976) p. 1021.
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The complementary process of fonnal subsumption is what Marx has termed as
real subsumption. The term denotes the intensification of the capitalist relations of
production i.e. the intensification of the domination of capital over labour. As Hardt
and Negri have commented, the process of the real subsumption does not rely on the
outside (namely in non-capitalist forms of existence of labour) and does not involve
the same process of expansion. ' Through the real subsumption the integration of
labour into capital becomes more intensive than extensive and society is even more
completely fashioned by capital'96.
Capitalism expands and subsumes labour into its own logic both extensively and
intensively. But how do these two complementary processes transform labour?
My point is that it is exactly the detennination of labour by capital under the
capitalist organisation of production -the paradigmatic form of it being the capitalist
factory- that is the cause of the transformation of the specificity of labour into abstract
labour. As Marx has said, 'in the relation of labour as the use value that confronts
money as posited as capital, labour is not this or another labour, but labour pure and
simple, abstract labour; absolutely indifferent to its particular specificity, but capable
ofall specificities'91.
According to Marx the abstraction of labour occurred due to the fact that it is
confronted and determined by capital that 'as such is indifferent to every particularity
of its substance... That is to say that labour is in each single case specific labour, but
capital can come into relation with every specific labour; it confronts the totality of
all labours Svvdpei98
In other words it is the character of capitalist production that abstracts labour
from its fonn as a specific activity oriented towards a specific production to an
abstract, mechanical activity that unlike craft labour is indifferent to its particular
fonn100. As Marx has said 'this economic relation... therefore develops more purely
and adequately and in proportion as labour loses all the characteristics ofan art'101.
What the labourer sells is just abstract undifferentiated labour power that is put to
work according to the needs of the capitalist employer.
96 M. Hardt and A. Negri, (2000) p.255.
97 Marx (1973) p. 296.
9S
Potentially. Greek in the original.




We can say that the crucial factor that in a sense 'triggered' the abstraction of
labour and its existence according to the specific demands of capital was the
technical-scientific organisation of capitalist production in the factory system. The
factory system in its turn provided a form of division of labour that subsequently was
adopted by the large services firms.
In the factory system or even the more so in a large service firm the product of
labour has no 'author'. The labour of the worker in the capitalist factory system has
deprived labour of any personal characteristics. The working process in the factory
system is totally de-personified. As Marx demonstrated the division of labour within
the factory deprives the worker from receiving any spiritual reward from the creative
power of his/her labour, since the worker has no control whatsoever over the creative
process. S/he just performs a mundane task according to the directions of the
employer. Even more s/he does not create objects not even commodities anymore.
S/he creates only a small part of what is to become a commodity102. The
fragmentation of the production process has as a result the dissociation of the worker
from the product as its creator. Consequently, the worker cannot claim any privileged
relation to the product of his/her work. As a result working consciousness cannot
become a creative consciousness since it loses its claim to the product as its creation.
In this case the Hegelian notion of the recognition of the self for itself through labour
is lost. Working consciousness cannot recognise and realise itself in its res creatum
because the creative process has been alien to it103. The worker can no longer say
when confronting the object 'this is mine; I have created it; it is the product of
myself. Moreover s/he cannot claim in seeing the product 'this is me. My self is
reflected in it.' The dimension of labour as a par excellence human creative force and
as the detenninant instance in the creation of free self-consciousness remains
unredeemed.
Marx himself has described the loss for human subjectivity as a consequence of
the dehumanisation of social labour that has transpired through the emergence of
capitalism:
Never, in any earlier period, have the productive forces taken on a
form so indifferent to the intercourse of individuals as individuals,
because their intercourse itselfwas formerly a restricted one. On the
102
Marx( 1976) p. 475.
103 See Gadamer (1976) p. 71.
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other hand, standing over again these productive forces, we have the
majority of the individuals from whom these forces have been wrested
away, and who, robbed thus ofall life content, have become abstract
individuals...
The only connection which still links them with the productive forces
and with their own existence -labour- has lost the semblance of self-
activity and only sustains their life by stunting //'104
This transformation of labour from a creative to an abstract and mundane action
had severe consequences for the relation of employment. As we have seen the
abstraction of labour has as a first result the deprivation of any qualities that it could
claim for itself. It becomes only what the capitalist employer wants it to become. As a
result the authority of the employer over the employee is totally justified under this
form of relation. Labour as abstract acquires as action a specific form through a
determining act on the part of the employer. Therefore the relation of authority does
not only stem from the act of contractual exchange through which the employer
appropriates the labour power of the employee and uses it for his/her own purpose of
profit maximisation. In other words the capitalist employer in order to successfully
pursue the aim of profit maximisation has to have the authority to command the
labour power that s/he has purchased. It also stems from the fact that labour acquires
its specificity as action through the command of the (property holder) employer that
makes it actual through its subsumption into the capitalist productive process.
What then remains of the allegedly natural, transhistorical, immutable character
of labour? The perception of this character radically changes. 'Labour becomes
equated with mechanical energy'l05. Labour apart from being subsumed to the
determination of the capitalist employer is also subsumed under the scientific-
technological discourse that from now on is strongly affiliated with the logic of
capitalist production as embodying scientific progress106. Labour under this
perception becomes a technical function within a process that puts humanity in
inimical opposition to nature. Labour becomes a factor in a productive process, a
Marx and Engels (1976) pp. 86-87.
105
Heidegger (1996) p. 40.
106 See chapter four section 2.2.
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factor that is calculated under the applied scientific-technological discourse as
'performance'107.
However, the alienation of labour from the labourer and its perception as a
function brings us to another issue that is of vital importance to our argument here:
How does the performance of labour come to be realised in the process of capitalist
production? As Marx said '...both the means and materials of labour are used
collectively'l08.
' This collective use in its turn is based on the absolute premiss ofthe co-operation of
an agglomeration ofworkers. It is itself therefore only the objective expression of the
social character of labour and of the social forces ofproduction arising from it, just
as the particular assumed by this conditions, the machinery for instance cannot
possibly be used other than for work on a co-operative basis'109.
In other words what we have here is the reintroduction of the social character of
labour through the process of the selfsame capitalist production that originally
abolished it through its objectification. We are going to see further in this chapter the
full implications of this re-introduction of labour but at this stage what is of relevance
is to see the how this collective character is realised in capitalism.
We have seen that through contract the worker loses his/her right upon the
created thing. Labour as such has no rights outside contract. However, the collective
character of the capitalist production reintroduces labour as a creative force that is
exercised collectively. As a result apart fonn his/her contractual rights that amongst
other things detennine the value of his/her labour as it is detennined by the free
labour market the worker claims a right in virtue of his/her labour as a collectively
exercised creative force. These rights however, belong to the worker not qua person
but rather as a member of the collective productive force. Labour in other words
claims legal recognition of its productive contribution not in the name of it being the
creator of objects that bear the mark of the labourer/creator but as the collective actor
that creates values in virtue of its indispensable role in the 'machine' of capitalist
production. Moreover, the social character of capitalist production refers it back to
society. In an insightful remark in reference to the just price of labour Weber has said
that where the return of labour is detennined by the sale of the product in a free
107
Heidegger (1996) p.41. 'What is actual is no longer that which rests and resides and subsist within
itself namely substance but ratherfunction'.
108 Marx (1976) p. 1053.
109 Ibid.
58
competitive market, the content of the right of the individual worker to the full value
of his product is meaningless, for there can be no 'individual yield of labour. Thus
the claim of labour becomes a collective claim for a wage that can guarantee 'a
standard of living as determined by a traditional need'"°. In other words the 'real'
value of labour in a capitalist economy is of no relevance. The value creative power of
labour as such cannot be quantified and be objectively expressed in terms of
money1Even in the case of the free creative labourer the amount of the value of the
labour in the fonn of the exchanged product cannot be predetermined. There cannot
be an objective amount of what labour deserves and this has to do with the fact that it
is not only a collective performance but moreover an action that as we have seen
above is based uses on the collective knowledge and experience of a working
community. As such it is impossible to assess in economic terms the value of any
individual contribution. Moreover Marx as the thinker that par excellence believed
that labour belongs to society thought that the products of labour should be given to
people according to their needs and not according to their contribution to the
production process112.
6. The Multidimensionality of the Employment
Relation
What we have done so far is to start from the 'phenomenology' of the
employment relation in its conceptual fonn and have moved to its expression in the
system of social labour. We have analysed employment as an exchange relation and
have discovered that the treatment of labour through the contract of exchange
provides a plausible justification for its hetero-detennination by property, which in
capitalism takes the fonn of property of capital. We have seen that in capitalism
labour is not treated as a fundamental characteristic of the self, but rather becomes an
objective quantifiable force that is calculable through its function in the system of the
capitalist market economy. As we have seen this entails the subjugation of labour to
the ends and purposes of capital. What we are going to attempt next, is to unveil that
110 See Weber (1978) p. 872.
"1 On the stifling effects on economic development of the attempt ofmedieval guilds to detennine the
objective value of labour see Simmel (1978) p. 317.
Characteristic is the famous dictum from the Communist Manifesto. ' From each according to his
abilities to each according to his needs'.
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the true character of the employment cannot be expressed under the exchange
paradigm. We are going to argue that employment in capitalism is a relation that
exists under ambivalent premises, namely as a relation simultaneously on the one
hand of domination and conflict and on the other of interdependence and cooperation.
6.1. The social character of labour
The critical point that is emerging concerns the collapse of the social
phenomenon of labour into its economic expression in capitalism. The issue that
emerges again and again is that of the tension between the economic use of labour and
its human and social character. Any understanding of labour in modernity will have to
compromise between its social character and its economic use. Our main point is that
the one is irreducible to the other and that therefore the tension between them can at
best be accommodated but never resolved.
By way of clarifying this important insight let me take Clauss Offe's three theses
against the commodification of labour: 1) it does not arise for the purpose of
saleability 2) it cannot be separatedfrom its owner and 3) can be set in motion only
, •. 113
by its owner
Let me say something about each of these:
Labour does not arise for the purpose of saleability.
The negative assertion that labour does not arise for the purpose of saleability
implies a positive one: that labour does indeed arise for a certain purpose. If it is not
saleability then what it is? The purpose of our excursion into Hegel and the
Phenomenology ofMind was to answer that question. The saleability of labour must
be perceived as a transformation of labour that has as a consequence its alienation
from its original purpose and meaning.
The second assertion seems more simple and straightforward than the first but
yet is far more intricate in its implications. Labour cannot be separated from its
owner. The first question that emerges from the excerpt is who is the owner of labour.
The association of labour to a certain owner seems to imply an answer that is in a
similar vein to the Lockean tradition that perceives the connection of labour to the self
in terms of acquisition of property rights. However such an understanding would be
113 Offe (1984) p. 83.
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beside the point. On the contrary this assertion rests on the notion that labour despite
its objectification and its economic perception and the fiction of its legal treatment is
not and it cannot be an object. In other words labour is treated as a thing whereas it is
not and cannot be a thing. The perception and treatment of labour as a thing will
always have to come up against its character as an essential trait of human practice.
As we have seen and learnt from Hegel, labour inhabits the labourer as an inherent
constitutive part of his/her self.
It is exactly this irreducible human character of labour that determines it as a
social category. As we have repeatedly said labour is not originally economic.
Habermas has remarked for example that labour has a dual character. As action it
belongs to the 'lifeworld''114 and is therefore determined by 'lifeworld' discourses,
when it is introduced to the economic system it is determined and calculated by the
latter on the basis of its economic performance115. If it has to have an economic
function it has to be translated in economic terms. As a result of this we have a double
understanding of labour. On the one hand we have its economic understanding that
quantifies and calculates the action of labour in terms of its performance for the
economic system according to the latter's own standards. On the other we have its
social understanding that perceives it a fonn of social action that satisfies human
needs and desires that are not in their essence derived and determined by the
imperatives of the economic system. A person does not work in order for a company
to maximise its profit nor in order to raise the national GDP. S/he works in order to
attain a standard of living through which as a social being s/he can satisfy her/his
needs and desires. This means that labour, as an expression and thus extension of the
human-social person will not cease to import its demands into the economic system.
In other words the modem system of labour has to constantly balance between two
different dimensions of labour: It's social-human character and its economic use. As
these two dimensions are in principle irreducible to each other the claims of each of
them derive their validity internally from their respective discourses and are projected
upon the other as legitimate demands. On the one hand we have the indispensability
of the economic system for the satisfaction of social needs and desires and on the
other we have the indispensability of the person of the worker for the economic
114 For the meaning of the term lifeworld, a concept that is central to the philosophy of J. Habermas see
chapter three section five.
115 Habermas (1987) p. 335.
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system, a contribution that constantly reintroduces in the capitalist system of labour
its irreducible social-human character.
On the one hand the analysis of the articulation of the relation between property
and labour as legally mediated by contract brings us back to the issue of domination
and conflict. We can see now that if labour is to be 'domesticated' it has to be
'domesticated' together with its original 'owner'. On the one hand the worker has to
be a part of the economic system if the economic function of labour is to be workable
at all. But the worker introduces into the capitalist economic system demands and
values that as we are going to see later in this thesis, the employer does not
necessarily recognise as valid116. In confronting these demands the capitalist
economic system has basically three options open to it. It can either suppress them, it
can come to a compromise with them and in a sense incorporate them in its function,
or it can make them work to its own benefit. What it cannot do is subject them
completely to its own rationality. Instead, capitalism has to strive in order to achieve
the domination of labour. Nonetheless, as the economic system is the only means for
the provision of social needs the social character of labour has to come through the
sieve of economic rationality in order for it to be meaningful. The two dimensions are
complementary and yet irreducible to each other.
In the light of this we can summarise the two main points that the analysis of this
assertion has revealed to us as follows: First of all we have the recognition of the fact
that labour is an original and universal characteristic of the human condition. It comes
to being with humanity itself. Even if capitalism has managed to commodity labour, it
cannot de-personify it: The relegation of labour to an external, quantifiable,
calculable, generic object cannot alter the fact that it inhabits human subjectivity. For
the economistic rationality of capitalism labour maybe impersonal, but for humanity it
is not.
The other point that should be stressed here is that as a result of the nature of this
dual character, the tension that exists between the social and the economic character
of labour is endemic. The economic use of labour—especially in late capitalism-, will
always stumble upon the human character of labour; this means that the modern
system of social labour 'suffers' from a structural inconsistency that forces it to
constantly balance between the diverging demands and rationalities that inhabit it.
116 See chapters two and four.
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This brings us the third and most intriguing assertion that in a sense is a logical
consequence of the previous one: Labour can be set in motion only by its owner.
At a first level this assertion deals with what is a basic presupposition for the use
of labour by the economic system of capitalism. Labour power in order to be
productive has to be set in motion. Labour power despite its perception by the
capitalist economic discourse as impersonal perfonnance cannot be used by the
economic system, without an act of the will of the person of the labourer. The
satisfaction of the need of the economic system for labour power has by definition to
come through an act of the labourer. The employer may determine the content of the
labour as action but the labourer decides its setting in motion, i.e. the initiation of this
action. In other words the labouring process depends on the motivation of the worker
to work. This means that despite the domination of property over labour there is a part
of labouring process that the employer has no sovereignty over. It is exactly this
motivation for the perfonnance of the labouring act that the economic system has to
induce. How does the capitalist economic system achieve this? The answer comes
through the system of generalised wage labour that operates on the basis of the free
labour market. It is self-evident that the satisfaction of the needs and desires of the
worker can come only through his/her participation in the economic system. The
generalised character of wage labour offers no alternative to the worker but to set in
motion his/her labour power for the purposes of the capitalist employer"7. Under this
light the contract of employment can be seen as the agreement of the employee to set
in motion his/her labour power and place it under the authority of the employer that
can use it for his/her own purposes. In this case we have the paradox that the
domination of the labourer is preconditioned by his/her free decision to work under
conditions of domination. In liberal capitalist societies, the sovereignty of the worker
over his/her labour power is lost from the moment of its setting in motion but not
before that. In a sense we can see contract as a legal device that regulates the terms
and conditions of the transfer of sovereignty over part of the creative power of the
self, rather than the content of the employment relation itself.
On another level and building on our findings so far we can say that this transfer
involves nothing less than one of the most fundamental aspects of the human
personality. Labour as we have said is inseparable from the worker. We have seen that
117 We will see the meaning of this situation following in this chapter.
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so far that labour as a predicate of our being is controlled by the self Of course the
self is as we have seen in our analysis of Hegel first and foremost a social self; the self
finds its final determination within the institutional social symbiosis and so does
labour. This means that labour is always realised within a certain division of labour
118that is decided by society and as such it belongs to society . As we have previously
seen labour cannot be realised 'monologically'. However, as we have already said
labour in modem liberal democracies cannot be directly coerced. The principle of
individual autonomy as it is enshrined in a manner of ways as a rule of our legal
culture does not allow this. Nonetheless, it is up to the self as a social self to decide
whether his/her labour should be put in motion or whether it should stay idle. No one
has the legal right to force him/her to work. The labouring act has to come through a
free decision of the labourer, even if this decision means putting it under the control
of another. And it is exactly the manner of the way that is put into action and the
status of this 'other' that the social division of labour decides. In antiquity where
slavery existed, the 'other' was the slave owner; in the middle ages, where labour
could be forced through serfdom the other was the feudal lord. In capitalism - where
labour cannot be forced- the other is the capitalist property owner. The difference is
that the slave owner or feudal lord had the power to impose upon the labourer the
obligation to work, whereas in modernity the capitalist employer has to induce an act
of the free will of the labourer so that s/he can use it.
What we have argued so far is that labour as something constitutively human
cannot be subsumed under the logic of the contractual exchange of property rights
without the infliction of a fundamental loss. This is so, since this schema divests
labour of its human and social characteristics and reduces it to a simple, exchangeable
commodity. However, labour resists its containment: It is not and cannot be a
commodity; it is only capitalism treats it as if it where one. This treatment that stands
on a series of abstractions that may make the schema of exchange stand, but
eventually this perception has to come up against some the fundamental
characteristics of labour; characteristics that attach to what is a certain 'surplus', its
nature as creating tensions and ambiguities that the fonnat of exchange can neither
settle permanently nor suppress without a remainder.
118 Gadamer (1981) p. 75.
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Our point is that the multiplicity and complexity of employment is the outcome of
its ambivalent character as both an economic relation and a social and human action
where diverging rationalities are expressed in a conflicting manner.
6.2 Exchange and Employment as a Relation of Conflict and
Interdependence
The question that therefore emerges is how the multidimensional character of
employment can be perceived through an approach that transcends the limits that the
paradigm of exchange of property rights has set.
Our starting point is the authoritative and hierarchical dimension of employment.
Unlike most contractual relations the employment relation is usually of indefinite
temporal horizon and is exhausted neither in a single act of transaction nor to the
completion of a simple undertaking. Of course there are other forms of contract that
are of long even indefinite duration (for example contracts for the lease of property,
insurance contracts etc.) but unlike the contract of employment they do not
presuppose a hierarchical relation of authority between the parties. In this case, we
can speak of power positions in the case of lease of property or even in insurance
contracts but we could not possibly speak of authority119. However, the presence of
authority is an inherent characteristic in any relation of employment. Moreover,
authority is something that in the case of employment is extended over time. It is not
of a temporally limited horizon. Additionally, this authority is not only dictated by the
needs of a specific task to be performed. Its justification apart from practical is also
ideological. It is imbued in the nature of the capitalist understanding of the relation
between property and labour. To recapture what we have found in our analysis of
Locke's theory, in any version of capitalism, property as a higher order value has the
right to command labour.
However, in the modern system of social labour this relation is an actual social
relation of permanence between ego and alter that due to the system of generalised
wage labour determines the terms and conditions of the social existence of the parties.
It cannot be seen as an abstract and contingent relation that can be described in the
terms of exchange of skills and resources for the completion of a specific task, as the
liberal contractual doctrine would have us believe.
119 For contractual solutions to this problem see especially Macneil (1979) chapter four.
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The temporal openness of the employment relation provides us with another
insight into the understanding of employment as an exchange relation. We have
previously said that the employment relation is not finalised in the instance of its legal
formalisation through contract. The conclusion of the contract is only its founding
120instance . In other words contract provides the legal justification for the employer to
use labour for his/her own purposes and under the command of his/her authority. On
the other side the employee's performance in the contract of employment requires the
allocation of his/her creative power to the authority of the employer in return for the
wage. In other words the assent of the worker that is given through the conclusion of
the contract becomes the source of the legitimation of the authoritative content of the
employment relation. As a result the employment relation is transformed from a
constant power relation to a legal one that is completed only in one instance, namely
the instance of the conclusion of the contract. In this sense the legal understanding of
labour as exchange, ossifies the relation and recognises as its content only what has
been explicitly agreed in the instance of its establishment. Whatever may transpire
from that point on that has been left undetermined in contract is simply regulated
unilaterally through the authority of the employer. The dynamic that the relation
develops from thereon is not recognised as being in need of a normative arrangement
that is mutually agreed between the parties. However, it is this dynamic that in a sense
provides the essence of the employment relation. In this respect the dynamic of the
normative aspect of the employment relation is simply left underdetermined by
contract, and as such normatively interpreted and decided by the unilateral authority
of the employer121. Employment from there on should be seen as a temporally open
and nonnatively evolving relation that derives its meaning from the constant
interaction between an employer -as s/he represents the category of property- and an
collective employee that within the relation are in conflict with each other mainly for
two reasons, firstly due to the distribution of resources as they are produced within the
relation and in due to the conflicting rationalities of the economic and the social that
guide the action of the parties within the relation. This conflict of rationalities coexists
and in a sense delimits the conduct of the conflict over resources. For the economic
system the remuneration of the worker, that represents his/her consideration in the
120 It is in this sense that contract in what concerns the regulation of employment is a figment ( as to its
regulative scope) yet an indispensable figment in what concerns the its absolute necessity for the
initiation of the employment relation through a voluntary act
121 See Collins (1993). The issue is analysed in detail chapter four.
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wage contract, is considered as a cost. Therefore, the employer as a rationally acting
subject has to extract from the worker the maximum amount of productivity for the
minimum amount of cost, namely the minimum amount of remuneration. In a very
crude outline we could say that according to the modern economic discourse it is this
relation of the cost of labour to its productivity that actually determines what the level
of remuneration of the worker should be and not simply the latter's subsistence122.
But one the other hand as we have seen the worker is not guided in his/her action
within the employment relation by the employer's purposes and calculations but
rather from the necessity of the satisfaction of his/her needs that are socially and not
123
economically determined . Therefore, the economic calculation of the cost of labour
is irrelevant to her/him. The aim of the worker for which s/he strives through
employment is to achieve the highest possible remuneration that his/her skills can
claim with the highest possible degree of employment security so that s/he can
continue to satisfy his/her needs through the participation in the economic system. As
result the worker cannot ignore the imperatives of the economic system, since they
provide the one pole that determines the nature of employment in modernity.
However, the conflict of rationalities delimits for the worker these imperatives as
practical limits of action. Practically, this means that the worker has to adapt to the
reality that its dependence on the economic system imposes. The parties are
interdependent in their conflict. They both need each other as of an imperative.
However this dependence of labour on the economic system does not mean that
labour must perceive economic demands as absolute imperatives as the economic
system claims that they are, but rather as systemic obstacles that cannot be overlooked
in the pursuance of a successful strategy in the occupational system of modernity.
However, interdependence does not ensue to mutuality or solidarity but rather
conditions the conduct of conflict. In all this conflict and interdependence coexist and
determine each other within the relation. This means that conflict cannot receive such
122 Of course this comment does not have the ambition to describe the mechanism ofwage
determination but merely to introduce the notion of its conflictual character.
123 There is an interesting issue that emerges here that however evades the scope of our research. That
is that the economic system particularly in advanced capitalism has managed through mainly through
advertising and social custom to control and determine the system of social needs. In other words needs
are in a sense pre-emptively and artificially created by the economy so they can later be satisfied by
increased production and all this to the benefit of the economic system. In this sense we could say that
face a vicious circle since on the one hand the economy does demand increased social needs so that it
can expand and on the other it wants to limit or at least control the resources of their satisfaction. See
Galbraith (1998) pp. 124-131.
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a radical form that would threaten the existence of the relation. On the other hand
interdependence does not cancel the fact that the parties in the relation are pursuing
conflicting interests as they are guided by diverging rationalities of action.
So far we have delineated the employment relation as a relation of domination,
where the action of both as directed by conflicting rationalities is oriented towards the
satisfaction of conflicting yet interdependent interests and needs. Moreover we have
seen that these interests and needs depend upon each other for their satisfaction. We
could say and in summarising our findings so far that employment in capitalism is the
relation of the socially determined labour to the purposes and rationality of the
capitalist economic system. However it would be an oversimplification to describe
employment as a straightforward relation between the two opposing terms of property
and labour. Of course in the first instance employment begins from the meeting, the
coming together of these two terms. Nonetheless, this relation is characterised by a
series of tensions and dichotomies that are produced from this ambivalent relation of
conflict and interdependence. It is exactly this ambivalent character of employment as
it creates paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions that we are going to trace in this thesis.
7. The ambivalent nature of employment. A Summary.
The multileveled tensions and ambiguities that are created through employment
will be more systematically addressed in the final chapter of this project where we
will deal with the issue of its practice within work organisations, as it is within this
practice that the ambivalent nature of employment and the results it produces can be
seen in their full extent. In order for this to become apparent we will try and
summarise the multileveled complexity of the employment relation by attempting an
analysis that commences from a schema that views employment as an interaction
124
system ~ .
The concept of the interaction system is not novel. On the contrary it has its
origins in the idea that the instance of recognition creates a form of community that
creates its own law that has to be abided by the two persons involved in it; this notion
124 'Interaction systems emerge when present individuals perceive each other' Luhmann (1982) p.71
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of the interactional community was firstly introduced in western philosophy by J. G.
Fichte as early asl796125.
In interaction systems action is always oriented towards the attainment of a
certain mutually agreed goal. Interaction systems in order to exist and be able to attain
their goal have to create their own nonnative framework that would regulate them as
action systems. The purpose of the nonnative framework of the interaction system is
to establish a pattern on the basis of which meaning communications on the part of
Ego provoke certain stabilised and anticipated reactions from Alter so that their
actions can be co-ordinated towards the attainment of the set goal. The aim of the
nonnative framework of such an action system is to stabilise expectations between the
parties and enhance the predictability and stability of the action pattern. For this
reason as part of the nonnative framework a corrective mechanism emerges that
operates through the exercise of sanctions and rewards. The exercise of sanctions and
rewards within the system depends on the confonnity or deviance of Ego and Alter to
the nonnative pattern of the action system and has as its aim the protection of its
19 ft
stability . Without a stabilised nonnative pattern any co-ordination of action
between Ego and Alter that would be oriented towards a certain goal would simply be
impossible127. In this case and especially through the establishment of a stable
nonnative framework of action we can see that we dealing with -an albeit
rudimentary- fonn of social organisation. We can see know the similarities between
this model and employment relation in its simplest fonn, i.e. as a relation between
Ego and Alter unfolding. Employment in this case can be analytically described as an
interaction system. This is so, since we have an agreement upon the performance of a
task; we have a stabilised nonnative framework with sanctions and rewards attached
to it. However, from this point on, the differences start to emerge due to the
complexity of the employment relation. In the previous interactive model the
emphasis is put in the creation of a nonnative framework that will guide and co¬
ordinate the action of two actors towards the attainment of a mutually agreed goal
with alter and ego being partners to it. It describes a relation of solidarity and
cooperation where distributive problems are left undetennined. In the case of the
employment relation things are not the same. The assumption of action towards the
125 See Ficthe (1970) pp. 72-73.
126 See Parsons (1965) pp.105-107.
127 Parsons (1982) p. 94.
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attainment of a goal might have been agreed but it is not the same goal for both the
parties. As we have described the parties see the goal from different perspectives.
First of all it is the goal of the employer for which the employee has to work for. The
attainment of the goal per se is prima facie indifferent to the labourer128. In addition to
this, power relations as they emerge between Ego and Alter in the solidary paradigm
are not predetennined by the nature of the system. In the case of employment we have
the ab initio existence of authority and right of command of one party over the other.
The relation is predominantly characterised by hierarchy and authority and not
solidarity and cooperation. However, the factor of interdependence of the parties
complicates the system even more since it is a factor that does not allow it to evolve
in a condition of open conflict that could dissolve it. Moreover, in the case of
employment we have a problematic relation between Ego and Alter since they are not
guided in their actions by the same rationality. The employment relation is the
outcome of the compromise of two conflicting yet interdependent rationalities,
namely the economic of property and the social of labour. The first problematical
consequence of this comes through the fact that the guiding rationalities of the parties
do not recognise each other's interests as invested in the relation as prima facie valid
and legitimate. The validity and legitimacy of the other party's interests are not
rationally recognised as such but are rather imposed upon the parties due to the fact of
their interdependence. And again it is this imperative that provides the ground upon
which the diverging rationalities must converge. Interdependence as a structural
component of the relation 'forces' the eventual recognition of the validity and
legitimacy of each other's interests in the relation. However, this recognition does not
occur through the unconditional acceptance of the validity and legitimacy of the other
party's interests. On the contrary the parties reserve the right to evaluate what the
other party's interests are and should be according to their own respective
rationalities. Additionally, unlike the paradigm of the solidary relation where the rules
of action and the canons of strategic planning are mutually concluded by the parties,
in this case they are diverging and conflicting as they stem from the diverging and
conflicting rationalities that guide the parties in the pursuance of common yet
conflicting goals. This is so since in employment we have an agreement and a
I2S Of course particularly in employment in work organisations the employee has an interest in the
attainment of the goals of the enterprise as this can indirectly benefit him in the form of increased job
security, production bonuses etc.
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subsequent cooperation on the performance of the task but not an agreement as to the
determination and the meaning of the task. In other words we have cooperation on the
basis of a unity of goal (i.e. the task to be performed) but not a unity of purpose (i.e.
the meaning of the task according to the interests and the rationalities of the parties).
In this sense employment must not be seen as a solidary and cooperative relation but
rather as a constant strategic compromise between two conflicting parties on the basis
of their interdependence. In this respect we have a relation between two parts that is
characterised by a structural dichotomy of incompatible and yet complementary
elements that are in constant interaction with each other and mutually determine each
other. These two parts of the employment relation determine and are determined by
each other in the conduct of a conflict that cannot be surpassed in capitalism. As such
property and labour are the two parts of a quite unique dialectic where we do not have
a condition of thesis-antithesis- synthesis schema but a constant evolution and
adaptation of one element to the other129. This means that if any of the parts of
employment reaches a condition where it can be self and not hetero-determined then
the relation substantially changes in its very core. If labour does not need property in
order to sustain itself, then capitalism as we know it will not exist anymore. What
needs to be stressed here -an issue that is going to be addressed extensively in the next
chapters-is that this unique dialectic is one of the most substantial components of
capitalist societies. In a sense it is one of the major factors that have contributed to its
success, in the sense that apart from the innovations that it brought about through the
rationalisation of human action, it managed to creatively exploit conflict as a factor of
social cohesion. In other words the paradox of employment and the productivity of it
lies in the fact that the conflict of interests between property and labour, the
incompatibility of rationalities and discourses is conditioned by the fact of their
indispensability for each other.
As a product of this unique and ever evolving dialectic we should see the
normative context of employment as being constantly adapted to the balance of power
that exists between labour and property. We should not forget that employment is a
power relation, where a dominant part exercises authority over a repressed one. This
incompatibility that we talk about is not relation between equal terms. The paradox
starts from the fact that this power relation stems from an action that is ambivalent in
129 For an analogy see Merleau Ponty (1968) p.91.
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*130itself. Labour as we have already said is the producer of social wealth and as such
has a function that is economic and this is a dimension of labour that cannot be
reduced or denied. On the other hand labour is a fundamental factor for the creation
of the social self and as a most important form of expression of human creativity. This
dual character of labour stems from its own nature. The ambivalence is structural and
not contingent and it expresses itself in different ways in different historical settings.
The form of this ambivalence as we experience it today is conditioned by the
131autonomisation of social systems and the subsequent primacy and the subsequent
social domination of the economic system in capitalism. This means that it is the
submission of labour to property that in turn is dependant on labour both practically
(in the sense that it needs labour for the use of the capitalist economy) and
ideologically (in the above mentioned sense of its moral justification) that creates the
form of the paradox of employment in modernity.
What we are going do next is to analyse different understandings of the
employment relation as they are expressed at three different social levels and attempt
to see whether this multidimensionality and complexity of labour can be captured
them. In a sense we will attempt to transfer our findings so far about the nature of
employment and test them against dominant perceptions of it, namely, that of the
market, that of the state (and its legal system) and finally that of the level of the
commercial corporation where we will try and discover a legal understanding that
tracks employment in modernity as multidimensional, as involving a balance between
its economic and its social dimension.
130 See footnote 93.
131 See Luhmann (1982)
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CHAPTER TWO
EMPLOYMENT AND THE LIBERAL CREED
Since Paradise, labour has been the curse of possessions, but property gives a
truly divine right to idleness
(Karl Renner)l
Introduction: The dual dimension of labour and its
function in modernity.
We have seen in the previous chapter that labour has a dual character as it has
both a human-social and an economic dimension. As we have said these two
dimensions are intrinsic to labour since labour as a fundamental trait of human
practice is both a constitutive feature of the self as an action that mediates its practical
relation with externality. Labour in this dimension is the instrument for the
appropriation of externality whether is externality is the physical or the social world.
In this respect as we have seen labour as one of the most fundamental constitutive
characteristics of the social self and of the social bond. On the other hand we have
seen labour is the creation of the social wealth, the action that stats the circle of
economic activity. As we have said these two dimensions are in principle -originally
at least- not incompatible to each other irreducible to each other they as they have co¬
existed historically in different ways, in different social formations. In a sense they
are complementary to each other; the economic use of labour follows its dimension as
one of the fundamental creators of the social bond. If we -albeit in an abstract
manner- we see economy as the sphere the pursuance of the satisfaction of material
needs and desires, where these needs and desires have to be satisfied through social
action - in the sense of the action that is oriented towards something external- then
the economic use of labour stems directly from its nature as a form ofmediation with
externality. However, what is specifically problematic, in modern capitalist societies
is that these two dimensions are being more and more separated, more and more
autonomous and more incompatible in their rationality to each other. As we have
already seen in modernity we have condition where the economic dimension of labour
1 Renner (1949) p. 104
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dominates the social one. As we have said the crucial factor is the relation between
property and labour in the sense that in capitalism we have a relation of domination.
However, in this chapter we will not deal with principles or concepts but with actual
and concrete social situations. What we will attempt is an analysis of the economic
use of labour and how this violently comes into antithesis, how it distorts its
dimension as s constitutive force of the social self and as a most important creative
force for humanity.
Therefore in this chapter we will look at the dominant perception of labour in
modernity, namely to the one that submits labour under the logic of economic
exchange. Therefore we pick up the trail of the Lockean analysis and deal with the
perception of employment as a form of contractual exchange. However, in this case
we do not deal with the agrarian capitalism of small property owners as the case was
in Locke. The common element in the early agrarian capitalism of Locke and the
modern globalised capitalism as we experience it today is the predominance of
property over labour, a predominance that is to a wide extent achieved through the
legal protection of property rights accompanied by the legal instrument of contract of
employment. It is this approach to employment and its consequences as they occur in
modernity that will occupy us in this chapter. Therefore particular emphasis will be
given to its main ideological proponent namely the current of neo-liberalism. In this
respect we will deal with neo-liberalism as it is expressed either as libertarianism
(Hayek, Nozick et. ah), that as a current of thought reintroduces in the context of late
modernity the basic philosophical, legal and economic premises of traditional
liberalism albeit in a different social and economic context, i.e. not the context of the
early bourgeois society but in the context of modern globalised capitalism, or as the
theory of economic analysis of law (Posner, Kronman et. al.) that as a more extreme
version of libertarianism asserts that legal relations should be uncritically subsumed
under economic rationality and that legal rules should have as their aim the maximum
economic efficiency of the relations that they regulate. Due to their strong ideological
affiliation and due to the fact that libertarianism and economic analysis share the same
basic assumptions and the same rationality they will be treated here as a single current
of thought that is expressing the perception of employment as a market relation of
exchange in its most pure fonn. The aim is to show that neo-liberalism's treatment of
employment as an act of economic exchange subsumes under a legal form that is
designed to understand only one of the parts of the relation that is property. As a
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result the contractual approach is bound to favour property which we should not
forget is the dominant part in the relation. Moreover the libertarian perception focuses
only on the economic function of labour and silences its human-social character.
As we are going to see further on the neo-liberal understanding of employment is
based on a wider perception of law and morality that in its turn is based on a series of
basic maxims that justify the function of the free exchange market. As we are going to
see these maxims are characterised by the reliance of the theory on the notion of the
self-regulating market mechanism. Therefore we will start our analysis by analysing
the basics premises of neo-liberalism in what concerns the foundations of the market
and we will briefly address the moral and legal implications of the theory. From
thereon we will address and assess the views of neo-liberalism on the concepts of
labour and the law and examine how these perceptions find their expression in labour
law. Finally our findings will conclude to a critique of the neo-liberal views on
employment.
1. Libertarianism: The Philosophical Underpinnings
Libertarianism is founded upon the basis of a wider epistemological and moral
perception that emanates from the writings of the liberal thinkers of enlightenment.
Moreover, neo-liberalism despite the obvious fact that has its internal differences as
expressed by different thinkers has a coherence that can only be attributed to a
common adherence to its major premises. Therefore, in what concerns employment
we can discern this approach being built upon two fundamental premises, a moral one
and an epistemological one: The moral premise is the position that individual freedom
is the supreme moral and social value. It cannot be denied that early liberalism put to
the fore the moral value of the individual, an individual that was until then entangled
in a web of dependencies as these were represented by a series of centres of authority
such as the monarch, the feudal lord or the church. Nonetheless, what was a radical
idea for the 18th, has now become an indispensable premise of our moral and legal
culture. Flowever, this premise as advocated by most neo-liberal thinkers has turned
into the justification of a form of radical individualism that by focusing on the notion
of the individual as a free property holder, undercuts the notion of collective
solidarity. The second premise is that the impersonal market order is the outcome of
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rational yet unpredictable human action. As we are going to see next these two
fundamental positions provide the groundwork on the basis of which the neo-liberal
(or libertarian) approach to employment as exchange is constructed.
We will start with the analysis of the second assertion, namely that the free
market is a spontaneous creation of rational yet unplanned human action. Classical
liberalism in this respect follows the old liberal theory promulgated initially by
Hobbes and Locke but moreover by the thinkers of the 18th century such as Adam
Smith and by the political economists of the 19th century such as Ricardo and
Malthus and the utilitarianism of Bentham who held -in substantially different ways
of course- the basic position that human action is rationally oriented towards the
satisfaction of basic human needs as the latter are determined by human nature. As A.
F. Hayek put it much latter, free action is oriented towards the attainment of specific
goals but not towards the accomplishment of substantive pre-given ideals, as they
might have been preconceived by human reason . These goals according to both
classical and neo-liberalism can be attained through the process of free-competitive
exchange as the latter can be guaranteed by the free market. The reason for this is that
the specific human needs that exist in a certain social area at a given moment are
projected on the market and can be subsequently satisfied through the process of
exchange. This is so since, according to Hayek, intrinsic in the market mechanism is
an infonnation system about which the actual human needs at certain point in time
are, a system that guides human efforts towards certain economic sectors3. This
infonnation mechanism is associated with and functions through the price
mechanism, which is an indicator for the direction of the future action of the
individual market actor. In other words the price in a free market system is a signal to
the participant in the market game about the direction of the latter's incessant and
unpredictable fluctuations4. The market therefore provides the satisfaction of needs by
making them known to other people. Exchange makes possible the simultaneous
satisfaction of divergent and indifferent between them needs thus promoting the
interests of all parties involved in it5.
2 See Hayek (1982) Vol. 2 p.109. See also Hayek (1960) chapter 3.
3
Hayek (1980) pp. 28-29.
4 For example, if there is an overproduction of wheat one year, the price mechanism of the free market
will infonn the farmer that s/he should concentrate his/her efforts in some other cultivation.
5 See for example Hayek (1982) Vol.2 pp. 110-111.
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The other significant characteristic of the free market is that it is always a
competitive market. In the theoretical model of liberalism competition is 'the
principle of social organisation'6. In this respect competition functions as both a
means of the optimum satisfaction of needs and as a safeguard for the maintenance of
the equilibrium ofpower in the market order.
1.1. The individual and the market - Human nature and the market
order
The ultimate legitimating criterion of the market order according to liberalism
encapsulated in the famous dictum of Adam Smith that man's propensity 'to truck,
barter and exchange one thing for another' is an exclusive characteristic of human
nature 1. In this way the act of exchange that satisfies the self-interest of individuals
becomes a most if not the most substantial expression of human nature . We will not
deal here with the validity of this position, since such an attempt far evades the scope
of this thesis. Nonetheless, this assertion is of great importance to our analysis, since
as we have seen in the previous chapter the understanding of employment as an
exchange relation is a rather problematical. Moreover this current of thought by
focusing on exchange as the primary form of human interaction- a view that in
various guises has been advocated by many thinkers who were not necessarily liberals
or neo-liberals 9- has major normative consequences as it promotes a certain
understanding of the nature of human action thus directly affecting the normative
understanding of employment.
The naturalness of exchange has as a consequence the perception of the market
as a spontaneously derived order based on a constant process of adaptation of human
action through the method of trial and error10. Moreover the market apart from being
spontaneous is also impersonal in the sense that there is no particular will that can
detennine its never-ending fluctuations. On the contrary, the market is the outcome of
innumerable and diverse human actions that are oriented towards the satisfaction of
6 See Hayek (1944) pp.27-28.
7 Adam Smith (1991) p. 12
8Ibid.p. 13.
9 See for example G. Simmel (1978) and J Baudrillard (1993) who perceive exchange as a form of
social interaction under a significantly different angle.
10
Hayek (1960) p. 41
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their subjective needs11. As such its function is contingent and ever fluctuating, since
contingent and ever fluctuating are both the needs to be satisfied and the factors that
shape the conditions for the satisfaction of these needs.
Moreover the schema of free competitive exchange has as precondition that any
relation of interdependence (contract being the paradigmatic form) presupposes the
preservation of the distinct individuality of the persons involved in it. This notion
suggests that any act of exchange takes place between distinct self interests that
momentarily converge, exactly in the act of contractual exchange. As a result in any
interactional system that is determined by market exchange the factor that determines
the structure of action is that of the mutual utility of the persons involved and for the
12
temporal horizon that the condition ofmutual utility exists .
However, under this line of reasoning the market becomes the natural outcome of
human action, the axis that provides the basis for the development of human
symbiosis. However, this primacy of the market presupposes a series of reversals. In
this schema we do not have the notion of society which through an economy that has
adopted the model of the free competitive exchange market, satisfies its needs. On the
contrary it is the rules of the free market that have been adopted by the capitalist
economy that impose their rationality upon a society that is called to adapt itself to the
given reality of free competitive exchange. It is the foundation and the consequences
of this reversal that we are going to address next.
7.2. The epistemological foundations of the market
This brings us to the issue of the analysis of another basic epistemological
premise of neo-liberalism as has been developed by Hayek that concerns the tasks and
the limitations of human reason in what concerns its understanding of and its practical
comportment in the market order.
For F. A. Hayek (probably the most influential neo-liberal thinker) the practice of
old rules that have emerged through experience and learning the adherence to
tradition represents a third way of guiding action, a way that overcomes simple
11 Famous in this respect is the metaphor by Adam Smith on the invisible hand that guides the actions
of individuals who while pursuing subjective interests promote to the public good without this being
their intention. Adam Smith (1991) p. 400. For a modern analysis on the issue of adaptation to the
fluctuations of the market see Hayek (1944), especially chapter one.
12 M. Weber (1979) pp. 85-86, 140, etc.
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instinct and sterile rationality. In this respect tradition becomes an instrument of social
evolution an evolution that is in a way seen as the adaptation to newly emerging
needs13.
Hayek in stressing the importance of inherited successful rules made a distinction
between what he called 'critical rationalism' and 'constructive rationalism'14. As
MacCormick has described it, critical rationalism is based on the application of
reasoned criticisms to 'inherited systems of thought and action under the basic
presupposition that change within such systems can only be partial and not total,X5.
The task of critical rationalism is to criticise what is structurally a part of the system
on the basis of its potential for development and improvement but obviously never of
radical change. On the contrary 'constructive rationalism' is that kind of rationality
that by using systems of thought radically challenges these allegedly immutable
principles and attempts to supplant them with its own arbitrary constructions.
This distinction has major normative consequences. For Hayek knowledge is
confronted with a social world that is given in its basic premises. Therefore the task of
reason is to accommodate its action towards the realities that the world imposes.
Hayek did not believe that reason can uncover the 'mysteries' of the social world. It
can only think that it can by creating rational systems that are in opposition to the
natural laws that determine social reality.
Nonetheless, this position has an ideological twist attached to it. According to
Hayek, in the case of critical rationalism we have the true individualism of the
creative actor -an active and practical individualism- whereas in the second we have a
futile individualism that suffers from an arrogant intellectualism that wants to impose
its otherwise fallacious constructions to other individuals16. In this sense we are not
even talking of a true individualism since the imposition of intellectual construction
on others deprives them of their freedom to act according to their own practical
understanding of the world. In Hayek's own words: ' The refusal to yield to forces
which we neither understand nor can recognise as the conscious decisions of an
intelligent being is the product of an incomplete and therefore erroneous
rationalism^1.
13
Hayek (1982) vol.3 pp. 153-176. See Glasman (1997) pp. 24-27.
14 See Hayek (1982) vol.1 pp. 26-34.
15 See MacCormick (1989) p.43.
16 See Hayek (1949) chapter one.
17
Hayek (1944) p. 152.
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What should be stressed here is that the world that Hayek refers to is not the
physical external world that is studied by the social sciences but the social world that
is the outcome of our combined actions. However, as according to libertarianism the
laws of the market are natural laws and not socially negotiated norms, the
methodology and the cognitive rigour of the positive sciences should provide the rule
of their cognisance: These rules express natural truths that just have to be discovered.
From there it naturally follows that they cannot be susceptible to criticism but rather
accepted as a datum. If we want to summarise the libertarian view we can say that
libertarianism advocates that a market based society (or catallactic society according
to the terminology of Hayek) should be cognised on the basis of an 'is', but never
18criticised on the basis of a normative 'ought' that challenges its structure . Otherwise
it would be as if a physicist tried to criticise the laws of gravity as unfair.
What we mean by this is that libertarians do not perceive social norms as
deriving from the need of an arrangement of the terms of the human symbiosis that is
contingent in its normative demands but rather as inexorably stemming from a pre-
given cognitive assumption, this being the assumption that the market order is
intrinsically rational. As such a market economy based on the rules of free
competitive exchange becomes the basis of social organisation. This in turn has as a
consequence that the free exchange market should be the source that detennines the
content of the norms that govern the terms of human symbiosis.
As market order is perceived as a natural fact, any social structure that is
constructed around different premises is a contra naturam aberration that simply has
to be abolished as a creation of the limited human mind that in its arrogance wants to
supplant nature with itself. Practically this means that a society that is structured
around the function of the free market cannot allow 'extraneous' (in the sense of not
justified by the market) demands to disrupt its function. This means that any view that
contests the validity of the model of the market-based society is condemned not only a
sign of cognitive fallacy but moreover a sign of moral arrogance. In this respect we
can see how the otherwise unpredictable market structure is transformed into an all
encompassing determining prima causa that causally determines the terms and
conditions of human symbiosis. The laws of the market as stemming from the strict
determinism of its function, a function that is beyond the sphere of human control,
18 'A complex civilisation like ours is based on the individual adjusting himself to changes whose cause
and nature he cannot understand' ibid. p. 151.
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produce norms that cannot be rejected by practical reason. Catallaxy does not produce
rational, socially negotiated norms but rather cognitively 'discovers' imperatives that
exist as natural facts. In other words, the rules of catallaxy do not derive their
legitimation from a rationally accepted 'ought' but rather from an externally
determined 'must'19.
In this way neo-liberalism seems to suffer from an acute contradiction: On the
one hand evolution is spontaneous but on the other it is guided by the unyielding laws
of the market, laws that as such cannot be changed by the human will. As the notion
of constructive rationalism would have it, evolution through constant adaptation
might be the pattern that determines the market order but evolution and adaptation
cannot overcome the structure of the market order. In other words, the notion of
evolution becomes an explanatory argument for the justification the model; evolution
does not affect the model which functions on the basis ofwell defined premises.
In this respect it cannot be stressed how succinct in noticing this contradiction was
the comment made by G. Lukacs that ' The capitalist process ofrationalisation based
on private economic calculation requires that every manifestation of life shall exhibit
this very interaction between details which are subject to laws and a totality that is
20ruled by chance. It presupposes a society so structured''' .
In this way liberalism seems to have to confront a problem of ideological identity:
On the one hand it presents itself as the natural heir of the ideas of the great project of
enlightenment that professed the power of human reason and raised the rational
individual as the supreme moral value; whilst on the other it denounces the basis upon
which this moral supremacy of the individual is based, namely its capacity as a free
acting person to create and maintain on the basis of reason the social world s/he
inhabits. Reason in this respect is challenged in its most radical dimension as
discovered by the enlightenment, namely as an instrument of critique21. Through the
neo-liberal doctrine the reflexivity of reason is lost. Reason cannot criticise itself in its
creation. The market order eventually becomes a natural-logical datum cannot be
altered through rational human action. The product of reason i.e. the market-based
society cannot be criticised by reason itself. In this respect human reason evades
human control. As a result, the creativity of human reason, its ability to dissolve and
19 For an analogy on the rationality and the normative results of strict deterministic thought see Cassirer
(1979) p.71.
20 Lukacs (1971) p. 102.
21 See Cassirer (1979).
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reconstruct"" that was discovered by the philosophy of the enlightenment finds its
absolute limitation in the primacy and the moralisation of the market order. This is an
order that has been created by a higher order of reason that as economic rationality
becomes a kind of a supreme meta-reason that provides the criteria for the validity of
all social action.
We will now turn to the moral and legal implications of the libertarian position.
Our main position will be that the idealisation of the market order has as a
consequence the conflation of society with the market with the result of the
suppression of the needs and desires of a social sphere that produces its discourses
autonomously from the economic system on the basis of a rationality that resists its
subsumption to the capitalist economic discourse.
1.3. The moral, political and legal implications of the market order
As we have already said, one basic position of both liberal and neo-liberal moral
doctrine is the notion that freedom is the supreme moral value. Liberalism exalted the
value of the freedom of the individual. Neo-liberalism supported its claims on the
assumption that freedom is guaranteed in a market society, where individuals are free
to pursue their self-interests unconstrained from social relations of dependency and
domination. It is thus that the moral dimension of the market emerges: The market is
the outcome and simultaneously the protective mechanism of human freedom.
In linking the traditional individualism of classical liberalism with libertarianism
Hayek defines liberty as ' the absence of coercion, or as the independence from the
arbitraiy will of another' ?A According to him coercion is defined as the use of
individuals as a means for the ends of others. As Hayek has put ' ...freedom refers
solely to relation ofmen to men, and the only infringement on it is coercion by men'.26
Under this perception coercion as a social relation becomes personalised. It
presupposes a power relation that can be expressed only in interpersonal terms, as for
example it existed in antiquity between the slave owner and the slave or in feudal
times between the lord and the vassal. Coercion can characterise human action only in
22 See Hardt and Negri (2000) p.204 on Spinoza. For a general overview see again Cassirer (1979)
23 See among his other works especially Hayek (1944) chapter one.
24
Hayek (1960) p. 12
25 Ibid. p. 21
26 Ibid. p. 12
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so far as other individuals attempt to direct it for their own benefit. Under this
definition, any form of structural coercion, social or institutional, is rendered
invisible, as for example is the one from the poverty that can be generated by the
market allocation of resources. However, the market order as 'impersonal' by default
cannot be coercive, since coercion can only be a characteristic of human relations. In
the visible absence of a particular arbitrary will of a physical person, coercion either
does not exist or it 'is deprived from its most harmful characteristics by being
confined to limited and foreseeable duties, or at least made independent of the
27
arbitrary will ofanother person' .
Eventually, under the libertarian prism, freedom becomes a market-determined
concept. As the market is the institution that guarantees freedom, freedom comes to
mean the unconstrained capability to participate in the market 'game' according to its
laws.
As a result of the belief in the inherent morality of the market based society
libertarians hold that any criticism that upholds the view that the market structure
produces unjust social results is either irrelevant or the result of social envy28. This
brings us to the notion of justice. For example for Hayek, justice finds its fulfilment in
the agreement upon the rules that regulate social action. In bridging traditional
liberalism with libertarianism and building on the work of Hobbes, Hayek asserts that
these rules are actually the rules of the free market29. The market is the primary field
of interaction of individuals. The individual through the instance of the encounter
with the other does not form him/herself, as was the case for Hegel; the individual
fully detennined and as such pre-exists any such encounter .
Hayek's fundamental determining maxim of distributive justice, a maxim that
was actually originally expressed by Hobbes31 is that the fair share of everyone in the
social product is detennined by the usefulness that one has for his fellow man.
Nonetheless, this usefulness can only be assessed through the process of free
exchange in the competitive market. It is the amount of money that the other, any
other is willing to pay for someone's particular services which are provided in a
competitive way in the free market that detennines this merit. In this sense, my
27 Ibid. p. 21. On the application of the definition in employment see Hayek (1960) p. 136.
28
Hayek (1960) p. 93
29
Amongst his other works see Hayek (1982) Vol. 2. On Hobbes see Macpherson (1962) chapter two.
30 For the conception of the individual as a homo clausus see the excellent analysis by Elias (1978)
pp.245-253.
31
Macpherson (1962) p. 90.
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usefulness is determined by the measure of the need of the other, from the quality of
the services that I have to offer, in the price that offer them in a strictly competitive
environment. Through this schema libertarians attempt to dismiss the argument that
the catallactic principle of distribution is egoistic, since it acknowledges the priority
of the need of the other and imposes on the actor the condition of its prior satisfaction,
as a prerequisite for the satisfaction of his/her own needs. Even if this as a theoretical
schema may not sound absurd, it starts from a principle that understands social action
as stemming from individual and nothing but individual desire for utility
maximisation. The flaw of the libertarian line of reasoning lies on the fact that it
attempts to construct a moral argument in favour of the market by discovering a moral
dimension in a relation that is purely instrumental. The libertarian notion of the
individual as a rational market actor is what determines the schema and not the
intrinsic moral value of the other. In other words, the significance of the other does
not lie on the integrity of his/her personality, not in his/her moral value as a person
32
per se, but rather on the fact that my need satisfaction has to pass through him/her .
The other does not determine my action as a result of her/his intrinsic moral value but
only as a means to the satisfaction ofmy needs. The other in the libertarian doctrine is
not perceived as postulated as an end in him/herself'3. My action towards the other is
detennined by his/her utility to me. And in reverse order, his/her action towards me is
determined by my utility to him/her.
Therefore the relation between Ego and Alter despite the methodological disdain
of Hayek for utilitarian solutions34 becomes a strictly utilitarian one. If Ego and Alter
cannot assist each other in the satisfaction of their needs then they are at best
indifferent to each other as moral entities. In this respect, the libertarian moral
argument comes up against the moral framework of social interaction that it has itself
established. This is so, since in the libertarian understanding of interaction the need of
the other cannot has no merit irrespective from the material needs of Ego.
Moreover, as economic action is strictly purposive and instrumental, the social
relations that it produces are also instrumental and determined by the ends-means
schema. In other words the interdependence of individuals as imposed by the market
produces a relation that is instrumental, contingent upon self-interest and with no real
32 ' The market community as such is the most impersonal relationship ofpractical life into which
humans can enter with one another.' Weber (1978) p. 636.
33 For the formulation of this moral imperative see Kant (1964) p.96.
34
Hayek (1982) pp. 17-24. MacCormick (1989) p.50.
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moral basis. As a consequence it creates a mechanical social bond where the other is
not internalised as a value per se in the sphere of moral beliefs and actions. S/he
remains external and morally indifferent35. As a result the individual that liberalism
put forward as a moral value is lost. On the contrary what remains are objective
relations between actors that have no moral capacity as individuals. The market
functions on the basis of fonnal rules that have the quality of avoiding substantive
moral questions that answer to demands that have to do with moral values. On the
contrary the individual market actor is perceived as someone that has limited social
responsibility towards the other36; a responsibility that solely lies in the observance of
the rules of the market 'game'.
This notion of individualism as understood by libertarianism has as another result
a deep distrust towards the notion of collectivity. For example Hayek claimed that
coercion comes from the collectivity upon the individual37. However, and although
the collectivity can be a source of coercion upon the individual we should not forget
that it can also be a source of solidarity and of moral embeddedness. Nonetheless,
libertarians as a starting from the notion of the primordial self do not recognise the
existence of legitimate collective interests since for them social action is always
->o
action of the free individual . In summarising we can say that libertarianism in the
last instance imposes market action as the measure of morality. This approach has
many implications which we will continue to trace. What we will try to show is that for
libertarianism moral rules are instrumental as to the success of the market order and
posses no inherent value by themselves39.
35 For a similar analysis on the superficiality of the morality of this kind of interaction see Durkheim
(1984) pp. 334-337.
36 On the notion of responsibility see Hayek (1949) pp. 17-20.
37
Hayek accepts the action of groups as friendly societies but as organised actors considers it coercive
(1982) vol. 3 pp. 150-152.
38 We do not claim here that libertarians deny the moral validity of the existence of all collective bodies
in general for such a thing would be a non factual absurdity, but even in cases where they accept the
legitimacy of collective body they always perceive it as an association of distinct individuals that can
never be determined in their essence by the collective body. See among his other works, Hayek (1944)
24-32. On the importance of the role of associations in a catallactic society see Hayek (1982) vol. 2
pp. 150-152.
39 See for example Fukuyama (1996) pp. 158-159. His analysis although has as its aim the recognition
of non-institutional, cultural variants to economic development and growth has operated within the
limits of the rationality of the economic system. In his analysis trust is not seen as a social condition
that stems from shared moral worldviews but as an abstract cultural factor that is exhausted as a virtue
upon its contribution on the creation of large-scale corporations. Besides the fact that one may have
many reservations with his analysis it is indicative that for him trust finds its limits upon its economic
usefulness. On the point where trust as a social principle becomes "unproductive" is turned into some
short of a negative value.
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We have so far seen the main positions of libertarianism as it concerns the moral
vision that the market order produces. What we will see next is how these basic
principles are applied in the libertarian understanding of labour.
2. Neo-liberalism and Labour
The basic distinction that will guide our analysis is again the relation between
property and labour as it underlies the ambivalence between its social character and
its economic function. We have seen so far that labour as a creative action is both
economic and social and that this dual character cannot be negated. However, what I
will argue is that libertarianism perceives labour strictly as an economic category thus
consciously silencing its social character and its dimension as an expression of human
creativity. In this respect I will argue that the libertarian view of labour due to its
sanctification of property and due to its methodological individualism, whenever
imposed on employment relations subjects labour to the determination of property,
with the eventual result of suppressing its social character and consequently silencing
its demands as a social creative force.
As we have demonstrated in chapter one through the legal device of contract the
labour of the employee is assimilated to that of the employer. We have seen there that
although in the final instance labour provides the legitimating principle for the
institutional arrangement of capitalist society its claim is exhausted in the
performance of the contract. Consequently, its creative force is appropriated and
assimilated by property and as such is determined by its interests and its logic.
According to this view as was expressed by Locke, rights are natural and as such pre¬
exist any institutional arrangement and in no way derive their validity from its
approval. The latter comes to existence in order to protect the already existing rights,
not to create them. Therefore in it labour has only the rights that appertain to the
person of the labourer according to the principle of self-ownership. If according to
this principle the labourer has freely entered by his/her own free will to a contract for
the provision of his/her services then the only s/he deserves is what s/he has freely
contracted for. This means that labour in post social contract society can claim no
right by virtue of its creativity or of its social significance, since the right of labour
has already been recognised in the principle of self-ownership and rewarded through
the performance of the contract.
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Libertarians would attempt to circumvent this contradiction by deploying the
argument of property as justified through the notion of self-ownership. A libertarian
would argue that the propertyless in a market society nonetheless have the opportunity
to enhance their position and acquire property upon things through their participation
in the market, through the exercise of their skills and abilities, in other words through
their labour (which of course according to the principle of self-ownership is their
property). Here we encounter again the abstract character of libertarian social theory.
The libertarians present us with a society were what legally exists in abstracto also
substantively exists in concreto. Libertarians consider that since there are no legal
restrictions for the participation in the market there are no social ones either.
Libertarians consider that anyone can participate in the market game without taking
into account the constraints that are imposed on individuals by the inequalities that are
produced through the modern class system. In other words they presume that the
conditions of entry in the market are the same for everyone. However, social and class
origins determine the availability of resources and knowledge and as such as play a
vital role in the opportunities that each individual has in participating in the market
game40. As libertarians would have it the child of a factory worker and the child of the
factory owner can go to work in the same factory under the same conditions. It is in
this sense that we can see libertarianism as based on ideological abstractions that
ignore social positions as a factor for the determination of social conditions.
Libertarianism in other words projects a rationally constructed social model whilst at
the same time ignores the realities that this model is supposed to accommodate. Social
needs are conflated with market needs.
At another level we can see how the ideological justification of property through
labour dictates a certain understanding of labour. We have seen in chapter one that
labour in capitalism is determined in its substance by property. Under its consequent
market perception labour becomes nothing but a quantifiable object of exchange. We
do not mean by this that capitalism nullifies the creative power of labour. On the
contrary, as we have seen it totally depends upon it. The crucial point here is again the
power of determination of the creativity of labour. The point is that in capitalism this
power rests with property. This means that labour should be creative, but not for its
own sake, not for its own immediate interest, but rather for property's goals and
40 For the structure of the reproduction of class differences see Bourdieu (1984).
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purposes. In capitalism property holds the prerogative to determine when labour is to
be creative and when mundane and meaningless; and this according to its own needs.
As a result neither society nor labour itself can be the measure of its own creativity.
On the contrary this creativity is determined by the capitalist economic system
through the market exchange process.
This analysis leads us to the point where the usefulness of labour is not
understood as social usefulness, as the satisfaction of needs and desires not even as a
contribution to a way of life but in its value as a an exchangeable product. The point is
that as an object of exchange labour becomes an object that has to be determined as to
its value as everything else that circulates in the free market.
What is of interest of us here is to see source of the determination of this value.
As we have seen labour for the labourer in capitalism like every other commodity is
realised as exchange value41. What does this practically mean: As Locke himself has
said value has nothing to do with ' the intrinsic natural worth ofanything''41. And as
Arendt has succinctly remarked, something becomes a value from the moment that it
appears in public and somebody recognises it as such. No object has an absolute value
attached a priori to it. According to Arendt the value of any object '...consists solely
in the esteem of the public realm where the things appear as commodities and it is
neither labor, nor work, nor capital norprofit, nor material which bestows such value
upon an object, but only and exclusively the public realm where it appears to be
esteemed, demanded, or neglected' 43. And Marx himself has said that things or ideas
or moral ideals 'become values only in their social relationship'44. In a similar vein
Simmel argued that value is a relative concept that is realised and objectified through
an act of exchange between two individuals that mutually satisfy their desires. The
factor of mutuality as it appears in the act of exchange is what creates and sustains
value45. And as we have said in the previous chapter the quest for an objective value
of labour regardless of the valuation of others is a futile undertaking46. This means
that the value of labour as any other value is detennined by the subjective needs and
desires of others. Does this mean that we accept here the free market treatment of
41
Marx (1973) p. 305-306. See also chapter one section 5.
42 Locke 'Considerations upon the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value ofMoney, Collected
Works (1801),II, p.21 cited in H. Arendt (1958) pl64.
43 H. Arendt ibid. p. 164.
44
Marx, Capital Vol. 3 p.689 cited in Arendt op. cit. p. 165
45 See Simmel (1978) pp. 59-101.
46 See chapter one section 5 on Marx.
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labour as a position that is universal and of the free market from thinkers that were not
liberals? The answer to the question depends on whether Arendt's public realm,
Marx's notion of value as a social relation and Simmel's notion of the relational
objectification of value through mutuality can be accommodated with the liberal
notion of the free exchange market. The answer is that it obviously cannot. Neither of
them denied the unquestionable superiority of the market economy, a superiority that
has been proved by the unprecedented success of capitalist economy. Our objection
here has to do with the particularity of labour and whether it can be submitted to the
process of free market exchange and not with the exchange mechanism itself.
In other words our problem does not lie with the process of exchange as such,
which undeniably is one of the basic forms of social interaction, but rather with the
liberal and neo-liberal understanding of labour. The problem lies in the subsumption
of labour under the logic of the process of the exchange of commodities that have
been deprived of all their substantial properties47.
The difference between the public realm that Arendt described and the libertarian
free market, is that the market is not the open forum for the exchange of opinions,
ideas and objects as they stem from human praxis but rather a space for the exchange
of self-determined and self-legitimating property rights. Unlike the market the public
realm is not determined by the logic of property. Moreover, value may be a social
relation as Marx has asserted but the problem is who determines the terms of this
relation. Labour in capitalism -and here we find the problems that Hegel discovered in
the exchange of labour- does not exchange its products and thus create the parameters
of the determination of value as stemming from a relation of mutual satisfaction of
desires, but on the contrary it is exchanged itself as an impersonal commodity. The
problem here rests on the fact that whereas labour becomes productive in and through
the relation of exchange of its product, in the capitalist market it erases itself through
the act of its exchange as a being a product itself. The crucial fact rests on the fact that
the exchange of labour qua product itself is not a relation where the self exchanges
but rather where the self is exchanged. The problem is that in the capitalist labour
market what is exchanged evades the logic of the market. Human creativity not only
as stemming from labour but also from e.g. art cannot be exclusively assessed in
economic terms. Our objection here has not so much to do with the determination of
47 See the classical analysis by Marx on commodity fetishism (1976) pp. 160-177
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the value of labour but rather with the source and the logic of the determination of
labour per se as exclusively economic in the capitalist sense.
Relative to this is the libertarian understanding of the compensation, the value of
labour i.e. the wage. Libertarians advocate that the wage as the price of every other
commodity should be determined by the market and only by the market48. The
position that perhaps best encapsulates the economically determined libertarian
understanding of labour is the assertion by Hayek that the wage is nothing but an
indication to the worker as to which sector of the market s/he should orient his/her
activity49. This assertion has major normative implications. First of all it divests
labour from all claims that can be justified on the basis of it being a creative action
with a positive contribution to society. The wage is not a fair compensation for a
performed act, for a creative effort. The wage is an indication that refers to the
fluctuations of the market not to the labour process. This means that the wage no
longer refers to the act of labour but to the self-referential norms of the labour market
that, according to the libertarianism are by default are just. Consequently, the notion
of the wage as the just compensation of labour loses its reference to a notion of social
justice, a notion that libertarianism abolishes as meaningless50 and becomes totally
market determined. The character of labour as social action becomes silenced and as a
result the rights that it may claim in virtue of this social dimension become totally de-
legitimated. As s result, for libertarians there can be no right to a fair wage, a fairness
that is understood on the basis of what society may consider as just, since social
justice is concept devoid of meaning, as not market determined. As market
determined labour has only the rights explicitly stipulated in the labour contract, i.e. in
the legal form that regulates the act of exchange of labour as a commodity.
The market perception of labour is tied to the market perception of employment.
If labour is collapsed into the exchange of a commodity then the labourer is but a
property right holder that exchanges it in the free market. Employment becomes a
relation between two property rights holders. The employee who has a right of
property over his/her labour power and the employer who has a right over the means
of production and who needs the labour power of the worker in order to put them in
48
According to Hayek as it stands for the price of every other commodity, every market determination
of a wage should be deemed as valid in the absence of violence, fraud and deception Hayek (1982)
Vol.2 p.141. See also Hayek (1960) p.282 and (1982) Vol. 2 p.75.
49
Hayek (1980) pp.28-29 and Hayek (1982) Vol.3 p. 144.
50 See Hayek (1982) vol. 2, chapter 9.
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action. The complexity of employment is collapsed into a straightforward case of
market exchange. It is under this prism that we can understand the role of the free
labour market in capitalism. Labour is the precondition for the production of
commodities and the labour market provides this production with a constant supply of
labour to be used according to the needs and the rationality of capitalist production. In
this respect the labour market in the last instance is nothing but the device through
which the market could apply market criteria to labour.
Having explored the commodification of labour as marketable commodity we
will now turn to law, to see how this domestication is effected legally and legitimated
through law's devices. Libertarian legal theory aims at justifying the basic premises of
the libertarian approach, which perceives the value of individual freedom as supreme
and as the source of its commitment to the legal institution of the rule of law.
3. Libertarians, Labour and Law
3.1 Libertarians and the rule of law
The main libertarian position is that any legal rule should be something
impersonal and rational that should not command action but rather determine the
limits within which action can take place freely. This means that no legal rule should
be crested by any particular will, for the fear of being coercive. As a result the rule
has to be impersonal and rational. The rationality of the law lies in the fact that it
should follow and accommodate rational human action. However since according to
libertarians reason is what has created and sustained the market structure the law
should adapt itself to its unyielding realities. As Hobbes has put it long before
libertarianism, just is what is not opposed to reason51. This has as a result that the
normative structure of human symbiosis is rationally given through the natural
orientation of action in the market, with the law having the task to formalise this
structure and protect it with the power of sanctions that it possesses. If we follow the
libertarian logic then the system of the rule of law becomes the perfect legal
counterpart of the market order. Just as the market, it was invented by no one but
emerged through an evolutionary process . Thus the rule of law is in correspondence
51 See Macpherson (1962) p.75
52 Gamble (1996) p.98
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with the ideal of critical or evolutionary rationalism in opposition to substantive law
that appears to be the equivalent of constructive rationalism. In other words the rule of
law guarantees the correspondence of law to the structure of interaction in the market.
According to libertarians only the rule of law can guarantee human freedom, since
only the rule of law guarantees the function of the market mechanism that as we have
seen according to libertarians unlike the human will is not coercive53. We see once
more the unwarranted libertarian derivation of the 'ought' from the 'is'. Norms cannot
be negotiated on the basis of the interaction of social interests and discourses. They
are rather given through the 'impersonal' market order. If a norm, even if it is socially
accepted as valid, runs contrary to the rationality of the market order has to abolished
as either unnatural or coercive or both.
It is worth mentioning two things here: The first concerns the notion of formal
legal equality that the rule of law established. The rule of law presumes all individuals
as equals before the law. This principle -apart from being one of the cornerstones of
our legal culture- expresses as well one of the basic moral foundations of the free
exchange market. We have seen that the main moral argument in favour of the market
was that any person is free to participate on an equal footing regardless of available
resources or power as everybody else in the market game, the rules of the game being
the same for everyone. The principle of legal equality in this respect can be seen as
the legal aspect of the argument. The rule of law in other words comes and guarantees
with the force of the law of the state the moral framework of the market order.
The second point has to do with the legal understanding of the individual in its
moral relation to its social world and the consequences that this approach has for the
legal understanding of the collectivity in general and of collective rights in particular.
Liberalism advocates, as we have seen, a concept of individuality as socially
unembedded (given how fundamental labour is to the constitution of the social
self.)54. This in combination to the individualistic approach of the person as rational
market actor shapes the libertarian view on social and moral responsibility. It is the
primacy of the individual over the collectivity that narrows down the ambit of
responsibility of the actor first of all in the observance of the rules of the market game
and secondly to the duty of care that one has (only) to one's loved ones, since it is
53 On Hayek's views on the rule of law see in particular J. Gray, Hayek on Liberty (1986) pp. 61-71
54 See Maclntyre (1981) chapter 9, Taylor (1979) pp.157-159, Sandel (1982) pp.94-100.
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only they that are dependant on his/her action55. In the first case they are motivated by
utilitarian and in the second by affective considerations.
I will here rehearse a largely familiar critique of liberalism and neo-liberalism
that nonetheless will be proved extremely useful in the next two chapters when we
will deal with the legal understanding of labour as collective action. It is exactly this
primacy of the individual over the collective body that determines the limits of his/her
social responsibility. Since the individual pre-exists and creates society for the
protection of his/her self-interests s/he cannot be bound by it in a course of action that
would contradict and negate those self same self-interests. It is this primacy of the
individual in the libertarian schema that prohibits the collective body to impose duties
upon the former. In other words no collectivity can impose to the individual a positive
duty in the sense of an obligation to proceed to a certain course of action since the
power of the state over the individual can be extended only to the degree that the
individual has agreed to hand over to it. The primacy of the individual that is derived
as a fact of reason has as a consequence that the moral responsibility of the former
should not have a substantive content that would command the observance of specific
duties. The imposition of such an obligation would directly violate the market order,
on the basis of substantive beliefs of a collective body that has rights upon the
individual, rights that extend beyond the observance of the rules of the market game.
Therefore any such imposition would be arbitrary and coercive. According to
libertarians individuals and only individuals have rights and these rights are negative
rights or immunities that protect their private sphere from infringements56. Moreover,
the individual cannot possibly have an abstract duty of care towards the other that is
imposed on the basis of coexistence within the same moral, social and finally
institutional framework nor on the basis of social solidarity. For example, according
to Hayek the notion of solidarity is irreconcilable with the market57. This is so since
the individual as the absolute moral unit has absolute responsibility for him/herself
and cannot be coerced into serving ends that are not his/hers58. Here we discover
another dimension of the principle of self-ownership a notion that is central for the
whole construction of the libertarian view. Since the individual owns itself, s/he has
responsibility only for itself. S/he can neither accept nor request responsibility for its
55 See this chapter, footnote 35.
56
Hayek (1982) Vol. 2 p. 101.
57 Ibid, p.lll.
58 Ibid. p. 149
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own person from someone else since that would result in its determination by another
will i.e. to the negation of his/her freedom. There is an important clarification that
should be made here. Libertarians do not oppose the provision of help to those who
are socially weaker. On the contrary both traditional and neo-liberalism have
traditionally relied on charity in order to relieve the burden from those who have
fallen victims of the unpredictability of the fluctuations of the market. What they have
vehemently resisted is the obligation to do so. For them help was a religious duty that
could never be translated into a legally enforceable legal obligation as such a thing
would remove any moral merit from the act of assisting the needy other!59
As a result the only obligation the individual has towards the other lies in the
observance of the rules of the market game and nothing else. This means that the
individual has to abstain from the use of violence and fraud since through them not
only would the freedom of the other person is violated, but moreover the function of
the market is contaminated. In conclusion we could say that libertarianism finds in the
principles of the rule of law a legal point of view that is in accordance with the ideal
of the market society. This is not to deny the value of the rule of law. Our objection
that is going to be articulated more clearly as we proceed with our analysis is whether
the rule of law as a legal approach can be adequate in itself in providing legal
solutions to problems as they stem from the multifariousness of the employment
relation, a multifariousness that is ignored by the rationality of the free market. Our
claim is that it cannot. And it is this that we are going to try and prove next.
3.2. Employment and the shift from status to contract.
We have seen that for libertarianism employment is like any other market
relation. In our analysis above we saw that the rule of law provides the basic
presuppositions for this exchange to take place in a catallactic society. In this respect
contract and especially the doctrine of the freedom of contract should be seen as
linked to the market and to a market based society60. Contract provides the
cornerstone for the legal regulation of exchange. This means that contractually based
understanding of employment will eventually subsume it under the rationality of the
market.
59 See F. Ewald (2000) pp. 131-134.
60 See A. Kronman and R. Posner (1979) p.2-3
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However as the doctrine of freedom of contract is fundamental for libertarian
legal theory and as it has been extremely influential in the fonnation of the system of
employment relations in modernity an analysis in reference to the historical-
sociological parameters that led to its prevalence would be very helpful at this point,
as it will demonstrate the ideological foundations upon which the nonnative idea of
employment as a fonn of legally protected market relation is built.
As we are going to see contract did not always have the fonn that it has today. It
was not always a legal instrument for the creation of voluntary obligations based on
the free will of the rational individual actor who pursued his/her self interest. On the
contrary as we are going to see the notion of purposive, task oriented contract is
historically connected to fonns of capitalist exchange. As Weber demonstrated legal
obligations in medieval, pre-capitalist societies were created on the basis of the
principle of social status and involved the whole sphere of the social relations of the
individual. The individual was legally detennined by his/her status in the sense that
the legal rights and obligations but also her/his social situation in general were
prescribed to her/him in virtue of the social stratum that s/he belonged. His/her social
condition was not the outcome of her/his free action as a citizen that determined
through his/her social action his/her social situation. In the cases were legal relations
were voluntarily created and shaped according to free will, the legal relation that was
created was very different in essence to what we understand today as voluntarily
created obligation. The obligations and the subsequent rights that would arise might
have been voluntarily incurred but nonetheless involved a total change in the legal
and social situation of the individual. The non-capitalist notion of contract was
distinctly different to our understanding of it. The medieval contract was a kind of
'contract' where a person assumed the obligation to be someone's friend, comrade,
wife, vassal etc. In Weber's words: 'the contract rather meant that the person would
become something different in quality (or status) from the quality he possessed
before'6I. Contract was detennined by affective considerations, as they were
perceived by a system of traditional social relations. The ideological function of
contract was to endow coercive power relations as they stemmed from the rigid social
stratification of a traditional, and immutable according to its self-perception - society,
with the legitimating excuse of the voluntary acceptance of the given order of things
61 Weber (1978) p. 672.
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by all the parties involved. In other words contract involved either the endowment of
a privilege or/and the acknowledgement of a social dependency that derived its
eventual legitimation from the fact that it was voluntarily concluded . In other words
its function was originally social and not commercial. It was not market but rather
social considerations that determined it as an instrument for the voluntary creation of
legal obligations.
From an historical point of view, we can say that the emergence of the market-
oriented economy was the main factor that gave major significance to contract.
According to Weber contract started to acquire importance when the economic unit of
'household' started losing its autarchy and increasingly had to barter with other
economic units i.e. other households outside of it; an instance that was critical for the
z. -3
creation of the free exchange market .
Contract in the free exchange market becomes an instrument that gives legal
meaning to a rational exchange relation of economic nature. It imposes a legal
obligation that it is voluntarily assumed, limited in its scope and purposive-rational in
its character. It should be stressed here that purposive, task oriented contracts existed
where we had the presence of capitalist commercial activity such as ancient Athens,
or in the merchant cities of Medieval Europe such as Amsterdam or Antwerp.
Largely, in these cases contracts involved the regulation of specific economic
relations that mainly had to do with maritime commerce that it was operating on a
capitalist basis. This means that purposive contract pre-existed capitalist societies; it
was however inexorably linked to capitalist fonns of economic activity, since it could
perfectly grasp and regulate the formal and purposive character of capitalist
commodity exchange64. The huge qualitative difference is that with the advent of
62 It is interesting to be noted at this point that in the Feudal times hierarchical relations of dependency
such as lord and vassal or baron and kind were ceremonially sealed through the voluntary acceptance
by the weakest party of the legitimate power over him of the hierarchically higher. The point is that
even then an act of consent as it stemmed from the free will of the individual was essential for the
assumption for the creation of any legal obligation. See Bloch (1989) Book two.
63 Weber (1978) pp. 668-681.
64 For example in ancient Athens we have complete freedom of contract, especially after the second
half of the 5th century B.C. The difference however, lies in the fact that in the Athenian polis freedom
of contract was not the organisational principle of the constitution of the city state or of the fomi of •
government. It was rather its indirect result. It mainly had to do with the separation between the public
and the private sphere; between public virtue and private interest. The Athenian democracy may have
created the concept of the free citizen but has produced very little in terms of commercial law. This was
largely left to the discretion and the autonomy of the free citizens through contract. Moreover, contract
had nothing to do with the political organisation of the city state. The notion of social contract is
inconceivable in ancient Greece. The point to be made here is that we have the emergence of legal
forms that regulate forms of capitalist economic relations in societies that cannot be characterised as
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capitalism purposive contract surpasses its peripheral character as a legal instrument
for the regulation of market relations that largely have to do with banking and
maritime commerce and becomes a fundamental principle of social organisation.
First of all with the advent of the free purposive contract we have a major change
in what concerns the source of legal obligation, a change that in its turn meant a
profound transfonnation on the understanding of the individual in its relation to the
normative order of society. It is no longer traditional norms that create legal
obligations and rights, but rather the individual will. Purposive contracts impose
obligations that have been voluntarily created and assumed. This means that the
individual is not entangled by virtue of his/her status in a normative web that
authoritatively regulates his/her position in life. On the contrary s/he creates it. The
notion of individual autonomy is now a value of paramount importance. The
individual can perceive him/herself as a free social and rational actor who is able and
capable to pursue her/his self-interest. We can see now the ideological affinity of
modern contract to both classical and neo-liberalism. It is the notion of individual
autonomy, the right of the person to freely pursue its self-interest that underpins both
theories. Unlike traditional societies where the obligation was due to a web of
personal or family dependencies now the obligation is inexorably tied to the right of
an individual to bind him/herself in a certain course of action through an act of his/her
free will; a will that is expressed in a legally binding promise to do so65.
In what concerns us here we have a profound transfonnation of the labour
relation in both its social and its legal perception. The vocational structure that
hitherto was regulated by status is now regulated by contract. The individual worker
no longer has the obligation to follow a vocational path that has been prescribed to
him by status relations (i.e. the son of the craftsman that has a duty to continue the
household enterprise) but on the contrary he can choose it by participating in the free
labour market that is created as an essential prerequisite for the predominance of the
capitalist system66. As a result, the source of regulation of the labour relation per se is
capitalist. As such and although we do have freedom of contract and purposive contracts in many
capitalist or quasi capitalist economies we do not have them as organisational principles of society and
government until the advent of capitalism. As Marx has said is that although we do have many forms
of capitalist accumulation in history we do not have capitalism until these forms become socially
predominant Marx (1976) pp 1021-1023. Moreover another difference lies in the fact that ifwe accept
freedom of contract as an organisational principle of society we accept the primacy of the economic
orientation of action, a primacy that the Athenian polis could not accept.
65 See Atiyah (1979) pp. 139-193 and pp. 398-454. See also Fried (1981).
66 See Weber on the preconditions for the emergence of capitalism. Weber (1999) pp. 43-45.
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changed. It is not the rules of the guild that regulated the relationship between the
craftsman and the worker; on the contrary in capitalism the rules of employment, in
theory at least, are mutually created by both, through the conclusion of the contract of
employment. In theory at least the worker can become anything s/he pleases and
anything that his/her abilities allow him/her to be67.
On the sociological level this change is parallel to the profound transformation of
the workplace a transformation that was the outcome of the emergence of the
capitalist mode of production. The workshop with its personalised labour relations
was substituted by the impersonal capitalist work organisation. In this sense the
labour contract prevailed due to the fact that it was the ideal legal instrument to
regulate the relations that the factory system created. Employment in the factory or in
the bank was a relation of mutual personal disinterest that was voluntarily concluded
on the basis of the operation of the free labour market. It was a relation that begun and
ended at the factory gate. Since in appearance at least no obligation was imposed on
the person of the free labourer apart from the one that s/he has assumed in the contract
his/her personal autonomy theoretically was not violated. Additionally, contract with
the notion of legal parity between the parties imported into the relation the principle
of formal legal equality. The authoritarian character of the capitalist work
organisation was concealed through the pretext of equality that contract provided6 .
As we have seen in the previous chapter and as we are also going to see in the final
chapter as well, the contractual employment relation especially as it is implemented in
the capitalist work organisation is one that is based on the permanent authority and
domination of the one party (employer) over the other (employee). In this respect we
can see the doctrine of freedom of contract as an ideological justification that through
the legal principles of individual autonomy and contractual parity attempts to obscure
the authoritarian elements in the employment relations of capitalism.
We have so far seen the market derivation of the notion of freedom of contract as
it was applied in labour relations. In the next section of this chapter first of all we are
going to examine the interrelation between freedom of contract and libertarianism.
67 However as Marx has shown this meant nothing else than the substitution of traditional forms of
dependence by objective ones that were reproduced through the social class system. Dependency in
other words rather interpersonal and subjective becomes social and objective. Marx (1973) pp. 163-
165.
6S Marx (1976) pp. 549-550. See more on the issue on chapter four section 3.1
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We have briefly traced how, historically, the doctrine of freedom of contract
eventually becomes the legal translation of the imperatives of an economic system
that is based on the notion of the free market. This will allow us to understand the
rationality of the subsumption of employment relation under the freedom of contract
model, and see whether as libertarians suggests such a solution is going to enhance
the individual autonomy of the parties involved in it.
3.3. Liberalism and the contractual perception of labour
We have seen that through the advent of capitalism contract has become the legal
instrument for the regulation of exchange in the free market. The basic principles of
the contractual doctrine especially in its original liberal period have been focused on
this function. We can say that the theory of contractual freedom represented the then
emerging liberal doctrine in the field of legal practice69. This is so since the
contractual doctrine especially in the years that contract attained prominence was
deeply influenced by the principles that the theories that the liberal political economist
of the time provided70. First of all they both shared the same ideal of social relations.
They both projected the ideal of a society based on the rational action of equal in front
of law individuals that are free to pursue their self-interest, in the free market.
Contract is what makes the process of free exchange possible by legally spelling out
agreements and consequently making them enforceable through the state legal system.
Contractual principles are thus aligned to the basic presuppositions of the early
political economy. They share the assumption that exchange is the basic fonn of
social action and that the social structure is developed and sustained through the legal-
contractual regulation of exchange. The role of contract for the early political
economy and liberalism is therefore paramount. Contract as a principle is not only
confined to the legal regulation of economic exchange, it has a wider role according
to the liberal social understanding: Contract encapsulates as an ideology and as a
practice the liberal ideal of a society that comes to life through acts of the free will of
its members that mutually bind themselves in certain courses of action. According to
69 See Atiyah (1979) pp. 292-304
70
Atiyah (1979) pp. 292-323.
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the contractualism, citizens through contract form their legal relations by an act of
their free will, thus freely forming the rules of their social symbiosis71.
The notion of competition as the essential characteristic of the market is
incorporated into the contractual doctrine, as the latter emerges as a form for the
regulation of competitive market relations. In this respect another dimension of
contract, its substantive neutrality, becomes important. The liberal notion that just
procedures produce just results finds its application here72. The doctrine of freedom of
contract thus becomes an ideal measure of distributive justice.
'Justice consisted in ensuring the rules offair play, setting the framework within
which competition was to take place, and then enforcing the results... Basically
those who succeeded owed their success (it was thought) to their own virtues,
while those who failed had only themselves to blame.' 73
We see in this the close connection of the liberal doctrine of contractual freedom
to early liberalism and modern libertarianism. P. Atiyah's account of the
understanding of the notion of justice of the English courts at the height of the
prevalence of the doctrine of the freedom of contract would translate smoothly into an
account of the normative positions not only of Locke or Hobbes but even the more so
ofmodern libertarians such as Hayek, Nozick or Epstein.
This brings us back to Hayek's argument that the success of a rule does not
depend upon the quality of its results in some particular cases. The rules are there to
protect the integrity of the game, not of the participants. If the rules of the game have
not been violated then the legal system should not have a problem with it. This notion
of justice upheld is absolutely in accordance with the libertarian doctrine.
This of course does not mean that contract is just a one-dimensional economic
device for the solution of problems and conflicts as they arise in and for the economic
system. On the contrary as we are going to see in chapter four it has evolved into a
sophisticated multi-dimensional legal instrument that is formed in its content by the
interaction of many discourses Moreover the extensive regulation of contract has
severely curbed the application of the doctrine of freedom of contract74. However, and
despite the fact that these relations as we are going to see involve non-economic
considerations contract has application when an economic goal is at stake. This is so
71 See among others especially Rawls (1971), Scanlon (1998)
72 See Nozick (1974) 215. For a critique see Sandel (1982) p. 112.
73
Atiyah (1979) p. 288
74 See especially Wilhelmsson (ed.) (1993) and Collins (1999)
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since contract by its nature regulates market exchanges that by definition are of
economic significance. The application of contract presupposes a relation that can be
expressed in economic terms, that has an economic meaning even when this relation
is not solely and sometimes even not primarily economic. However, in this case the
originally non-economic stake is translated into the economic discursive genre, and is
regulated by the latter as an economic stake75. This means that when subsumed under
the contractual form social relations are through the legal discourse translated as if
being primarily of economic nature. The social interest that is expressed in the
contract becomes an economic demand that can be legally enforced76.
In this respect Pashukanis was right in saying that the legal form of contract was
the essential expression of the capitalist legal form. In it the exchange relation finds
its expression in what he termed the legal form as a legal relation77. In this respect
contract is but the transposition of the economic practice of free commodity exchange
with all its implications (epistemological assumptions, social theory and
anthropological perceptions) into the legal system. Under this perspective not only we
have the regulation of an economic practice but also the adoption of an ideology that
now has been translated in legal terms. Libertarianism as an ideology becomes state
law.
4. Libertarians on Labour Law
We have seen so far how through contract social relations acquire through their
legal translation a primary economic determination. What we are going to see next is
how employment through the same rationality is divested from its social character and
is reduced to a private economic concern. The libertarian approach is characterised by
the denial of the complexity and the political and social dimension of employment.
On the contrary it recognises only its economic dimension that in its turn it is
75 Classical example of this are prenuptial agreements.
76 For example for Luhmann contract is the legal instrument through which the close structural
coupling between the economy and private law is made possible Luhmann (1993) Das Recht der
Gesselshaft p 459 ff. cited in Teubner (2000) p. 411.
77 Pashukanis (1978) p.121. Although I cannot agree with Pashukanis when he says that outside
contract the legal concepts of the subject and of the free will are lifeless abstractions, since historically
we encounter the existence of the concept of subject even in different guises in social and legal cultures
that were not based on free market exchange. Nonetheless, I do accept that in capitalism the legal
understanding of these two concepts cannot be separated from the notion of free market exchange and
therefore from the notion of freedom of contract.
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subsumed under the logic of the free exchange market. As a consequence the denial of
the social dimension of employment finds its expression in an attack against any
understanding of employment that is not market oriented. The collapse of society into
the market economy allows libertarians to advocate the abolition of all legal measures
that have been adopted in order to mitigate what we perceive as the structural
inequality of the employment relation.
Perhaps the most comprehensive work that provides us with a clear
understanding of the libertarian positions of labour law in late modernity is R.
Epstein's 'A Common Law For Labour Relations'™. In this article Epstein has set the
basic principles upon which the modern libertarian understanding of labour law
should be based.
This article can be considered as seminal because it has heralded the attack
against the employee protection legislation in the USA as it was introduced mainly by
the policies of the 'New Deal'. Epstein advocates the abolition of the welfare state
policies, in favour of a contractually determined, private law approach.
He argues that 'the defence of the common law system is not an assertion that the
market can handle every social problem but that the law ofproperty and the law of
torts are the basis upon which aframework oforiginal rights can be built'19.
He continues: 'Every person owns his own person and can possess, use and
dispose of its labor on whatever terms he sees fit80. To state otherwise is to say either
the labor cannot be used or that someone can direct its use'.
Locke himself could have written this passage; the position of self-ownership as
applied in employment relations cannot find a better justification. The self owns
his/herself and therefore it can dispose his/her property, i.e. his/her labour as s/he sees
fit. Employment is a relation that stems from individual autonomy81. As a result we
have a straightforward opposition to any principle of substantive law. The law cannot
supplant the choice of the individual regardless of the motives and conditions that
affect his/her decisions. As we have seen for libertarians social conditions that
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Epstein (1983) p. 1357. For an overview of the libertarian position on labour law see Epstein and
Paul (1985).
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Epstein (1983) p. 1364. Of course no one (not even Hayek if that says anything) has ever suggested
that the market can provide solutions to every social problem. Nonetheless, in a catallactic society the
market although it is not a panacea it is the source that that provides the rule of decision in situations
concerning the satisfaction of social needs and desires.
80 Ibid. Epstein citing W. Erie "The Law Relating to Trade Unions" 1869
81 It is indicative that Epstein considers employment as a private relation of exchange between
individuals that form this relation in any way that they see fit. Epstein ibid. 1366.
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determine the state of labour are considered as irrelevant. The inequality of bargaining
positions, need and deprivation are not considered by libertarians as forceful
conditions that might curb the principle of free choice.
To give an example: for Epstein the minimum wage requirement is coercive
since it prohibits a worker from finding employment by offering his labour at a lower
price than the customary one82. This is so since through minimum wage the state
supplements the worker in his/her choice of the disposition of his/her labour as s/he
sees fit. The fact that this choice may be conditioned by the social context under
which the offer for the disposition of labour is given (namely coercion under the
pressure of need), or by the collective interest of employees to the preservation of a
high customary standard, here becomes irrelevant as they are not recognised as valid
factors of determination of the content of the employment relation. We see here again
the libertarian perception of the employee as an individual market player that without
being constrained by social bonds and dependencies egotistically pursues his/her self-
interest (the only valid form of interest) in the free labour market. Moreover the fact
that the one who benefits from such an exercise of choice is the employer who,
unconstrained by legal rules, can impose terms and conditions of employment as s/he
sees fit is completely ignored by Epstein.
As for the contract of 'employment at will' that is projected as a credible legal
solution only a brief comment will be made here. The idea of employment at will
should be seen as an extreme version of the doctrine of freedom of contract as applied
in employment relations. The advocates of employment at will basically ask for the
possibility of the conclusion of the contract of employment according only to the free
will of the parties. Additionally the termination of employment can be unilaterally
decided by either of them without any restrictions as imposed by unfair dismissal
regulations. The argument again is based on contract law principles. The idea that
underpins the justification of employment at will is again that of private autonomy
through the free disposition of labour. We have seen that this is the principle that
libertarians want to govern employment relations. Therefore employment at will as a
direct expression of private autonomy should be the guiding principle regulating




limitations but cannot be excluded from whole social areas . But is autonomy really
enhanced by the 'contract at will'? As we have repeatedly said employment is a par
excellence a heteronomous power relation. In this respect enhancement of autonomy
would mean the reduction of heteronomy, the balancing of the position of the position
of the parties. But does employment at will contributes to this?
If one wants to perceive autonomy as the capacity of self-determined action, then
only the limitation of the power of the employer and its compliance to a socially
accepted - both in terms of fairness and economic expediency -perception of what is a
valid reason for dismissal can enhance autonomy. This is so because the sense of
security provided by a minimum floor of rights can protect the employee from
arbitrary or coercive behaviour84 on the part of the employer since the latter is in a
position of superior power. The contention that employers will be careful not to
dismiss workers capriciously because this will damage their reputation and
or
subsequently make it difficult for them to recruit personnel , presupposes an extreme
transparency in the job market that simply does not exist, and is anyway of
instrumental rather than intrinsic significance. Additionally, in a period of continuous
high unemployment the bad reputation of an employer would be a very small
hindrance to people asking to work for him/her. The argument that the employee has
the right to quit as well whenever she/he wants seems to forget that the cost for the
employee losing his job is far greater than for the employer losing a good employee
(even in the case where he has invested on him/her a high level of training)86.
The argument that the contract at will, will increase productivity, will improve
the monitoring of the performance of workers and that it will allow the management
to employ carrot and stick tactics more successfully87 (leaving the issue of
productivity outside since this as a valid argument that nonetheless cannot be
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Epstein (1984) p.954.
84 Even the liberal notion of coercion would apply here since it implies action dictated by another and
serves the other's ends. On that see Hayek (1960) p. 137.1 don't thing that the unilateral imposition of
working conditions by the employer under the constant threat of dismissal could be interpreted
differently.
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Epstein (1984) p. 967.
86 Besides that, in most labour law systems the employee does not have to compensate the employer
when for whatever reason he/she leaves his/her job. The obligation to give notice prior quitting cannot
be considered as a considerable constraint. An application of the compensation of inequality principle
that alters contract law solutions.
87
Epstein (1984) pp. 963- 965.
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uncritically accepted ) maybe valid as a statement of fact but it suggests a relation
between management and labour that has nothing to do with the autonomy it allegedly
comes to restore. It reveals the oppressive side of the libertarian argument as a blatant
support of property in its opposition to labour. These arguments in the name of private
autonomy completely abolish it for workers in support of employers as if the latter
represented a general social interest that the law should protect. What is frightening is
that these voices not only advocate the de-legitimation of employee interests as
valueless, but moreover suggest a new form of social exclusion. In the recent past it
was unemployment and moreover the inability to enter the labour market that created
marginalised social groups. In the case that the doctrine of the employment at will
prevails, we will have the social exclusion of persons or groups that can be
marginalised despite their participation in the labour market. This is so since
employment at will forces a part of the workforce -its most low skilled and therefore
vulnerable part- to work with absolutely no rights. In the recent past the importance of
a job rested not only in the fact that it provided the worker with the means of his/her
subsistence but moreover with a feeling of security that stemmed from the awareness
of the fact that s/he had rights. Moreover this feeling was translated into a notion of
being an active and participating citizen with rights and obligations towards his/her
employer. On the contrary the employment at will theory creates a workforce -or
rather a significant part of it- that cannot derive a feeling of security from its job.
Moreover it creates groups that as amenable to manipulation will not claim their
rights with the fear that they might lose their means of subsistence. Therefore in this
case we have a part of the workforce that practically will not be covered by a net of
social protection, but will constantly try to sustain itself in all kinds of jobs regardless
ofworking conditions and remuneration. This means that a part of the workforce will
enjoy a significantly lower standard of living not only in terms ofmaterial subsistence
but also in terms of rights, security and ability to plan a successful life strategy.
The argument that 'employment at will' will enhance the flexibility of the labour
market and will make it more accessible to disadvantaged social groups may have
some validity. However, employment at will creates a form of downward socialism in
the sense that it pushes social groups that until now enjoyed an acceptable standard of
88
However, it is highly contested that policies of flexibility will be economically beneficial in the long
run. For an overview of the economic case against the deregulation of labour standards see Deakin and
Wilkinson (1994)
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living to accept a significantly lower one. As for the argument of the accessibility of
89the labour market to disadvantaged and excluded social or ethnic groups , one of the
things that one could argue is that the creation of a low skilled overexploited labour
force with very limited bargaining power is a very bad 'remedy' against racism and
social exclusion. The question that therefore emerges is what kind of flexibility we
need in the labour market. If it is combined with the abolition of rights, the severe
constant insecurity it instils in the workforce, the aggravation of the gap of power
between property and labour and the intensification of heteronomy in industrial
relations then the price is too high to pay.
Moreover, the defence of the idea of 'employment at will' should not be deemed
as some libertarian extravagance. Its justification is central to the idea of employment
as a private economic relation. It is characteristic that libertarians in comparing
employment to private life situations construct their argument on the basis of the
principle of the arbitrariness of human preferences that cannot provide the basis for
the creation of legal expectations. Nozick for example uses cases from private life
situations and he compares them to social claims as they occur through the system of
social labour90. This argument suffers from the fact that social relations create
expectations that can acquire legal meaning through the social context they operate in.
Certainly most private-life relations do not have the capacity to create legal
obligations as they evade the scope of the legal system. For example the demand for
the reciprocation of somebody's love as of legally enforceable right as Nozick says
sounds and is ridiculous91, but this comparison is totally irrelevant. Employment
relations are not private-life relations but relations of the outmost social and economic
significance that are guided and monitored by law, as they determine the tenns of
subsistence of people but no less because it is one fundamental way through which
people relate with what is originally external to them. In other words, work is by
definition a public and not a private activity. Libertarians completely disregard this
most important aspect of labour when they assimilate employment relations to
relations as they appear in the sphere of private life. Here we see again the connection
with classical liberalism that perceives employment as a relation between private
individuals. However the arguments that support employment at will are far more
89 Ibid. (1995) pp. 310-311.
90 See Nozick (1974) p. 237.
91 Ibid.
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extreme since not only they place employment under the exclusive jurisdiction of
private law as classical liberalism would have it but rather deprives from any legal
content altogether. The argument here dovetails with the economic approach to
employment as mainly expressed by Richard Posner who uses extreme libertarian
arguments to make employment at will a relation of purely economic determination
with the only legally enforceable obligation being the payment of remuneration for
the task performed. For example, Posner says that in life people harm and get harmed
by others by their action either willingly or unwillingly without a compelling reason
to do so92. Therefore, an employee who gets harmed by an arbitrary decision of an
employer to dismiss her/him faces a typical condition of life that need not be covered
by a legal provision. As Posner says the jilted boyfriend has no legal recourse for the
pain he has suffered. Love is not a legally enforceable obligation. However, and in
order to make the distinction between relations that can acquire legal meaning and the
ones that cannot I will just say that the jilted boyfriend may not have recourse to the
legal system for being jilted and rightly so but the jilted spouse does. The difference
lies in the fact that the boyfriend's claim cannot be processed by the legal system
since affective matters do not fall within its jurisdiction. On the contrary, the jilted
spouse's does have a legal claim since marriage is a legal institution of the outmost
social significance. In a sense it can be said that the obsession of libertarians no is to
push labour relations outside of legal sphere and consequently of the public domain.
Employment here is not as classical liberalism and libertarianism would have it an
economic relation with a legal -albeit only contractual- dimension (that under the
monitoring of the law acquires a public dimension) but rather an economic relation of
no public interest whatsoever! Moreover, arguments in support of the position of
'employment at will' such as that - given unemployment insurance and welfare - the
loss of a job eventually is something not that tragic or that workers who are afraid of
the sense of insecurity that employment at will entails can go and work where job
protection does exist, sound in the first instance contradictory as they presuppose
what as a matter of principle they want to abolish and in the second as out of sync
with the social reality they pretend to describe93.
In a sense we can see that employment at will fully encapsulates the logic of the
assimilation of labour from property in a condition that property does not depend in
92 Posner (1995) p. 305.
93 Ibid. (1995) p.303.
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any way on social recognition. Labour through contract becomes property's own. It
can therefore be submitted to its power to use, destroy or dispose of it in any way
property sees fit without society having any right to intervene. Eventually the
pretences for the protection of individual freedom and autonomy come down to the
attempt of the legitimation of the most blatant form of coercion.
5. Libertarianism and the Collective Organisation of
Labour.
What our analysis has shown so far, is that for libertarianism labour relations are
economic relations of legally mediated exchange that involve two individuals, a seller
and a buyer, with the labour power of the former being the object of the transaction.
According to the doctrine of freedom of contract these two individuals are free to
shape the nonnative content of their relation on the basis of their individual autonomy
with the aim of promoting their respective self-interests, under the guarantees that the
rule of law provides.
We have confronted the consequences of the legal understanding of labour as a
strictly economic relation of exchange on the basis of the understanding of labour
already advanced. Our starting point is the ambivalent nature of employment as
simultaneously a social and an economic relation of conflict and interdependence. We
have seen in part one that employment is a power relation that is determined by the
power relation between property and labour. We have also seen that the condition of
conflict and interdependence of the parties is a structural condition of employment
that cannot be negated within capitalism. Our aim here was to show that the
libertarian understanding of employment by ignoring the complexity that this
ambivalence creates and promotes a model of it that is based on the detennination of
labour by property that has as its end result the complete domination of labour by
property.
We have seen many facets of this de-recognition and reduction and I will limit
my analysis here to a brief analysis of the libertarian attitude towards collective
organisation.
We have examined the approach that libertarians take towards the labour force as
a collective entity and as a holder of collective rights. The methodological
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individualism of libertarians and its ideological hostility towards collective entities
does not allow them to recognise the collective right of labour over a socially
legitimate notion of fair remuneration nor the right to act collectively on the basis of
the principle of unity and solidarity (rights that stem from the collective character of
the production process). As a result, labour organisation is not recognised as a valid
form of labour representation because labour is not recognised as a collective entity.
This has as a consequence the opposition between wage labour and capital is denied
its character as a structural opposition between social forces as it is subsumed under
the notion of competition as the generalised form of human action. Market
competition as the all-encompassing form of social action absorbs structural
oppositions between social forces. In the market determined society, social groups
cannot be opposed to each other for the attainment of diverging, conflicting ends. This
perception results in the transformation of the structural opposition between property
and labour to the horizontal competition between employees. Workers compete
between. As in any other market the worker competes against worker in their capacity
as sellers of the same commodity. Structural conflict becomes individual competition.
This logic has as a legal result the notion that workers as individual producers, as
property right holders over their labour power, when organised should be confronted
by anti-trust legislation under the legal logic that regulates competition in the free
market94. Eventually employment is normatively perceived under the schema of
horizontal, competitive exchange of property rights.
However, the property right of the employer over the means of production and on
the product of the labour process is real whereas the property right of the employee
over his/her labour power is fictitious. Moreover, the perception of labour as a market
category reduces its collective character and reduces it to a private concern between
individuals. It is therefore natural that libertarians deny labour organisation as a form
of social collective action. We can see now how the libertarian model of horizontal
competition between employees has as a result that workers, as competitors, do not
have a community of interests. The legal arguments that libertarians use in order to
deny the collective claim of labour are again provided by the application of the theory
94
Posner (1986) pp 133-138. However, one cannot avoid the temptation of noticing a huge
contradiction that can only be explained through the ideological opposition of the proponents of
employment at will to organised labour. Employment should not have a legal content unless labour is
organised! In this case the most severe anti-trust legislation should be applied as if trade unions were
the dreaded monopolies that would destroy the function of the free market!
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of freedom of contract. For libertarians employment is a private concern between two
individuals. And while one might argue that no modern legal system denies collective
organisation and that no government, even those with the strongest libertarian
ideological orientations, has ever attempted to abolish the collective organisation of
labour, the libertarian polemic against trade unions ranges from the strengthening of
the legal position of the employer against them95 to their complete abolition96. And to
a large extent their success has have forced a serious re-thinking of the agendas:
experience has shown that neo-liberal governments have pursued consistent strategies
that aim at the weakening of their power and the attenuation of their role in industrial
relations97.
6. Conclusion
In concluding we could say that the libertarian approach legitimises the
domination and the detennination of labour and consequently of the person of the
labourer by property.
Labour is considered as something external from the worker who offers it for the
use of another. Our point is that libertarianism by perceiving the market as the space
for the determination of the values of labour as an object of market exchange does
something more than treating labour as a simple market commodity. It determines
labour as a contingent relation of economic exchange by thus trivialising the relation
of humanity to labour by negating the inherent connection between them. This
reduction of labour to a market relation of exchange determines the approach of the
organisation of employment as a generalised social relation. This is so since the
notion of economic exchange cannot perceive the ambivalent nature of employment
as a dialectical relation of conflict and interdependence and of labour as an action
with both economic and social significance. This is so since economic exchange in
capitalism as we have seen reduces otherness to similarity. On the contrary
libertarianism does not recognise the employee as the other that acts under a different
rationality and pursues interests of a different order than the employer. The
95
Epstein (1984) pp.963-965, Posner (1980) pp. 133-134.
96
Hayek (1980), (1982) Vol. 3 pp. 131-134, Posner (1984)
97
Dickens, L. (1994) pp. 225-248 see also Hepple (1995) p. 304.
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recognition of the complexity of employment presupposes the recognition of the
otherness of the other. And it is exactly this otherness that is being suppressed in the
economic perception of employment by denying labour the legitimacy of its
difference to the logic and interests of property. In a sense we could say that what
libertarianism attempted to do is to deny this dual character through the assimilation
of labour to property and impose the figment of the homogeneity of interests and
rationality in employment. In a sense we can say that libertarianism typically
represents the denial of the contradictory character of employment. However, to
recapture the thread of our analysis at the end of chapter the ambivalent nature of
employment may be suppressed but it may not be annihilated since it is a condition
that stems from the irreducible social character of labour. We will not repeat that
analysis here, what we will only say is that what libertarianism attempts to eradicate
what by its nature cannot be eradicated.
Ill
CHAPTER THREE
EMPLOYMENT, THE WELFARE STATE AND
BEYOND
Introduction
In the previous chapter we dealt with the libertarian perception of employment
not as an abstract ideological construction but rather as representing a consistent line
of reasoning that has been implemented through legal policies and political programs,
in different political and historical contexts. To put it in concrete sociological terms
both classical liberalism and neo-liberalism -although they do not develop it
explicitly- contain a comprehensive theory of labour. We now turn to the welfare state
as the main opposition to the liberal and neo-liberal perception of labour within the
context of capitalism. What our analysis will attempt to demonstrate is that the
welfare state, despite its major inner contradictions provides the main opposing
paradigm (within the context of capitalism) to the liberal and neo-liberal
understanding of employment. This does not mean that we have a clear-cut relation of
opposition; instead the welfare state provides a different approach to the ambiguities
of employment without challenging the basic premises of capitalist economy and
without challenging the existence of the free market. In a sense we can say that we
have two paradigms that have opposing yet complementary views on employment.
We say here complementary because they both accept the determination of labour by
property in capitalism and opposing because they have opposing views as to the limits
and purposes of this determination. In this sense we will deal with sociological ideal
types that despite the fact that their inner contradictions do not allow them to be
uncritically subsumed under the schema of opposing descriptive typologies represent
opposing points of view on employment.
We will focus our analysis on how the transformation of employment under the'
policies of the welfare state captures and expresses the ambivalent character of
employment as a relation of conflict and interdependence. The crucial factor that we
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have to stress is that the welfare state shapes its policies on the basis of the
assumption that apart from its economic dimension employment exists within a
certain social and institutional context that largely detennines its specific content as a
concrete social relation that produces actual social results. In other words we can say
that the model of employment that the welfare state promoted is structured around the
notion of the social significance of labour.
As we have seen libertarians consider employment as a private economic relation
that should be regulated by private law. This approach that we can say was
predominant during the largest part of the 19th century was to a wide extend
substituted by another that tried through the intervention of the state into the function
of the market to mitigate the extreme social inequalities that the latter brought about.
The state approach towards employment brought about a different understanding that
redefined its content as a social relation. As we have seen in the previous chapter
employment in capitalism is a relation between labour and property whose character
is detennined by the rationality of the market. In this chapter we are going to see how
this relation takes its shape through the mediation of the logic of the welfare state. In
this respect we will start with a short analysis of the transfonnation of the state and
the law through the emergence of the welfare state and we will focus on the
phenomenon of juridification. We will continue by analysing its approach towards
labour and employment and see how the rationality of its intervention is based on the
acknowledgement of the social significance of labour. What we are going to argue is
that in the in the welfare state labour refers to the general social structure and is
therefore subsumed under the logic of the protection of the general social interest1.
Under this logic the welfare state recognised the collective character of labour and
promoted and institutionalised labour organisation. However this was achieved at the
cost of the suppression of the conflictual element of employment, a suppression that
was justified in the name of the social balance that the welfare state had as its major
aim. Our final point will be that the welfare state despite its unquestionably positive
contribution to the improvement of the conditions of living of employees failed to
contain the underlying ambiguities of employment. The somehow ambiguous result of
welfare state policies is that by subsuming employment under the logic of conflict
1 As Habermas has shown the role of the state as the guarantor of the general social interest occurs
before the welfare state in the democratic constitutional state where it is legitimated through political
representation through general and equal suffrage (Habermas (1987) p. 357. On the same issue see also
Luhmann (1990) p. 14.
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pacification did not allow the dynamics of the relation to be expressed in their full
normative potential.
1. The Emergence and the Rationality of the Welfare
State
At this point we will briefly deal with the phenomenon of the welfare state as a
reaction to the consequences of the implementation of the principles of the liberal
ideology. However as the issue has been extensively analysed and as it is more than
well known we will focus this short exposition to the points that have to do with the
rationality of the intervention of the welfare state in employment.
We have seen in the previous chapters that liberalism assigns a certain role to the
state, namely that of protecting already existing natural rights. In libertarian theory the
spontaneous market order precedes the liberal state. The latter comes about in order to
protect property, to enforce contracts and to protect individuals qua market actors
from force and fraud. The demarcation line between the respective domains of the
state and the economy is clear and unambiguous2 with the former subordinating the
latter to the needs of the free market. This relation especially during its earlier period
was one of positive subordination, in the form its total abstention from the function of
the market. Under the schema the state mechanism, namely the administration, the
legal system and the system of power politics operated in isolation to the function of
the market economy, with the latter being the dominant social system that through its
unimpaired function could impose its demands on society. However the expansion
and the ever increasing complexity of advanced capitalist societies have laid to a
condition of increased differentiation on the one hand and interdependence on the
other, between the state and the economy. This paradoxical relation becomes one of
positive subordination in the sense that state mechanisms although they are
functioning autonomously in the sense that they are pursuing their own ends,
contribute positively to the function of the free exchange market. The market
therefore needs the positive contribution of the administration and the legal system in
order to continue its function and produce its optimal results. This does not only have
to do with the role of the state mechanisms as compensating possible market failures
but moreover with existence of a sophisticated systemic complex that assures the
2 See among others J. Habermas (1987) pp. 358-361.
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reproduction of the market economy . What should not be forgotten is that the
common thread between these two phases of the relation between the state and the
market is the priority of the latter. However, with the emergence of the welfare state
we have a substantial transformation in this relation of between the state and the
economy.
The welfare state emerged as a spontaneous political reaction to the social
consequences of the market4. Historically, social legislation was a spontaneous
reaction that attempted to mitigate the extreme social results that the industrial
revolution produced. Planning was not as Hayek claimed an effort of some arrogant
mind to impose its arbitrary constructions to society but on the contrary a spontaneous
social and political reaction to the major social disturbances that the abrupt
introduction of the free market social model caused on a society that was violently
transfonned in a very short period of time. As Polanyi has succinctly remarked:
'laissez (aire was planned, planning was not'5.
Under this prism the policies of the welfare state should be seen as an attempt to
mitigate the social effects of the unfettered function of the market. Nonetheless, the
relation of the welfare state to the market is rather problematic and in a sense
ambiguous.
The welfare state in its self-perception as the authentic representative of a general
social interest (through the legitimation that the political system receives through the
majority rule in the constitutional state) intervenes through central economic planning
in the economy so that its function will not have detrimental effects to society, which
in this case is represented as a functional, integrated whole. This approach
nevertheless does not question the autonomy of the economic system nor does it
challenge the structure of the free market. What it does is to give to the economy
long-term directions in the form of incentives and disincentives for economic activity.
Moreover it confines the social results that the market produces within socially
acceptable and institutionally prescribed limits. In other words, the welfare state does
not challenge the substance of the social relations that the capitalist economy
produces. Nonetheless, it is opposed to the notion of a free market society, in the
sense that unlike the state in a catallactic society prescribes the limits of economic
3 For the definition of the concepts of negative and positive subordination see Offe, C. (1984) pp. 38-
39.
4 See amongst others the excellent analysis of Polanyi in Polanyi (1957) especially pp. 86-102
5 Ibid. p. 141
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action. Moreover unlike the catallactic model it guarantees that the social costs of the
market will not undermine the stability of the society as a whole. An additional and
most important difference is that the welfare state is not an institution that comes to
existence through and for the market. On the contrary it considers itself as above the
market. This entails another crucial distinction. As such the welfare state firmly resists
the notion that all interests that exist within the society are individual interests that
should be pursued through action in the free market. On the contrary the welfare state
acknowledges the existence of valid collective interests the satisfaction of which
cannot be attained through the free market. As a result the ideal of social justice is not
an empty mirage as Hayek would have it but rather a most significant aim towards
which the welfare state concentrated its efforts. For the welfare state all interests that
can be represented within it are deemed by it as valid. The welfare state has the task
of attempting to compromise and combine them in the name of an all encompassing
general social interest that it allegedly represents and to which all partial, non-
generalisable interests refer to. Moreover, on the basis of this legitimacy it creates a
self-perception that allows it to become the arbiter of these interests since it is from
their compatibility to the common good that they derive their validity and
legitimation.
2. The Legal System in the Welfare State
Probably the most prominent characteristic of the welfare state is that given its
comprehensive role as a vessel of the common good is an expansionary state6. The
welfare state as a regulator has the tendency to extend its boundaries by taking over
and solving problems including those that are created from the function of other social
systems7. Eventually the aim of the welfare state becomes the achievement of a
balance between the function of social systems, a balance that is seen as a
precondition for the unimpaired reproduction of the societal system as a whole, a
reproduction that the welfare state perceives as its primary task8.
6 Luhmann (1990) pp.71-72
7 Ibid. pp. 74-75.
8 See Luhmann (1982) pp. 229-237.
116
We mention this at this point because the expansionary nature of the state as a
representative of the common good is the factor that determines the character of its
intervention in employment relations. What our analysis leads to is the approach of
the welfare state towards conflict as it stems from social relations. It is in this context
that we should see the approach of the welfare state towards the ambiguities of
employment, especially in what concerns its conflictual dimension. As Luhmann has
put it the mechanism of the state is an 'official cycle of power rests on legally
regulated authority, and therefore is capable in prevailing in cases of conflict' . It is
this ability of the welfare state to impose its solutions to conflicts that we are going to
address next.
2.1. The value orientation of law
Social conflict in this context loses the abstract character that it had under the
liberal model and acquires a visible, concrete character as an actual social problem.
The law does not give solutions to legal disputes between individuals, disputes that
can be subsumed under rational and abstract rules as the rationality of the system of
the rule of law would have it; it rather makes value judgements on actual problems
that can upset and endanger the societal balance. In other words it gradually abandons
the formalistic approach of liberalism and moves towards a model that has been
described as material law10.
This model of law, which in modernity is inexorably connected to the
juridification process", brings about the dynamic encroachment of the state through
the medium of law, into previously unregulated or self-regulated social fields of
action, (i.e. the economic system, the educational system, the family, etc.). The
'materialisation' of the law meant a deep change to the system of legal values. Instead
of the abstraction of formal freedom and equality between market-oriented legal
persons we have the promotion of freedom and equality as actual social values,
through the recognition of the inequalities that the market produces. The law in the
welfare state is active and it takes sides: It is no longer oriented towards safeguarding
the rules of the market but rather towards the realisation of social values that now take
9
Luhmann (1990) p.49
10 For the concept of the materialisation of law see Habermas (1996) pp. 392-409.
" For the concept ofjuridification see Teubner (ed.) 1987 and Teubner (1987b). See also Habermas
(1987) pp.356-373.
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the form of legally enforceable rights for those that the market has put in a position of
weakness and vulnerability.
In consequence, the central value to be protected by the legal system is no longer
that of formal legal freedom and equality but rather that of equal substantive capacity
12for action . In other words the state attempts to mitigate the results that the
abstraction of the free and equal individuals creates. Freedom and equality acquire
here a new significance, not as abstract concepts but rather as values to be legally
enforced. This means that the law takes a direction towards it has been described as
result orientation13, namely towards the pursuit and achievement of substantive ends
that have been set by the state in its capacity as the arbiter of the common good14.
2.2. Law and Juridification.
Juridification points to the limitations of the effectiveness of the legal approach
(that the welfare state adopts) to complex social problems. In the first instance it
means the tendency that has been developed in the welfare state of the subsumption of
social relations under the legal system. It also means the proliferation of legal rules in
two senses: First the extension of law to an increasing range of societal relationships
in areas previously unregulated or self-regulated and secondly the densification of
law, that is, the ascription of abstract normative definitions or ideas with legal status.
This means that legal rationality is becoming more pervasive, more eminent, and
more conspicuous in areas where either did it not exist or was simply implied15.
The effects of legal proliferation on the legal system itself are many. Some of
them, such as the expansion of its boundaries or the increased complexity of its
structure are evident. Some characteristic problems of the interaction between the
legal system and the social sphere in general have been criticised by G. Teubner under
the heading of regulatory trilemma16. G. Teubner focuses his critique on the problem
of structural coupling namely of the capacity of the legal system to cognitively grasp
12 See again Habermas (1996) pp. 392- 409.
13 Teubner (1987b) p.16.
14
As a consequence we have the taking into account by the judiciary of the social
needs expressed in a legal dispute and the effort to balance them. This principle has
been described as the principle of socialisation of judgement. See Ewald (1986) p.
65.
15 Habermas (1986) p. 204.
16 Teubner (1987b) pp. 19-27.
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social realities and translate them into valid legal norms. Teubner distinguishes three
possibilities where structural coupling may fail. The first is the mutual indifference
between the legal system and the system under regulation; the second is the
disintegration of the social sphere through the imposition of legal rationality and the
third the disintegration of the law through the burden that increased social demands
impose upon it. Here we see again what we have discussed about Luhmann's
understanding of the law as cognitively open system. As such legal cognition is
intimately tied to the function of law and thus to the conditions of normative success
(the stabilisation of expectations).
This brings us back to the point of view of the legal method of the welfare state
and its ability to translate and reduce the complexity of employment into legal norms.
However, Teubner's critique indicates the limited cognitive horizon of the legalistic
approach.
It is under this perspective that we should see the problem ofmutual indifference
and inability of structural coupling. It brings us to the inability of the law to
understand that what is dealing with is a relation of extreme complexity. The problem
of structural coupling apart from being a normative one is primarily a cognitive one.
In order to normatively reduce the complexity of the relation the system must be able
to understand it. The welfare state transposes its problems to the legal system since
the latter can provide clear solutions to problems that the state as the authentic
representative of the common good cannot solve. It is under this rationality that the
law (as substantive law) becomes the arbiter of the validity of the social claims as
they stem from the ambiguous structure of employment. It is under this perspective
that we should seek the law as the medium ofwelfare policies.
The legalistic approach has as another effect what has been described as the
blurring of the boundaries of the legal system. This effect can be seen as increased
demand for litigation in areas that traditionally evaded the jurisdiction of the state.
Quite often we have the political or the administrative system transposing its
responsibilities into the legal system, or the legal system by its own initiative usually
in the form of the decisions of constitutional or higher administrative courts to
interfere in the domain of action of the political or the administrative system. In this
sense we have a "blurring" of the boundaries of the differentiated functions of the
state. Luhmann has attributed this phenomenon to the effort of social systems
particularly of those with a predetermined function to avoid their overburdening with
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decisions that imply a high degree of risk17. Our point is that this phenomenon would
not be possible without the expansion of the boundaries of the legal system. The legal
system eventually assumes that it can process everything, that every social relation
has a legal content and thus can be subsumed under a legal rule. In view of our
analysis on the cognitive incapability of the legal system to grasp the substance of
employment we can only say that this approach apart from being potentially
authoritarian can also be the result of a cognitive misunderstanding. However before
we focus on the issues that have so far emerged so far we should first address the
perception of labour and employment by the welfare state.
3. The Welfare State and Employment
We have seen in the previous chapter that labour according to the market
approach is an economically quantifiable factor of capitalist production and that
employment is perceived as an economic relation of exchange. We have said that the
welfare state has a different perception in the sense that it recognises labour as a
social productive force. We should not forget that as labour is the creator of social
wealth, that it produces the vital for society relation of employment and as such falls
I 8
within the scope of the definition of the common good . For the welfare state labour
is a category that has to be protected.
In commenting the relation between the juridification and employment
Habermas has said that juridification 'can in fact be understood as the
institutionalising in legal form of a social power relation anchored in class
structure'19. Juridification not only regulates employment, it rather starts from
employment as it recognises that its structure produces the relations that determine the
structure of the social sphere. In this sense juridification starts from employment and
from the recognition of it being a power relation that reproduces the inequalities of the
social structure. This approach however, presupposes a certain ideological orientation.
It presupposes the acknowledgement of the fact that the free-market determination of
labour creates imbalances to the social structure. The welfarist-legalistic approach is
17
Luhmann, N.(1993a) pp. 166-167. See also Luhmann, N. (1990) chapter two.
18 This however does not mean that it recognises its character as formative of self-consciousness. In
this sense it is indifferent to it. In other words it does not deal with labour per se, it has no perception of
labour per se but only of its social significance. The state does not deal with ontological categories but
with relations that fall within the ambit of its authority.
19 Habermas (1987) p. 361
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conditioned by the recognition of the structural inequality between the parties in
employment. In other words the approach of the welfare state towards labour entails a
value judgement. The approach of the welfare state is determined by its attachment to
social values. The welfare state does not hide the fact that it presents another
paradigm based on a competing notion of morality to the liberal one. The crucial
factor here is the understanding of social responsibility. In other words the welfare
state in the name of the all-inclusive common good sees public obligations where
20liberalism sees private good deeds" . The abstract moral duty towards the other (the
employee) becomes a concrete obligation with a legal character. It becomes a legal
right21. Under this perspective interests are no longer interests of individual market
actors that are determined by the logic of the market, but rather social interests that
refer to common good. This principle transforms the notion of employment from a
private concern between autonomous market oriented actors to a relation of social
significance that has to serve the legally protected common good. Labour interests
are not interests of private individuals but rather social interests that are aligned to the
general social interest. As a result responsibility towards the worker is not an abstract
moral duty towards the undeserving victims of the unpredictable fluctuations of the
market but rather a legal duty that refers to the reproduction of the social structure
itself. As such employment rights are no longer contractual rights but rather public
rights to the common good. The welfare state takes employment out of the sphere of
privacy and brings it to the centre of public light.
On another level we see here again the distinction that we drew on chapter one
on the dependence of property on its social recognition. We have seen in the previous
chapter that if we accept property as a natural right arising in a state of nature that is
in need of institutional protection but not of social recognition, then we accept
property as developing its own distinct logic as a self-legitimating principle that is
determinant of and in no sense determined by labour. However, if we accept that
20 As we have seen, for both traditional and neo-libertarianism the idea of charity to those who unjustly
suffer is considered as a good moral deed that helps alleviate the burden of the unfortunate poor and as
such it should be consistently practiced and encouraged. However, charitable action should always
depend on the moral good will of the benefactor and should never be imposed to him/her as an
obligation, as according to traditional libertarians such a thing would diminish the moral value of the
act. Therefore the moral duty towards the undeserving poor can never be transformed to a legal
obligation to assist the less well off. See F. Ewald (2000) pp. 131-134. See also chapter 2 fh. 77.
21 As Chatelet and Pisier-Kouchner have shown the welfare state is based on the transformation of a
moral idea to a political (and legal we should add) principle. Chatelet & Pisier-Kouchner (1982)
pp.167-180.
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property exists as a legal principle from the moment of its recognition as a right by an
institutionalised form of social symbiosis then it becomes valid only within and
through this institutional arrangement that determines the limits of its exercise.
Practically this means that property cannot develop its own logic irrespective of the
limitations that the social body imposes upon it.
This returns us to the issue of the interpretation by the welfare state of the
relation between labour and property. The use of labour by capitalism is challenged
by the welfare state in what concerns its consequences but not in what concerns its
substance. For the welfare state the domination of property over labour is a datum.
This means that the rationality of its intervention is conditioned by capitalism.
Nonetheless this intervention in the name of the general social interest poses serious
limitations to the results that the treatment of labour by the logic of the free market
produces. For the welfare state the logic of the 'deployment' of property rights in the
free market cannot disturb the balance of the societal system. This means that labour-
as a productive force that exists for the common good- has rights against property;
rights that derive their legitimation from labour's social role, but additionally from the
recognition of it being a collective social force that is an indispensable part of an
organic whole. What should be mentioned here is that one of the major contributions
of the welfare state is that it does not conceal the power structure of employment. On
the contrary, its policies have as their starting point the acknowledgement of the
inequality between property and labour.
We have seen that labour in the welfare state is acknowledged as a social
productive force that has rights in virtue of its contribution to economic growth. In a
sense we can say that the major achievement of the welfare state is the restitution of
labour as a most significant element of the social process; a restitution that wants to
alleviate the results of its domination by property in capitalism. Flowever, this
recognition in no sense means the emancipation or the reclaim of self-determination
of labour. What the welfare state has achieved is on the one hand the de-
individualisation of employment relation and on the other the reintroduction of the
social determination of the value of labour alongside its market one. This does not
mean that the welfare state re-socialises the value of labour irrespective of the market,
by normatively implementing the social interests of labour as they derive their validity
from social discourses, discourses that refer to the social organic whole .It is this
perception of the welfare state as at the protector of the organic whole that demands
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that labour (as a part of this organic whole) should have a socially acceptable
minimum standard of living.
4. Labour Law in the Welfare State
What we will turn our focus on next is how the welfare state through policies of
juridification provided alongside the market the basis for the formation of
employment in modernity. If the market represents the economic determination of
labour, then the welfare state represents its legal one. The welfare state approach is an
approach that is conditioned by the notion of the all-encompassing rationality of the
22law as the communication medium of the state" . Therefore to return to the main line
of our enquiry the question that emerges is how the legalistic approach perceives
employment. In this respect we will have to face the following questions: can the
legalisation of employment with its inherent cognitive limitations provide an adequate
normative paradigm for the regulation of the relation? Can the cognitive limitations of
the legal system combined to the authoritative character of legal interpretations
normatively express the tensions and ambiguities that are produced through it? The
next question that logically follows from our analysis concerns the socialisation of
labour under the aegis of the authority of the state. Namely how the value judgements
of the welfare state and its ideological orientation find their expression in actual legal
policies. This orientation is translated into to the compensation of inequality between
23the parties and to the precedence of the collective over individual rights . What our
point will be is that the welfare state supports a model of employment that allows it to
control its social repercussions. As such it promotes the consensual elements in it, in
other words the factor of the interdependence of the parties, whilst de-emphasising the
conflictual elements of it so that they will not threaten the social balance that itself
guarantees.
22 Luhmann (1990) p. 83.
23 P. Van Der Heijden (1995) p. 135.
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4.1. Juridification and the compensation of inequality in
employment
The starting point of the analysis of the orientation of labour law is the
recognition of the fact that it cannot be seen as an isolated branch of the legal system.
The complexity of employment and the wide areas that it affects make it necessary for
it to be seen in the context of a wider social law (such as law of social insurance,
aspects of corporate law, etc.)24. As such labour law is attached to the rationality of
the intervention of the welfare state that aims at the guidance of employment relations
in the name of the general social interest. In other words in view of the social
significance of labour the law has to mitigate the results of its economic use.
Therefore the issue that we are going to address first address the effects of the
legalisation of labour as the method of compensation of inequality.
The first result of juridification (a direct result of the expansionary character of
welfare state) was that aspects of employment that were outside the scope of the law
have come within the ambit of its regulatory power25. Through juridification we have
the abolition of the undisputed priority of contractual agreements and the regulation of
the labour market by the law26. We can see in this respect one aspect of the opposition
between the welfare state and liberalism. The state acquires the exclusive competence
in an area that according to liberalism should be regulated by the principle of
individual autonomy27. It is this direct determination that makes employment a public
concern that falls within the competence of the regulatory power of the state that
wants to uniformly shape employment relations according to its own rationality28. As
a consequence labour law becomes expansive and inclusive but moreover gives an
official and therefore authoritative legal meaning to aspects of the relation that were
either regulated through contract or through the unilateral will of the employer on the
basis of his/her right to command labour. In this respect we see the role of labour law
as compensating inequality by intervening in the power relation of employment with
the aim of balancing the unequal power of the parties, but without intervening to the
substance of the power relation. The relation of domination is not challenged per se
24 Clark (1985) p. 72.
25 Teubner (1987b) p. 16
26 See Clark (1985) p. 72.
27 See Simitis (1987) p. 135
28 See Ibid. p. 142.
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however the state wants to unilaterally impose its content upon the parties.
Employment thus becomes a relation between property, labour and the state but this
time not as the liberal model would have it as a guarantor of legality but rather as the
dominant part in it.
We can see this dominant character of the state in a series of issues that belong to
the core of the employment relation. For example, the determination of working time,
the limit and the remuneration of extra time, the regulation of health and safety at
work was regulated in the past through collective agreements. Nowadays, the state in
its effort to guarantee a safety net of social protection has taken them out of the scope
of collective bargaining, since it considers them non-negotiable social interests that
directly affect the common good. In the same line of reasoning unfair dismissal
regulations29 are expressive of the will of the state to determine directly aspects of the
employment relation that have significant social repercussions. Dismissals are
unlawful if they are discriminatory: discrimination on the basis of sex, because of
pregnancy and of trade union activity is considered as unlawful. Departing from the
contractual understanding of employment that considers dismissal, as a simple
termination of contract, a dismissal has to be deemed as fair and be justified by the
serious misconduct of the employee. Moreover, the notion ofmisconduct is no longer
determined by the will of a party in a contract but rather authoritatively defined
through the definitions and criteria of state law30.
Another institution that indicates the control of the state over the labour market is
that of the labour inspectorate, an institution that exists in all EU countries. These
institutions are administrative organisations that have the task of monitoring the
labour market and enforcing legislation. In this way not only we have state
determination of the condition of employment relations, but also a direct form of
surveillance over it31. This means that the state uses its apparatus in order not only to
shape the content of employment but moreover to prevent it from divergences that
may be introduced by the parties. Of course realistically speaking the labour
inspectorate prevents abuses that as a result of the power positions of the parties can
mainly come from the part of employers thus being a natural ally and therefore much
29 For a brief outline of the legislation of unfair dismissals in the EU see Barnard, Clark and Lewis
(1995) pp. 32-41.
30 For dismissal regulation in the UK see Deakin and Morris (1995) chapter five, Collins, Ewing &Mc
Colgan chapter five and Collins (2003) chapter eight.
31 For the position of Labour Inspectorates in the EC countries see Barnard, Clark and Lewis (1995) pp.
13-14.
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welcomed by employees32, it nonetheless signifies the intention of the state not to
tolerate divergences from what it has nonnatively prescribed as the content of
employment.
We can see now a major source of opposition between the welfare state and neo-
liberalism. The welfare state intervenes and limits the scope of the application of the
founding principle of liberalism i.e. individual autonomy in order to compensate for a
social situation that liberalism does not admit as existing i.e. inequality between
property and labour on the basis of a principle that it considers as non-valid i.e. social
solidarity. What we are going to see next is the rationality of the other main principle
of labour law namely the precedence of the collective before the individual, its
opposition to liberalism and its consequences for social action.
4.2. The collective character of employment in the welfare state
We have said that the welfare state is characterised by the attribution of the
abstract moral duties towards the socially weaker members of society with legal status
and their subsequent conversion to legally protected rights. In this respect we move
away from the contractual model and the limitations that the legal understanding of
employment as an interpersonal relation of exchange imposes. On another level, the
recognition of the social character of labour forced the legal system to overcome the
individualistic approach of liberalism and acknowledge the fact that employment is
not an economic relation of exchange between two property right holders but rather a
social relation between property and labour. As such the right of association, that
expresses the right of labour to be legally represented as a collectivity, becomes
institutionalised as an essential part of labour law.
4.2.1. The institutionalisation of class conflict through collective bargaining.
Through its institutionalisation collective bargaining acquires the status of a
basic regulatory mechanism of employment relations. In this section we will see how
the institutionalisation of collective bargaining ensued in the transformation of the
confrontation between property and labour from a social struggle that was conducted
32 See Collins, H. (2003) p. 11
126
on the basis of the contradictory power relation to a legally mediated relation that is
subsumed under the notion of the general social interest.
The principles that underlie the conduct of collective bargaining are a legal and a
nonnative one: namely that of the public status of the parties involved in the process
and that of collective autonomy. According to these principles the collective entities
that are involved in this process that is trade unions and employer's associations that
as legal persons through a negotiating process shape the content of employment
relations through the conclusion of collective agreements that establish obligations
33
(that is legal obligations with the exemption of the UK ). This outcome is the point of
convergence between two originally diametrically opposed positions as they express
diametrically opposed interests, to the point where a compromise can be reached34.
The points I would like to focus on at this stage are: 1) the institutional network in
which this negotiation procedure is conducted as it expresses the ideological basis for
the institutionalisation of collective bargaining and 2) the effects of the
3 r
institutionalisation'" of labour movements on their relation to their members.
The recognition of public status to worker's organisations signifies a major
change in the conceptual understanding of employment. Through the
institutionalisation of collective bargaining we have the recognition of the validity of
different interests that are expressed in employment. These interests are justified on
the basis of different discourses, but also on the basis of the principle that no part in
employment has a universally valid claim '6. On the contrary this claim of universality
is attributed to the welfare state itself that monitors the procedure in the name of the
common good, the meaning and content of which it defines and represents.
The stake in collective bargaining in its institutionalised form is not
predominance or supremacy of ideas and worldviews but a minimum basis for the
necessary cooperation that is an imperative condition for the smooth function of
employment as a relation that directly affects the common good. The conduct of
collective bargaining under these conditions released the legally recognised collective
33 In the UK collective agreements are considered not as contracts but rather as non-binding informal
agreements that cannot be legally enforced. See especially Morris and Archer (2000) pp.288-291.
34 At this stage we deal with collective bargaining at the societal level as understood by the rationality
of the welfare state. For the logic of collective bargaining as the institution of that regulates the
confrontation and compromise between property and labour see chapter four section four.
35 For the issue of the institutionalisation of labour movements see Offe (1985) pp. 220-258.
36 See also Ewald (1986) p. 48. Although Ewald's approach is based on the Durkheimian notion of
solidarity that explains succinctly the "mechanism" under which the state is legitimated to demand
concessions from social groups in the name of its absolute right.
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entities37 from the hostility of fonnal law and allowed them to engage as self
determined actors in a process of pursuance of strategic and substantive goals. This
had as a result that labour was recognised as an institutional actor that legitimately as
a collective group shapes the content of employment together and simultaneously in
opposition to employers. The crucial difference here is that in this procedure the
actors are not market oriented individuals, but rather represent determined collective
social forces. In this respect we can see the difference in the perception of autonomy
between the welfarist and the liberal understanding of action. In the second model
action refers to the individual qua pre-socially determined market actor. In the first to
the collectivity as representative of socially determined interests that refer to the
common good.
Although no one can deny the fact that the process of institutionalisation of
collective bargaining had and still has extremely beneficial effects to the welfare of
employees and that its purpose was to guarantee the space where the autonomous
action of collective groups such as trade unions, its conduct under the auspices of the
rationality of the welfare state that conditioned its outcome to its beneficial
contribution to the common good had some considerable side effects.
First of all the recognition of a trade union depends on its conformity with the
prescribed standards that are set in state laws. Characteristic is the fact that the
recognition of the constitution of trade union has to be approved by the judicial
authorities. This means that the recognition of a trade unions as an autonomous
institution with public status is done with the presupposition that the autonomy that
has been recognised will be exercised only within the limits that are prescribed for it
in the legal institutional framework of society. As Offe has remarked: 'In a typical
case, access to government decision making positions, is facilitated through the
political recognition of an interest group, but the organisation in question becomes
subject to more or less formalised obligations, for example, to behave responsibly and
predictably and to refrain from any non negotiable demands or unacceptable tactics'
38
37 This reference is mainly made to labour, since the capital has wider margins to follow individual
strategies, in order to promote its interests See Offe, (1985) pp.248-253. That is why the recognition of
public status to private interest groups is generally seen as an achievement of workers and as a
concession on the part of employers.
38 Offe (1985) p. 235.
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As a result collective bargaining is seen as a form of conflict that may potentially
threaten the social balance. Therefore, the state cannot allow the actual power
positions of actors to be translated into impositions of demands, especially if this
imposition may result into a threat to the vital interests of either of the negotiating
parts. This indicates that welfare policies cannot accept the economic system to be
overburdened with 'concessions' to workers that assumedly may threaten its stability
to the same measure that they do not want the social effects of unfettered economic
action. Institutionalised collective bargaining is a struggle conducted under the aegis
of the state in its capacity as guarantor of social coherence. Collective bargaining
becomes a device to reduce the sharpness of adversarial strategies on the part of both
property and labour and to guide class conflict towards resolution. In other words the
state allows the conduct of conflict as long as it does not escalate to situations that it
cannot control. As Benjamin has remarked in reference to the phenomenon of strike,
the state as the sole representative of the exercise of legal violence can recognise and
accept it to the extent that it does not threaten its monopoly39. The legal framework
exists to make sure that this happens.
In this respect employment becomes de-politicised in the sense that the conflict
between labour and capital loses its character as a social class relation around which
the political system is constituted and becomes mediated relation of interests that is
subsumed under the goal of conflict pacification40. In this respect the
institutionalisation of collective bargaining through the recognition of the public
status of collective groups can also be seen as an attempt of the state to control
collective autonomy41. Therefore, the institutionalised recognition of collective actors
in employment without the curtailment of collective autonomy can be seen as a valid
and relevant demand42. However, the problem is whether trade unions at their present
form can rise to this challenge. It is on this issue that we will turn our attention next.
4.2.2. The institutionalisation of trade unions
The attribution of public status to trade unions has created a new reality in what
concerns trade unions themselves. In this new reality trade unions have to deal with
39
Benjamin (1979) p. 137
40 See Teubner (1987b)
41 See especially Schmitter (1979), Panich (1979)
42 See Streeck and Schmitter (1984) and Teubner (1986).
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new challenges that concern both their legitimation as public bodies but moreover, the
internal legitimation of their leaderships, a legitimation that has to be conferred by
their grassroots basis. External legitimation can be achieved on the basis of the
recognition of their role as a factor of social cohesion and on the basis of the fact that
they represent the interests of a substantial proportion of the population. This
assumption on the part of the legal system in order not to be relegated to a formal
criterion has to be expressed by the fact of the active participation of workers. The
problem that emerges is that the conduct of collective bargaining is a complicated
procedure. Trade union representatives have to be able to deal with complicated and
delicate matters, a condition that presupposes a high degree of specialisation. This has
gradually laid to the creation of an elite of professionals that has been alienated from
the grassroots of the labour movement43. Eventually this development transformed
trade unions from movements that promote the interests of workers as a collective
entity in the social and political arena, to official bodies act with the aim of promoting
and supporting the interests of their members only. The specialisation of trade union
executives has gradually led to the adoption of a corporatist structure with the
attribution of specific roles to them. The position and status of trade unions becomes
distinctly different under these terms. The relationship between the trade union and its
members becomes the impersonal relation between a provider of services and a client,
where no actual bond of solidarity exists44. What is meant by this is that trade unions
have become bodies of representation of partial interests that people join in order to
have a representation in order to attain better working conditions and protection in
case they face difficulties in their workplace. Trade union participation is no longer
participation on a collective body on the basis of class solidarity but rather a rational
decision on the basis of the promotion of individual interests. Loosely speaking trade
unions can be seen as 'quasi-companies' that on the basis of their expertise effectively
protect and promote workers interests. Instead of the labour movements extracting
their power from the strong bonds of class solidarity, we have institutionally
recognised public organisations, the survival of which depends on their ability to
comprehend and respond to the framework of rights and duties that legal rules impose
on their members.
43 For the most classical analysis of trade union elites see Michels (1959) especially parts two and four.
44 Simitis (1987) p. 141.
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These limitations on the ambit of action of trade unions and their subsequent
alienation from the rank and file, has led to a deficit in terms of their dynamism and
their radicalism. Institutionalisation may have helped help trade unions to attract
members45 - welfare state policies have substantially contributed to the increase of
trade union membership46-, but they do lose out in terms of the commitment and the
loyalty of these members as the latter do not participate actively in the decision
making process but rather accept decisions that have been taken at a level where they
have no access to. Trade unions by accepting the- indeed privileged- framework of
action that the welfare state imposed on them became organised bodies for the
promotion of interests through their institutionally conferred ability to have access to
the decision-making mechanisms of the state.
Eventually, one can say that the institutionalisation of collective bargaining
ultimately has achieved what the coercive strategies of the liberal state could not
achieve; that is the incorporation of labour movements into the rationality of the
capitalist system47. However, what liberalism has not achieved through coercion the
welfare state has achieved through recognition and participation. The welfare state by
recognising the conflictual character of employment and by actively promoting
workers' interests incorporated labour into the logic of the promotion of the common
good. In other words by recognising the aspect of conflict it managed to promote
interdependence, an interdependence that was guaranteed under its own power. By
incorporating the interests of labour as legitimate it managed to annihilate the threat
that labour organisation could pose for the capitalist system in conflictual terms.
We have seen so far the major transformations that the welfare state brought
about in employment. It is the consequences of this perception that we are going to
analyse next. What we will particularly focus on is whether the legalisation of
employment has managed to successfully express its tensions and ambiguities or
whether it has presented us with a well-intended but eventually ambiguous
compromise.
45
Particularly in cases that were quite common in the 60s' and 70s' where trade union participation
was compulsory for workers at certain workplaces or even whole sectors of the economy. For this issue
section infra.
46
Although this trend has started to be reversed and in our days trade union membership is very low.
Rogers and Streeck (1995) p. 3-4.
47 See for example Esping -Andersen (1976) pp. 4-5.
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5. Juridification and the Ambiguities ofEmployment
What we have seen so far is that the eventual outcome of juridification of
employment was the conduct of class conflict under the auspices of the law in the
name of the common good. What is of interest to us here is to see now is to look at the
logic of the reduction of complexity under the rubric of juridification as it operates in
the legal system in order to iron out ambiguity, suppress paradox and generalise
normative expectations in the workplace.
The cases where the eventual outcome of an industrial dispute is decided by the
judiciary are many and cover a wide range of its aspects whether of collective or
individual character. The case where a judge decides the outcome and gives a
definition of the content of an industrial dispute is the rule in the welfare state.
However, the judge does so according to the criteria of the legal system. Legalisation
changes the field the dispute is going to be decided on. What the judge has in front of
him/her is not an aspect of social conflict but a legal case. S/he does not see
conflicting interests, rationalities and discourses but rather competing legal claims
48that have to be decided on the basis of the legal distinction legal/illegal . However,
under this perspective the substance of the conflict is mutated. It is no longer a
conflict of interests, rationalities and discourses; it is a difference between two
litigants in a legal case49. The legal system unlike political groups does not think in
terms of conflict50. As we have seen the principle that the legal system functions
under in the welfare state, is the promotion of the goal of societal stability through the
resolution of these conflicts in a way that will not affect the balance of the
reproduction of the societal system. In this respect social conflict as conflict between
interests, rationalities and discourses is reduced to a series of individualised disputes
that acquire their meaning through the legal system. As we have seen the welfare state
recognises conflicting groups but under the precondition that their conflict will be
conducted under the terms that itself prescribes through the legal system. Therefore
any form of collective action in order to attain access into the legal system and project
its claim must relinquish its constitutive element, namely its radical conflictual
identity. Moreover, an identity that is constituted around the conduct of struggle can
48 See Luhmann (1992)




only have extra legal content51. By being subsumed under the rationality of the legal
discourse the original conflict between property and labour is being neutralised in its
substance. What we have instead is the legal system through its authoritative
definitions, detennining both the rules and the boundaries of conflict, which
eventually loses its character as a social conflict between the forces of property and
labour.
As a result we have a condition that has been described as expropriation of
conflict52. By this term, another aspect of the phenomenon of the enhanced role of the
legal system in society is illuminated. This term expresses the fact that the conflict is
taken away from the originally parts of it. It is no longer the trade unions or the
employers, labour and property, who are confronted but rather legal cases to be
decided by a higher order of authority that determines it in its substance. The outcome
of the conflict does no longer depend on the strength and the strategies of the parties
but rather on the authoritative definitions of the legal decisions that decide its content
on the basis of the legal rationality of conflict pacification. Conflict apart from being
mutated and transubstantiated to a one-dimensional legal dispute, is moreover
alienated, taken away from its original field.
However, by suppressing and eventually suspending conflict it stifled the
dynamics of collective action as structured around organised labour movements. In a
sense we can say that the legalisation of employment created a phenomenon where
the legal understanding of employment contradicts its actual reality. The approach of
welfare state law to employment could be characterised as a case of normative
legalism, a term introduced by U. Beck that illustrates the contrast between
institutionally planned and socially valid normality . What we mean by this is that
the institutional understanding of employment can often be in contrast with social
reality. The problem has to do with the ability of the law to help and enhance social
communications. As Teubner has noted: ' The price of interference between law and
the lifeworld54 is thus a loss ofmotivation. Legal communications reliably motivate
51 See Christodoulidis (1997) pp.190-191
52 See Teubner (1987b).
53 Beck (1992) p. 134.
54 Lifeworld is a term (originally used in a completely different meaning in phenomenological
philosophy of E. Husserl) developed by J. Habermas. For Habermas the lifeworld is that part of society
that is distinct and free from the main organised systems ofpower, namely the economy and the state
and represents the aspects of the free development of cultural discourses, free social discourses and
discourses concerning the free development of the human personality. In a sense one could say that for
Habermas the lifeworld is the sphere of social interaction that is left outside of the ambit of the
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only legal communications. It is well known that their capacity to motivate general
social communication is veiy limited55. This lack of motivation in the lifeworld
creates a 'normativisation' of social life, particularly in areas that so far evaded
institutionalisation. This is the crucial factor that stifles the potential for the creation
of relations of solidarity and as a result the dynamism of labour movements. As
Adorno has remarked, the notion of the individual has not been liquidated and most of
all not diluted into formations of solidarity. The individual exists objectified,
neutralised, standardised56. This situation has been characterised by Habermas as
colonisation of the lifeworld where lifeworld communications and structures are
overpowered by the rationality of systems of organised power such as the state and
the economy57.
6. Employment under the Auspices of Law
What we have seen so far is that the welfare state has a position towards
employment that despite its undeniable benefits had some contradictory and
ambiguous side effects. First of all in the legal understanding of employment conflict
is a condition that is acknowledged as a datum that has to be compensated on a
consensual basis with the view of serving an abstract wider social interest to which
this relation supposedly refers. As a result we have a paradox in the sense that the
recognition of conflict presupposes the rejection of its source. Conflict is recognised
not as a structural condition that stems from the ambivalent relation between property
and labour; on the contrary it is acknowledged and dealt with as an unfortunate social
fact that can be contained within the scope that the state prescribes as acceptable. In
this sense the aspect of interdependence in employment is upheld as the value to be
promoted at the expense of the de-recognition not of conflict per se, but rather of its
significance, its source and its intensity. In this sense conflict is recognised as
organised systems of power. In a sense this distinction is very close to the one we make here between
the economy or the state on the one hand as systems of organised power and society as a field of
production of needs, rationalities and discourses that oppose these systems. For a detailed analysis of
the concept see Habermas (1987). lifeworld as a term is very
55 Teubner (1993a) pp. 90-91.
56
Adorno, T. Minima Moralia Cited in Habermas J. (1975) p. 127.
57 Of course J. Habermas has given to the term colonisation a wider meaning (see Habermas The theory
of communicative action vol. pp. 332-373 and particularly p. 356), but here we are interested in one
dimension of it that is the normativisation of social life.
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existing, but through an approach that wants to eliminate it as a social evil58. The law
encounters and deals with conflict as a pathological phenomenon to be overcome and
as an occasion that calls forth a legal solution. In a way we can say that it regulates
what it can understand under the perspective that it understands it. However, this legal
treatment cannot eliminate employment as a major source of social conflict. The
reasons that create it remain unaltered by its legal regulation in the welfare state. As
such we can say that the welfare state recognised inequality as a source of undesired
social conflict and intervened. However, the intervention did not and could not solve
the conflict. On the contrary by regulating aspects of employment it just managed to
suspend it.
In this respect and again without denying the positive contribution of the welfare
state59 we are looking for this new 'magic' legal formula through which we can
achieve both autonomy for social discourses and social action, an autonomy
embedded in a lifeworld free from external determinations and the regulatory
coordination of autonomous social systems on the basis of recognition of diversity on
a non-hierarchical basis. It is on the basis of such a legal understanding that
recognises inequality but moreover conflict and autonomy that employment can be
perceived as it is namely a contradictive power relation of conflict and
interdependence between property and labour.
1. Employment in the Welfare State and the Market
Society. Instead of Conclusion
In concluding I would like to make a summary of what we have discovered in
the last two chapters. The reason for this is that in under different guises and
variations the welfare and the catallactic model represent the two basic paradigms that
compete for the determination of employment in modernity.
58 Here the similarity between the welfarist and the communitarian approach is apparent.
Communitarianism holds more or less the same values but nonetheless projects another way towards
their attainment, a way that attempts to circumvent the authority of the state but
59 The contribution of the welfare state to the amelioration of the social condition is denied only by
hard-line neo-liberals. Hayek for example attributes the improvement of the condition of the working
class solely on the market and rejects the idea that the welfare state and trade unions had any
contribution to this end. Hayek (1982) Vol.2
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We can see this first of all on a historical basis. We have the free market
emerging as a reaction to the paternalistic structures of pre-capitalist employment. For
the longest period of the 19lh century we have the absolute dominance of the exchange
model, then the political reaction in the form of the welfare state and eventually the
attack of the new right against the welfare state that has been strengthened by the
recent emergence of the phenomenon of globalisation.
Especially in view of this last trend many have decided that the nation state and
with it the welfare state belong to the past. However, I hold the view that such an
assertion apart from involving an oversimplification is beside the point. The point
here is that traditionally we have two opposing rationalities as to the nature of
employment, rationalities that under different guises appear as competing paradigms
throughout modernity. This brings us back to the opposition between the Lockean and
the Hegelian State. Eventually the determination of employment in modernity
depends on whether property is a natural right or whether it exists from the moment of
its institutional recognition. In a sense we can say that the opposition between the two
paradigms is based on exactly this seemingly small but apparently essential detail. As
we have shown and as a prominent neo-liberal has conceded if we accept property as
pre-institutional then we cannot impose limitations upon its practice since no power as
derivative of it can in a legitimate way condition it. Property is absolute. However, if
we accept that property depends on its institutional recognition then as a derivative
category it has to be practiced for the benefit of the superior principle that legitimises
it, i.e. the state60. In this respect it is no accident that liberalism bases the legitimation
of property on an inherent relation to labour whereas the welfare state disregards the
role of labour and legitimises property on the free common will. The interpretations
for this paradox are many and do not fit in the confines of this thesis. The only thing
we could stress here is the paradoxical treatment of labour. Its most vehement
corroboration ensues in its denial and the disregard for its constitutive role ensues in
its social protection!
What we mean by this is that the opposition between the welfare state and
liberalism in what concerns employment is not a contingent historical phenomenon
that has ended with the crisis of the welfare state, the emergence of neo-liberalism and
the emergence of the 'global market'. On the contrary as long as we live in a society
60 C. Fried (1984) p. 1012.
136
that eventually derives its legitimacy in one way or another from the labouring act the
opposition will persist. In this respect Locke and much more so the early political
economists on the one hand and Hegel on the other, neo-liberalism and welfarism,
express two social ideal types that are in opposition with each other within capitalism.
As such one model may at times be predominant and the other recessive. In this
strange dialectic this is the last thing that matters. The opposition will change fonns,
will change power positions but as such it will persist. Maybe the welfare state is an
antiquated formation that has been overcome by globalisation. Maybe liberalism and
the notion of catallaxy have seemingly triumphed. However, what this analysis has
shown is that the opposition will return in another fonn, from another social space
since the issue of the recognition of property will forever be contested as long as
capitalism persists.
With this we bring an end to the enquiry into the main ideological perceptions of
employment. From thereon we move into the inquiry as to the how these competing
paradigms take shape in its actual practice as a social relation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ORGANISATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN
MODERNITY
Introduction
In the previous three chapters we dealt with labour and employment first in their
phenomenological-social dimension and then in their location in the philosophy of the
market and then by the welfare state. In the first chapter we discussed labour as a
form of human action that as a fundamental human trait is one of the most basic
expressions of human creativity. The phenomenological reading points away from a
perception of labour as a relation of exchange and towards a dialectical relation with
property that is expressed at a number of levels and bears within it the basic elements
of a political relation. In the second and third chapters and building on the
phenomenological analysis of labour, we focused on the predominant perceptions of
employment in modernity namely, that of the free market and of the welfare state. In
this respect we saw the perceptions of the two basic ideal types as they oppose each
other. We saw the catallactic model as representing the economic-property side of
employment to the detriment of its social dimension. Under the logic of the market,
labour is divested of all that is constitutively human about it and becomes an external,
economically detennined object. We rejected the catallactic model as it involved the
reduction of labour to a commodity and the perception of employment as a relation of
free exchange of commodities, reduction that produce morally unjust results.
However, the reason that we dealt with it is that it provides the paradigmatic fonn of
understanding of labour and employment in capitalism. In a sense we could say that
the catallactic model proffers capitalism with its legitimating ideology. On the other
hand we reviewed the welfare state as an effort that mitigated the extreme social
results that the catallactic model produced. In this respect we saw the two models not
as opposing social realities but rather as the two basic ideal types, the basic two
ideologies that in a competing fashion detennine the content of employment in
modernity.
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In this chapter we will we will look at the actual practices of employment in
modernity. Our aim is to show how the ambiguities and tensions that we have
described are expressed in -and give the concrete content of- employment in
modernity. In this respect we are going to see these tensions of employment as they
occur within an institutionally determined setting within the context that the
rationality of the market, the state and the social interests of labour dictate.
We will focus our enquiry on the relations of employment as they are developed
in the modern corporation. The reason for this is that the multifariousness of the
practice of employment in modernity is unveiled in all its complexity in the function
of corporate work systems. This is so mainly for two reasons. The first reason is that
large corporate structures represent a very significant proportion of the total
employment in society. The second and most important is that in corporate structures
the interests, rationalities and practices that are formative of the character and
function of employment in modernity are deployed in a clear and distinct form. By
this we mean that in corporate structures we can see the conflicts but also the relations
of interdependence as they develop embedded in the practice of employment.
For this reason our analysis will start from a brief exposition of the modern
corporate phenomenon especially in what concerns the features that detennine the
relations of employment developed in it, i.e., its 'work system'. We will not deal with
the modern corporation in its detail since such an attempt evades the scope of this
thesis. We will deal with those of its aspects that are both determinant and indicative
of the character and the structure of employment relations in modernity. For this
reason we will focus especially on the interests and actors that exist within the
corporation. The basic categories of corporate actors that we will talk about are
property rights holders (shareholders), management and labour. We will see how the
basic tensions of employment are expressed within the corporate structure in the
interaction of distinct categories of actors with conflicting interests, with competing
rationalities of action and who nonetheless have to cooperate under the imperative of
the performance of given tasks. Next we will deal with the basic paradigms of the
understanding of the corporation and see how they respectively perceive these
tensions of employment relations. On the one hand we have the neo-liberal approach
that perceives the corporation as a nexus of individual contracts and on the other the
'institutional' paradigm that perceives the corporation as a unit that integrates the
different interests that exist in it. What is of most interest to us here is how these
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different paradigms express different approaches towards labour. On the one hand the
contractual model as it is inspired by neo-liberal theory perceives labour as external to
the corporation that as such has no legitimate interest in it apart from the rights it
receives through the contract of employment. On the contrary the institutional model
despite it weaknesses integrates labour and perceives employment as an integrated
aspect of the corporation. This has as a result the recognition of the rights of labour in
the corporation as legitimate, a condition that despite its limitations empowers it as
against its economic determination by property. In this respect we will deal first with
the institution of collective bargaining as it provides the exemplary paradigm for the
conduct of conflict under conditions of interdependence. We will see collective
bargaining as the founding institution of 'private government regimes' and we will
analyse the principles these systems are built upon. What we will try and show is how
'governance regimes' eventually become political forums for the resolution of
disputes that stem from the power relation between property and labour and provide a
form of accommodation of the tensions that arise through employment and allows
them to be productive in an important sense.
The aim of this analysis is to capture the employment relationship in its
complexity on every social level in which it appears, whether this is the interactional,
the institutional or the societal level. What we will try to demonstrate in this chapter is
the complexity and the multidimensionality of employment as it actually takes place
in the corporation in the form of social praxis. It is exactly this form of social praxis
that unveils the substance of employment in late capitalism as a dialectical relation of
conflict and interdependence that can be at best accommodated but never transcended
as such within capitalism. And this with the final aim to understand employment in
late capitalism by shifting our understanding of it from a relation of economic
exchange to one that can actually recognise its inherent ambiguities as a
multidimensional political relation of domination.
1. The Modern Corporate Structure
1.1 'Unitas Multiplex'
We have already said that the focus of our enquiry is not the corporate structure
per se but rather the relations of employment that are developed in it. However, any
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attempt of analysis of corporate employment relations would be groundless and
incomplete unless some features of the corporation that are determinant of
employment are not addressed first.
The paradigmatic form of corporate order that we are going to address here is
that of the commercial firm. Its analysis will provide us with as clear an insight as
possible into the ambiguities ofmodern employment relations. In the commercial firm
the conflict between the market and the social determination of labour is clearly
demarcated since in it the interests and rationalities of property and labour have to
coexist and moreover to cooperate in a dialectical relation of interdependence and
conflict. In this sense a commercial firm is quite different from a public service or an
educational institution. The latter even where it may have adopted a bureaucratic
structure and accepted economic rationality as the basis of their operations and
subsumed employment relations under the logic of the economic discourse its primary
aim is nonetheless not economic but social, educational, etc. On the contrary the firm
as the par excellence producer of wealth, as the par excellence representative of the
economic dimension of the employment relation, provides us with the ideal paradigm
for the understanding of paradoxes of labour as they stem from its ambivalent nature.
Our starting point is that the corporation must be seen as an integrated system
that is characterised by the coordination of action that takes place within it. However
this action is subsumed under a form that allows the corporation to accommodate a
series of incompatible at first sight distinctions that determine it as a system of
organised action that operates under premises that are defined by the ambivalent
character of the relation between property and labour.
The basic distinction that will allow us to observe this complexity unfold is the
legal distinction between contract and organisation in so far as it applies to corporate
employment relations. We can see the modern corporate phenomenon is a mixture of
market oriented and associational phenomena. We will use the distinction in order to
bring to the fore the contradictory premises, under which employment is perceived in
the corporation. Our starting argument in this respect is that we cannot really see the
corporation as being exclusively contractual or exclusively organisational. On the
contrary both these forms exist within it and have distinct yet sometimes incompatible
spheres of competence.
Our starting point is that these two dimensions of the corporation cooperate
while at the same time represent two completely different 'systemic identities', that in
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return represent two competing paradigms in what concerns their approach to
employment relations.
Our distinction resembles that introduced by Teubner1. According to Teubner,
'contract serves to formalise the process of exchange which organises the economic
reproduction of the economic system - that is the reproduction ofacts ofpayment by
acts ofpayment. Organisations, on the other hand, formalise co-operation as a third
basicform ofsocial action... They, too, are autopoietic systems, the elements ofwhich
comprise not payments but decisions... At the same time, they use their self-organised
structures in order to specify expectations which guarantee that within the system
every action can be treated as a decision'' .
Following Teubner's rationale, the corporate employment 'system' must be seen
as a relational 'system' that is largely determined by two different forms, orientations
and logics of action. On the one hand we have the enterprise that represents the
economic orientation of the finn. The enterprise is based on actions that are oriented
•5
in their basic structure towards competition and exchange . The enterprise
communicates with its external environment, namely the free exchange market,
through the legal regulation of its transactions through contract. The conceptual link
between contract and the enterprise is expressed in the assertion by Teubner that
contractualist approaches proceed on the assumption that competition and exchange
are the nonnal conditions of human action4. Therefore, the enterprise finds in contract
a tool that can accommodate its basic orientation of action. In this respect we should
see the enterprise as a system that is economically oriented, determined by the
economic discourse and that legally mediates its actions through contract.
On the other hand the organisation comprises the actions, communications and
structures that are internally oriented and has as its main focus the co-ordination of
these actions, communications, interests and goals. The organisation as we have seen
operates on the basis of decisions. These decisions have as their main goal that the
operations of the corporation function at their maximum rate of efficiency and are not
constrained by indeterminacy and conflict. Whilst the enterprise is based on action
oriented towards competition and exchange, the organisation is based on action
1 Teubner (1993a) pp. 123-158
2 Ibid. pp.133-134
1
For exchange, competition and co-operation as basic types of human action see Luhmann (1995) ch.9
section 6.
4 Teubner (1993a) p. 129
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oriented towards co-operation. It is apparent that the organisation operates under
different principles than the enterprise. Its actions are oriented not towards the market
but towards the corporation with the view of cooperatively co-ordinating action with
the aim of attaining mutually accepted goals. In this respect we can say that one of the
main, if not the most important, tasks of the organisation is the co-ordination of its
'work system' in which the concept ofmembership also plays a key role, so that the
latter, that encompasses inherently conflictual elements, does not unbalance the
corporate structure.
The distinction between the external (enterprise) and the internal (organisation)
operational orientation of the corporation delineates the fundamental analytical
schema under which employment relations in the corporation can be perceived. The
point to be made at this stage is that the different orientation of these two logics of
action introduces the interface of two distinct rationalities to the main 'system' of the
corporation. As we are going to see these two simultaneously existing rationalities
whilst complementary may cause indetenninacy and may become a fundamental
source of and conflict within it. This is so, since as we are going to see these two
logics by default can never adequately delimit the field of their application in the
sense that there will always be cases where their respective rationalities and spheres
of application of competence will overlap.
7.2. The corporation as an economic actor -The enterprise
As economic actors firms direct their activity towards the market. The
corporation as enterprise belongs to the economic system of society. The enterprise in
other words is the expression of the firm as an economic actor. For example according
to R. H. Coase the firm should be seen inseparably from market, even the more so as a
creation of the free market structure. Under this perspective not only the individual
firm but moreover the generalised system of firms that provide the basis for the
operation of the free market, should be seen as associations of economic actors that
cooperate with the aim of reducing the costs and risks that economic transactions
entail5. The firm therefore in its essence is economic and its actions are solely
economically oriented. As we have seen in chapter two, action in the market by
5 See R. H. Coase (1988)
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definition precludes value considerations as determinant factors of action unless they
ultimately serve or justify an economic purpose. This means that the firm as a
partnership of individual capital holders develops fonnal, antagonistic market
relations of externality with its environment, which in this case comprises whoever
does not belong to this association of capital holders namely, the shareholders6. This
of course includes employment relations, since employees do not belong in this
association. The contract of employment as we have seen considers the employee as a
seller of labour power; and as a seller to the firm s/he is no different to any other
provider of goods or services to the corporation. It is therefore natural that the
employee under this schema remains external to the corporation.
The point that we will argue next is that that the distinction between the
enterprise and the organisation should be seen under the perspective of the notion of
the functional primacy7 of the economic system in modernity. Under the perspective
of the enterprise the organisation has the task of coordinating the economically
oriented actions of the fonner. In this sense the organisation is seen as an arrangement
of economic forces that has the aim of attaining their maximum economic efficiency.
According to the rationality of the enterprise all actions, communications and
relations of the corporation should be processed and moreover decided on the basis of
economic rationality. In other words according to its self-perception the enterprise is
the primary system of the corporation whereas the organisation is a secondary,
supportive system. However, some aspects of the function of the corporation cannot
be successfully grasped and handled by the rationality of the enterprise. These aspects
especially have to do with the social dimension of the corporation. In our view this
definitely includes the employment relations in the corporation. We have seen that the
human-social character of labour is in sharp antithesis with its economic
detennination as a calculable factor of production. As we have seen in the previous
chapters the economic discourse cannot perceive the complexity of this problem that
is constantly present in the function of the corporation, as it cannot be quantified in
economic terms. In other words as long as employment relations in the corporation
are perceived solely as economic the social character of labour will be ignored in the
6 For the historical evolution of this idea and not the way it has been surpassed by the development of
the modern large-scale corporation see Ireland (1999) especially pp. 38-41.
7
Luhmann in explaining the functional primacy of the economic system in capitalism connects it to the
functional primacy of other social subsystems in the course of history. 'Functionalprimacy appears to
fall to the subsystem that can be structured as differentiated from the rest ofsociety with a higher
degree of its own.' Luhmann (1982) pp.223-224.
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sense that its demands will be met only to the extent that can be economically reduced
and found compatible with the strategies for the attainment of the economic goals of
the enterprise, or silenced if they cannot be economically justified at all. In this
respect the economic discourse provides a very poor rule of decision for the handling
of the ambiguities and tensions that the employment introduces to the corporation.
This brings us back to a point that we have raised in chapter two. The ambivalent
condition that is created by the coexistence of the social and the economic
determination of labour can become insolubly problematic due to the rationality of the
economic discursive genre. As we have seen, in capitalism the economic system that
is constructed around the market becomes determinant of the social structure. In this
sense we do not have just a case of functional primacy of the economic system but
rather a case of belief in the absolute validity of its doctrinal creed.
Therefore what we need is an approach that accepts the complexity of
employment as a reality to be dealt with rather as a fallacy to be dispensed with. This
brings us to the organisational system.
1.3. The Corporation as an organisation
As we have already seen from the point of view of the enterprise the primary
gtask of the organisation is the coordination of action so that it can make possible the
attainment of the economic goals that it itself has set. The first dimension of this
organisational task is that of the technical coordination of actions through the internal
division of labour. Although this may at first seem straightforward and simple, it is
not.
Through employment a whole different dimension of the corporation comes into
existence. The relations of employment in the corporation 'transform' it from a one-
dimensional economic association, as the economic discourse would have it, to a
complex set of relations of conflict and interdependence. The crucial factor is that
labour is contradictory in its economic perception. By this we reiterate the
fundamental ambivalence of labour. Labour on the one hand as crucially is of
absolutely necessary for the function of capitalism. On the other hand it is a cost of
the capitalist production that has to be reduced to its absolute minimum. In other
8 Other organisational tasks could be considered the handling of the relations of the corporation with its
social environment in the fonn of other social, environmental and public demands upon it. In other
words with issues that do not have to do with economic transactions.
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words as we have seen in chapter one on the one hand we have a relation of conflict
over the distribution of resources produced by labour and on the other the mutual
interdependence of the parties whose cooperation is an absolute prerequisite for the
attainment of their respective diverging goals.
This means that the aim of the corporation with regard to labour is to obtain the
highest possible productivity from it at the lowest possible cost. It is to this end that
the organisation contributes. As we have seen the rationality of labour is not originally
economic; therefore the interests that employees pursue derive from social needs and
desires and as such cannot always be compatible with the interests of the enterprise.
Under this perspective and in order for the organisational point of view of the
corporation to be perceived in all its complexity the corporation should be understood
simultaneously as a locus of conflict and as a field of compromise where different
interests, values and discourses as expressed by different actors, meet and interact.
These interests, values and discourses are not necessarily compatible with each other
and their coordination towards the attainment of a single goal not always attainable. In
this respect the organisation becomes an extremely complex system that has the
delicate task of accommodating them and making them compatible with the function
of the corporation. In other words the organisation in order to coordinate action first
has to internalise and in a sense neutralise the damaging potential of the conflict
between capital and labour within the corporation.
What we are going to attempt next is a brief structural analysis of the
organisation that will allow us to proceed to its perception of employment.
1.3.1. The corporation as a system of organised action. Bureaucracy
What our analysis has shown so far is that it would be an analytical mistake to
perceive the corporation only in its dimension as an economic actor. As we saw
economic action at this level presupposes the coordination of the actions of multiple
individuals, which is something that in its turn presupposes the existence of a form of
a division of labour that is rationally developed according to a certain organisational
arrangement. This arrangement has to accommodate the fact that employment
relations in capitalism are characterised by the presence of the authority of the one
part who has the right to detennine and guide the actions of the other.
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According to Weber the apparatus through which rational authority as existing in
capitalism, operated and exercised itself in the field of social and economic
organisations, is bureaucracy9. By getting an insight into bureaucratic organisation we
can get an insight in the organisational structure of the corporation. For Weber,
bureaucracy should be approached as a product of the rationalisation of society. It is a
strictly goal oriented system which like the capitalist economy, operates on the basis
of instrumental-formal rationality. For Weber, bureaucracy prevailed due to its
superior rationality, in the sense of its superior ability to any other form of
organisation that existed up to then to achieve predetermined goals on the basis of the
ends-means schema. This means that these goals are rationally selected and rationally
pursued. We could say that it is the rational operation of bureaucracy as a system that
differentiates it from all the other forms of administration that have existed in various
periods of history. In other words bureaucratically structured organisations according
to the Weberian ideal type should prima facie preclude from their operative system
any consideration or any method that cannot be formally-rationally calculated,
evaluated and pursued with strict methodological diligence. Rationalisation is the
crucial element that has enabled bureaucratic organisations to be so successful in
achieving their goals.
The most significant effect of the adoption of the bureaucratic rationality by
corporations is that they enable themselves to cope to a much more efficient degree of
with the contingencies of the free- market. Additionally another most important factor
is that through bureaucracy they create organisational structures that allow them to
rationally organise their internal structure as well. In other words the bureaucratically
structured organisation mainly aims at the attainment of a basic equilibrium of all the
contributions involved in corporate action so that the latter can continue to exist as
such.
In summary we could say that we have a case of a structural dichotomy within
the corporation. A dichotomy that stems from the fact that the corporation has to act
and to adapt both to its external environment (namely the market) but also towards its
internal structure, a structure that in the last instance guarantees its survival and its
reproduction as a system. Under this perspective we can delimit the corporation in its
dimension as an enterprise and in its dimension as an organisational system. Our
9
For Weber's analysis of bureaucracy see Weber (1978) pp. 956-1002.
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position as it will be developed in this chapter is that the dichotomy of action between
the internal and external is a fundamental problem that underlies the corporate
structure. What our claim will be is that this dual orientation of action determines the
character of the corporation as both an economic actor and as a nonnative system.
1.3.2. Organisation and authority-hierarchy
We have seen so far the duality in the rationality of the corporation by delimiting
the two basic logics of action in it. We have also seen that in the organisation itselfwe
have a case of double rationality since on the one hand we have tasks that are pursued
according to the needs of the enterprise but also issues that have to be dealt with on
the basis of its integrating function.
We will continue our analysis on the system of the organisation by trying to
demonstrate its characteristics as an organised nonnative order with its basic
characteristic being its hierarchical structure.
Our first observation is that the organisation of the fmn is structured around a
strict hierarchical schema that is based on the authority of one part (employer) over
the others (employees). This authority stems from the power of property in capitalism
to put labour in action for its own purposes. However, and as we are going to see
further in this chapter, the complex structure of the modern corporation presupposes
relations of authority and power far more subtle than this relation suggests, although
this is the basic schema that provides them with their legitimation.
We have said that hierarchy is a fundamental feature of every bureaucratic
organisation. However, as the case is with every substantial feature of modernity
authority becomes rationalised and acquires the attributes that make it compatible
with the general social context of modernity. In Weber's words: Rational authority is
determined by the fact that 'the validity of a power of command is expressed in a
system of consciously made rational rules (which may be either agreed upon or
imposed from above), which meet with obedience as generally binding norms,
whenever such obedience is claimed by him who the rule designates... Obedience is
thus given to the norms rather than the person 'l0.
Here we have a normative system of rational authority that runs through
employment relations. This nonnative system of rules is of paramount importance for
10 Ibid. p. 954.
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employment relations as it can regulate substantive issues that influence the livelihood
of employees such as promotions, dismissals and discipline in the workplace. What
should be stressed is that this authority is not exhausted in the interpersonal relation
between an employer and an employee. It is a generalised system that runs through
the whole of the relations within the corporation.
Although we have had major developments and essential transfonnations in the
structure and the function of organisations over the last years to the extent that there is
the view that the Weberian model of bureaucratic organisation has been overcome I
believe that its essential characteristics remain intact. Although it is undeniable that
that we have major changes in the internal structure of organisations but not in the
substance of their rationality. They may be far more flexible and open to adaptive
strategies so that they can assume varying roles but they remain mechanisms of
organised power for the pursuit of specific interests". Moreover, hierarchy although
not rigidly structured and applied as the case was in the Weberian organisational type
was never contested in its essence by the new models of organisation.
The question that henceforth emerges is by what principle does this rational,
hierarchically constructed internal order of authority receives its legitimacy. This
brings us to the issue of the legitimating foundation of corporate authority.
1.3.3. Organisational membership
This legitimating foundation is that of membership. Membership in commercial
corporations has certain characteristics that are particular to them. First of all in the
commercial corporation the motives for membership are irrelevant to the goals of the
corporation. This has to do more than anything else with the fact that economic action
is individualised in the sense that the actor despite his/her social contribution has no
purpose and is not motivated by a desire to serve wider social interests. Additionally,
in the corporation in contrast to other fonns of institutionalised action, action is not
primarily oriented towards the realisation of commonly held values12, but rather to the
attainment of goals set by partial non-generalisable interests. For example, and as we
have already seen, the economic firm has as its aim profit maximisation, whereas the
goal of any single employee, even if s/he is a senior manager, is individual well
" See Melucci (1996) p.251. For more seen section 6.2 of this chapter.
12 See Weber (1978) p. 902. However, as we are going to see there exists a strong political element in
the corporation, introduced to it through its conflictually operating work system.
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being13. The separation between the motive for membership and the nonnative
consequences of membership in the first instance filters out this incompatibility and
provides the organisation with a plausible ground for the legitimation of its authority,
since membership in the commercial firm is voluntary. In other words the normative
justification of the corporate order rests on an act of the free will to join it and thus to
accept its internal normative order. Therefore, the ideological value of membership
rests on the fact that it provides a consensual justification for the nonnative order of
the corporation.
However, although voluntary membership may legitimise the authority of the
organisation, it cannot in any case induce the loyalty ofmembers neither to its values
nor to its goals as the case would be with an e.g. political organisation. Voluntary
membership is not the product of an agreement on values and goals, an agreement that
could induce loyalty feelings from the part of the participants, but the product of a
rational compromise on the basis of the balance of competing non-generalisable
interests. These interests are produced through individual but also collective real life
situations and strategies of action and preserve their autonomy vis a vis each other in
the sense of their capability to project demands on the corporation. The recognition of
the validity of the corporate nonnative structure does not alter this fact. This is so,
since this recognition is mainly established on functional-instrumental rather than
value oriented criteria14. This means that whereas, one may agree on the tenns of
membership and accept the authority of the organisation as legitimate, for s/he may
believe, that through membership s/he can promote hers/his personal goals, s/he does
not have to agree on the value orientations of the actions of this authority. Moreover,
s/he will react when the decisions of the organisation are detrimental to what s/he
perceives as hers/his personal interests (e.g. pay cuts). Consequently, the goal to be
achieved is to make commensurate individual motives ofmembership to the goals of
the corporation. In view of the fact that individual motives, interests and goals can be
in a conflicting relation as expressed in the conflict between capital and labour,
membership must become the nonnative concept that allows mediation of the
conflicting forces at play in the organisational decisions. In this respect membership is
a nonnative filter used for the hannonisation of diverging motives of participation and
13 On the substantive motivation of formal economic action see Weber (1947) p. 185
14 For an overview and a critique of the notion that the worker participates with a segment of its
personality into the corporation see Selznick (1969) p. 271.
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the stabilisation of individual patterns of behaviour on the basis of the voluntary
acceptance of organisational rules15.
We can see that the organisation besides its task of determining the internal
functional division of labour and of coordinating action with the aim of supporting the
economic goal of the enterprise has additionally the task to achieve a compromise
between the aforementioned goal of the enterprise and the various interests and goals
that are invested in the corporation. In other words the organisation must be seen as a
system that has the task of integrating the corporation into a coherent unit of action.
1.4. The relation between organisation and enterprise-A summary
We see that the organisation has different goals to achieve and different tasks to
perform than the enterprise. The corporation as an enterprise guides its operation
towards the market where the 'basic unit' is the financial transaction. The legal form
of the financial transaction is the contract of exchange. On the contrary for the
organisation the basic unit is the rationally concluded decision16. The organisation has
become an autonomous system of action that reproduces itself 'through the recursive
linkage oforganisational decisions ,l7.
In this respect we can now say that the organisation and the enterprise as two
functionally differentiated, logics of action that operate on the basis of distinct and
quite often diverging, rationalities. Following the logic of general systems theory one
could designate the 'enterprise' and the organisation as subsystems of the corporation.
The relation between part/whole is designated by Luhmann in terms of the system
subsystem distinction where the latter are differentiated out in terms of a unique
function that they perfonn for the system. While function tracks the relationship
between whole and parts, performance tracks that between parts. Our discussion of
the distinct rationalities of the enterprise and the organisation was an attempt to
discuss their respective functions. In terms of their relationship to one another,
Luhmann would designate their mutual externality in tenns of 'internal
15 On the issue ofmembership as the basis of organisations see Luhmann (1982) p. 75.
16 See Teubner (1993a) p. 130.
17 Ibid. 134.
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environments', each of them providing in its own terms the rationale of the
corporation18.
We have delimited the two main logics of action in the corporation and we have,
albeit with a very general description, outlined their respective functions. In this
respect we can say that they function in a complementary way in reference to the
main system of the corporation. However, the complementarity of their function and
the positive contribution of their performance to the corporation can be endangered in
a multitude of situations, particularly when they both stake a claim as to the
prevalence of their operative rationality over the same situation. I consider that the
fact that information can be processed from both the economical and the
organisational point of view and that both systems can lay an internally legitimate
claim upon the handling of a situation can in some cases create conflict situations.
This may be so, to the extent that the stakes that they pursue can be diverging and in
some cases even incompatible.
At this point an important issue should be clarified. When we talk about two
basic subsystems we do not talk about departments with distinct sphere of competence
as determined by the internal division of labour of the corporation, although
sometimes due to the organisational division of labour they may appear to be so. The
distinction between the enterprise and the organisation is not an inter-departmental
feud between production and administration. On the contrary the distinction applies to
orientations of action towards what the systems perceive as their environment.
Moreover it concerns the processing of information according to different functional
goals and on the basis of different discursive stakes. In this respect we do not talk
about enterprise actions and organisational decisions but of decisions and actions that
are simultaneously both organisationally and economically processed. In other words
action in the corporation comprises of events that often have a double discursive
meaning.
Of interest to this thesis is to see how the corporate structure which 'suffers'
from the presence of this dual rationality, handles the challenges that are produced
from the claims of the dynamics of employment relations. This is the more so since
this recurrent incompatibility may be the source of tensions and frictions in respect
with employment. The focus of our inquiry will be on the how the organisation and
18 See Luhmann (1990) pp. 73 -78. For the concepts of internal differentiation and internal environment
see also Luhmann (1995) p. 18 and 189-194.
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the enterprise deal with the question of labour and on how their respective
rationalities perceive in different and quite often, conflicting ways the role and the
status of labour within the corporation.
On the one hand we have the rationality of the enterprise that perceives all its
relations as market transactions with its external environment. In this respect for the
enterprise employment relations are market relations of externality. Labour is not
integrated in the corporation as the latter is seen as an association of property holders.
On the other hand the organisation focuses in the internal structure of the corporation
with the aim of ensuring the stabilisation and the safe reproduction of its function. In
this respect all relations that affect not only productivity but also the stability of the
corporate structure are perceived as internal relations that have to coexist within an
integrated coherent unit. In other words whereas the enterprise externalises labour the
organisation integrates it.
This dual rationality, namely on the one hand the orientation towards the market
on the basis of economic action and on the other the co-ordination of motives and
interests on the basis of decisions, create the need for a system ofmediation between
them, so that friction and indeterminacy may be reduced.
And this pertinent here as employment relations are the major source of
controversy between the enterprise and the organisation. Our main concern will be to
explore the social and legal validity of this system ofmediation that takes the form of
a private government regime. Our point is that we should see private government as a
system that has to give plausible solutions to the problems that our analysis so far has
posed. At this point we will turn from system to action perspective as the latter will
allow us better to explore the complexity of governance as defined by the interests
and rationalities that are at play in the corporate system. This is so since primarily
governance is a system of legal mediation of these interests and is hence determined
by the relations that their interaction in the corporation creates.
Therefore since private government is a system that tries to accommodate these
diverging interests the corporate actors, a presentation of them would illuminate the
task.
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2. Interests and Actors in the Corporation
The purpose of this section is to show the actors in the corporation and identify
their respective interests and rationalities of action. This will allow us to unveil the
corporation both as an economic actor and as an organisation from an action
perspective. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal the corporation as a locus where
diverging interests and rationalities as produced through employment converge and
interact within a constantly negotiated nonnative framework.
It should be stressed that the identification of actors and interests outlined in this
section by no way provides an exhaustive catalogue. Interests are in a 'strict sense
socially constructed, that is to say constituted only by social communication ,19. This
means that we are not seeking analytical elements in an immutable idealised structure
but rather forces, practices and relations that as socially constructed are constantly
evolving. What our analysis will try to demonstrate is that the modern corporation is a
system of organised power constructed around the interplay of the key concepts of
property, economic and technical knowledge and finally and most importantly labour
and how the fundamental ambiguities and tensions of employment are played out in
this context.
2.1. Shareholders and the right ofproperty on the corporation
As we have seen in the previous section, under the conception of liberal political
economy the firm is seen as an economic actor that is established by individuals in
their capacity as economic actors who collaborate with the aim of best pursuing their
self-interest. This means that the firm comes to existence with the sole purpose of
promoting the interests of the shareholders. The understanding that bases the
corporation on property rights is strongly favoured by neo-liberal economics and in
the legal discourse by the contractual nexus theory20. For example M. Friedman states
that the only responsibility of business is to increase its profits (i.e. the short or long-
term interests of the shareholders) whereas all other interests that invested in the
19 Teubner (1994) p. 33
20 See below
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corporation are irrelevant as they depend exclusively in its economic success21.
However this approach that in a sense can be considered as the legitimising theory of
capitalism has been surpassed by the selfsame development of capitalism itself. This
first of all has to do with the transformation of the classical or entrepreneurial firm
(with the individual entrepreneur-capitalist being the prominent figure in it) into a
complex, subtle and in a sense de-individualised structure22.
This de-indivualisation of property first of all has to do with the increasing size
of the corporation that had as a result the dispersion of property rights to an
unidentifiable number of physical and legal persons. As such shareholders have
become external to the corporation in the sense that they do not operate actively but
rather nominally in its operation23. The second reason has to do with the legal
development of the concept of property in the corporation, a condition that the
increased size and complexity of the modern corporation brought about. The classical
legal perception of property right as a right of a physical person over an object or a
title to a legal right can no longer describe the relation of the shareholder to the
corporation24. The shareholders have become traders of titles to revenues to
companies that they now very little or even nothing about, rentiers to shares the value
of which is often independent of the 'property right' that is enshrined in them25. In
other words shareholders no longer have a right of ownership over the company but
rather a right to the income that the company produces. It is this that is exchanged in
the stock market and not property rights. In other words we can say that the share
does not represent property but rather the exchange value of the prospect of the
income of the company. This means that first of all the figure of the individual
stockholder as the proprietor of a company becomes less and less distinguishable in
the modern corporate reality.
On another level the nature of the share and its dispersed character creates a
divergence of interests between shareholders as a group. For example a part of the
shareholders may have an interest in the liquidation of the company whereas another
21 See M. Friedman (1977) pp.168-174.
22 See amongst others J. K Galbraith (1967) especially chapters one to eight.
23 See Galbraitrh (1967) chapter eight.
24 The individual property right holder that Locke developed has immensely changed in the last two
centuries of capitalist development. The irony of the fact is that all neo-liberal theories ofproperty
under different guises still refer to the Lockean abstraction in order to find a legitimating theory that
could plausibly support that property is a concept that despite its references to labour should be
developed according its own logic.
25 See Ireland (1999) pp.41-47 and Ireland (2003) pp. 259-264.
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may have an interest in the continuation of its operations. The aim of profit
maximisation that supposedly is pursued collectively by the shareholders is not a
unifying principle of action in the era of speculative capitalism.
Our last remark has to do with the ever-increasing size and complexity of the
modern economy. This had as a result the demand of knowledge and skills from the
part of the corporation in order to be able to survive the increased complexity and
intensity of the market game. As a result, the entrepreneurial talent that was the
driving force of the classical corporation was inadequate in itself to meet the demands
of the new reality. This development of capitalist economy and consequently of the
modern corporation brought about and made prominent a new caste of experts that
became indispensable for the workings of modern corporations; management, or in J.
K Galbraith's tenns, the technostructure26. The special knowledge and skills
necessary for the function of the corporation in addition to the dispersion of property
rights holders has gradually made managers the actual makers of corporate policies. It
is exactly the function and rationality of management that we are going to examine
next.
2.2. Management and managerialism
We have said above that in the modern corporate structure employment becomes
a tripartite relation between property labour and knowledge. It is the role of
knowledge that takes the form of scientific management and the role that it plays in
the formation of the employment relation27.
From all the aspects of the managerial phenomenon what is of interest to this
thesis is first of all the emergence of management as distinct a layer of authority
within the hierarchy of the corporation, an authority that was the eventual outcome of
the development that has been termed as the separation of ownership and control28.
Managerialism as the rationality ofmanagement will particularly occupy us here, both
in its dimension as a legitimating ideology for the function ofmanagement but even
the more so in its pretension to be the application in social practice of the classical
26 For the term technostructure see J. K. Galbraith (1967) chapter six.
27 For a general overview see Thopmson & McHugh (1995) pp. 27-58
28 For the term see Berle and Gardiner (1991). For an overviewA of the development see Galbraith
(1967). For a more detailed analysis of the development of large-scale corporations, see Edwards
(1979).
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project of modernity that perceived rationality as the fundamental principle of social
organisation.
2.2.1. The role and the interests of managers
As we have already said the functional significance of managers in the
corporation rests in the general acknowledgement of their status as experts. Managers
occupy their positions by virtue of their knowledge of a specific and demanding role
that is assigned to them. As such the role presupposes knowledge of the scientific
substratum of the task. Moreover the perfonnance of the duties of a manager whether
technical-scientific, economic or organisational will more often than not demand the
coordination from his/her part of the actions of individual workers.
In other words we can identify managers as the persons who direct according to a
specific corpus of knowledge the actions of workers with the aim of the optimum
attainment of corporate goals.
However, the external characteristics attached to managers such as control over
their work, carrying out the task of planning for the enterprise, supervision over the
work of employees etc.29, are insufficient in themselves to provide us with a
satisfactory criterion for the understanding of management. Structural as well as
functional attributes of management have to be analysed in order for this to be
attained. We have stressed the importance of the rationality appertaining to the role,
but before venturing to its analysis, there is another fundamental dimension,
determining the notion of management. That is the identification and nature of
management role and interests in the corporation as distinct from those of property
and labour.
The answer lies in the hierarchical system of the corporation under the
perspective of which, we can see management as functionaries of a certain rationality
that is indispensable to the workings of corporations.
The key to the understanding ofmanagement lies in their relation to knowledge.
In this relation also rests the legitimation of their authority within the corporation.
Under the organisational logic this authority is not delegated contractually, but rather
is legitimated on the basis of knowledge. It is this autonomy that made I. Macneil to
29 For example, see Watson (1995) p. 308.
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succinctly characterise managers as 'agents without principals'30 since in reality they
do not act in their own name but neither in the name of someone else. These attributes
ofmanagement are the decisive factor that has led to the assumption of the control of
the corporation by them. As we have said ownership and control are separated in the
modern corporation. The tenn describes the fact that the structural limitations that the
complexity that modern corporations imposed on the ability of shareholders to
manage the corporation, has shifted the control of its operation to management.
Managers due to the identification of their interest with that of the shareholders and
due to the economic rationality of their role can represent the corporation both
enjoying the trust of the shareholders while at the same time being independent of
them.
In this respect we can say that we have a strategic alliance between these two
distinct interest groups management and the shareholders. On another level this
alliance can be seen as an alliance between all too powerful social forces that in a
sense provide the basis for the legitimation of the capitalist system, namely those of
property and knowledge.
However, I believe that the cognitive horizon for the understanding of the issue
ofmanagement extends far beyond the limits that the notion of the corporate structure
has set. On the contrary, I believe that the role and status of managers cannot be
comprehended unless we understand the 'culture' ofmanagerialism, in its functional-
instrumental and ideological dimensions. Therefore, we need an altogether new
approach that will unify the seemingly incoherent functional attributes of the notion of
management. For this to be achieved we need a comprehensive view on management
so that it can be revealed in all its implications, both on the corporate micro level and
on the social macro level as well.
2.2.2. The rationality ofmanagerialism. Managerialism and Economics as a
Science
I consider that we should seek the key characteristics of management in their
relation to the economic goal of the enterprise. Even when their role is
'organisational' rather than 'economic-productive' the rationality of their role to their
30 I Macneil (1979) p. 78.
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task is economic, in the sense, that their performance will in all cases be quantified
and assessed in economic terms.
In my opinion their affiliation to the rationality of the economic-technical
discourse is the decisive factor that determines management. Under this perspective
management should be seen as the product of the increasing complexity of economic
action and of the all-embracing tendency of economic rationality in capitalism.
On a first level we saw that management emerged when the intricacies of the
operation of a commercial corporation became too complex for any single
entrepreneur to handle. On another level we are going to argue that managerialism is a
product of the social predominance of formal-instrumental logic and of economic
action as the socially predominant form of action. As such, management as a concept,
as a principle and as a social force can only be perceived in conjunction to the rise of
the capitalist economy. Moreover, management in all the above outlined dimensions
is inextricably linked to the main proposition that was developed by many thinkers of
the enlightenment namely that, reason should guide human action.
Although the enlightenment of the individual was undoubtedly a most important
period for humanity, a period that liberated humanity from ignorance and prejudice
demonstrating the capacity of the free acting person to create and maintain on the
basis of reason the social world s/he inhabits the application of some of main
propositions had some considerable side effects. Under this perspective social action
became something that should be calculated and measured according to the principles
of reason (as they were expressed by the method of either the mathematics or of the
31
physical sciences as they were perceived before their differentiation at the time) .
Consequently reason in the above mentioned sense, should guide one of one of the
most fundamental dimensions of social action that is, economic action. What we are
going to argue next is that this principle gave the ground for the development of
managerialism.
It would be interesting to mention a fundamental inconsistency of the neo-liberal
thought at this point. For neo-liberals the superiority of market society lies in the
ability of the market order to stabilise expectations through the adaptation of action to
its ever-fluctuating function32. The market is supposed to be under this paradigm
unpredictable and contingent in its fluctuations. This is a condition that stems from
31
Again see Cassirer (1979).
32 See chapter 3. Hayek (1944), (1960) etc.
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the fundamental limitations of the capabilities of human cognitive capacity. In this
respect the need for the cognitive-technical manipulation of the otherwise
unpredictable function of the market that management provides seems to be
redundant. As we have seen the pure version of the libertarian model attributes
everything to the individual economic actor that has the ability to adapt its action to
the demands of the market. Nonetheless, as we are going to show the role of
management although largely ignored by neo-liberalism plays a most fundamental
role in the 'naturalisation' of the market order. Managerial ism is in a sense the
practical version of the neo-liberal assertion that a market society guided by economic
rationality is in the last instance the natural order of things.
The emergence of economics as a discipline with a claim to scientific truth has
been analysed extensively by many political philosophers and has sparked a
productive political and philosophical debate over the last decades. The subject is not
relevant to this project in all its width. However as it presents aspects that are of direct
relevance to this thesis an analysis of them can be extremely fruitful.
The point to be made here, following the tradition that has been built upon the
critique of the Critical School of Philosophy, will be that economic rationality in its
connection to the technical instrumental discourse of modernity has the tendency to
impose its claims as norms upon social discourses that originally are not dependant on
systems of organised power, thus frustrating their norm producing capacity33. Our
final aim is to see how such an approach finds its application in the employment
relations of the corporation.
According to the modern tradition that ascribes to reason a cognitive-
instrumental the prominence of the natural sciences as the par excellence cognitive
genre operates on the basis of formal logical axioms that translates to a notion of
reason that can stake a valid claim to the truth of the world. The world for the
enlightenment is predominantly a physical world that is34. The human world, the
world of human relations is naturalised and in this sense objectified, since nature itself
has been reduced to an object for the natural sciences that from now on can
technically manipulate it. However, as Husserl demonstrated the technical-scientific
perception of the world, a perception that followed the logic ofmathematical thinking
33 See especially the notion of colonisation of the lifeworld as developed by Habermas (1987) pp. 332-
373
34 Ibid. pp. 37-92
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through the sumbsumption of phenomena under geometrical formulae, eventually
imposed a superficial understanding of the world that had as a result the rejection of
contemplation upon nature in favour of its technical manipulation35. As Heidegger
argued, the technological understanding of the world 'enframes' it in the sense that it
turns it into object that is delimited by the utilitarian logic of its objective use. In this
respect technology instead of being a tool in the interaction between humanity and the
world, imposes an understanding of the world that transforms it from a plain of
human action to an object of human domination36. It is on this basis that reason thus
becomes an operative principle that hypostatises the world and reduces it to a
manipulable object of domination. As Habermas has remarked 'What seems to belong
to the idiosyncratic traits of Western culture is not scientific rationality as such but,
its hypostatisation. This suggests a pattern of cultural and societal rationalisation
that helps cognitive-instrumental rationality to achieve a one-sided dominance not
only in our dealings with external nature, but also in our understanding of the world
and in the communicative practice ofeveryday life,37.
Moreover, as H. Marcuse has remarked 'the very concept of technical reason is
perhaps ideological ...Technology is always a historical-social project: in it is
>38
projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things' .
In other words the emergence of economics as science is inextricably linked to the
instance that instrumental dimension of reason becomes predominant, in the sense that
it guides action on the basis of the ends-means schema. It is this ends-means schema
that on the basis of technology posits humanity in opposition to the world as
•?Q
calculable object of domination . As a result in capitalism economic action under the
principles of cognitive instrumental rationality transfers this objectification of nature
to the sphere of the social world that in its turn offers itself as a predictable object of
human domination. It is under this perspective that the social lifeforms should be
made quantifiable calculable functions of a process that is determined by economic
rationality. Thus economics as a quasi- rigorous science operates on the premise of a
cognitively accessible and calculably predictable world of human action. Again just
like the natural sciences this world is a world where validity claims are tested against
35 See Hussserl (1970) p.42ff.
36 See Heidegger (1993) pp.311-341
37 See Habermas (1984) p. 66
38 Marcuse (1968) p.223.
See the classical analysis by Habermas in Habennas (1971) pp.81-122.
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truth and where as a result the normative ought is inexorably derived from the
cognitive is. The world of human relations is naturalised and becomes amenable to the
manipulation of reason, a reason that as it operates on the basis of the instrumental
calculability of the forms of the world, cannot comprehend the universe of human
life-forms in all its diversity, since the non-quantifiable and the unpredictable forms
ofhuman relations evade it40.
We mention this here because what we will try to demonstrate is that
managerialism has a logic that represents in action exactly this scientific claim of
economic action. In other words and despite the ideological reservations of neo-
liberals towards managerialism as a distinct function we can see that they derive the
validity of their discourses from the same source. The difference between
managerialism and the ideological neo-liberal individualism is that the former
transformed economic action from a field where entrepreneurial talent and insight had
the predominant role to a field of action where a strict scientifically derived
methodological diligence has to be applied. In other words managerialism
transformed economic action from a craft to an applied science. What concerns us
here is that through the introduction of managerialism the economic perception of
labour becomes far more subtle and complicated. A whole range of terms from
efficiency to productivity are now being used to describe the economic function of
labour. Labour is no longer a crude object of domination by the property right holder
but rather a complicated productive factor that has to be subtly manipulated in order
for its use to be optimal for the economic system. The work of F. W. Taylor on the
scientific management of labour paved the way to a whole new era of industrial
relations that was characterised by the intensification of labour perfonnance and
maximisation of its efficiency under economic terms42. The important factor that
needs to be stressed is that this transformation of labour relations took place under the
guise of scientific principles. This means that the technical manipulation of labour, the
manipulation of its creative power in favour of the capitalist economic system takes
place under the aegis of a discourse that considers its findings as invulnerable to
critique. In other words the relation of domination between property and labour ceases
40 See Habermas (1984).
41 See Hayek (1982) Vol. 3 p. 82
42 F.W. Taylor (1947).
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being a contingent power relation and is transformed to a natural fact43.
Managerialism projects an image of the employment relation, as it immutably should
be. The demands and desires of labour inexorably succumb to the determinism of its
perception as a manipulable productive factor.
Another most important change that managerialism brought about was that in the
legitimation of the relation of subordination of labour to property. The legitimation of
capitalist production through a technical/economic rule changed the character of the
subordination of labour to property. The labourer does not obey the person of the
employer s/he rather succumbs to a technical imperative that s/he cannot in any way
challenge or influence44. In other words the relation of subordination becomes
rationalised as well.
What should be stressed here is that this thesis does not hold that economics
produces invalid assertions. Such claim would be outrageous. However, I believe that
economics as a reflective social science makes assertions that are bound within the
certain cognitive horizon that is delimited by the actual practice of economic action
and therefore are not scientific truths with universal validity45.
What our analysis of property in the corporation and managerialism has shown so
far is that there exists a strategic alliance between them. This alliance is not just a
phenomenon based on a contingent affiliation of interests but rather a structural
condition that is connected to the foundational logic of capitalism. In what concerns
our enquiry this means that labour apart from being subsumed under the logic of
property is also subsumed under the logic of technocracy. This of course only adds to
the complexity and to the contradictory character of employment. We will see the
consequences of this added complexity further in this chapter. Prior to this what needs
to be addressed in order for the analysis of the interests and rationalities at play in the
corporate order to be complete is to look at the role and interests of labour as an actor
in the corporation.
43 For a similar view see Albrow (1997) p. 41.
44 Simmel (1978) pp. 335-336
45 See in Teubner (2003/2004 a)
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2.3. Employees and the corporation
We have seen in chapters one and two that according to the liberal notion of
employment the employee, is the person who sells his/her labour power to a buyer
(the employer) that has the right to use it for his/her own purposes.
However our analysis has shown that contractual definitions are not able to
capture fundamental elements of the employment relation such as its heteronomous
and authoritative character especially as it takes place in the hierarchical system of the
corporation. As O. Kahn-Freund has observed about the contractual relation of
employment:
'In its inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of
subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed
by that indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the 'contract of
employment'46.
This approach provides us with an understanding of employment that is in
accordance with the reality of the corporation as a hierarchically organised system of
authority. In other word the criteria of submission and subordination supplemented by
the criterion of control47 may help us identify the employee as a person that in view of
the existence of a contract of employment is submitted to the system of authority that
already exists in the corporation.
This helps us put the position of labour in the corporation in perspective. The
labour relation is as we have seen a relation of submission and subordination
something that produces conflict but we should not forget that it is also have a relation
of interdependence48. The problem is that the simultaneous pursuance of these
interests cannot always be possible, since pursuing the one can jeopardise the other.
Moreover, the situation becomes even more complicated since these interests are not
46 Kahn-Freund (1983) p. 18.
47 This happens among other things so that a distinction can be drawn between the contract of
employment and the contract for the provision of services. Over the last few years this distinction has
acquired increased significance, since many companies have resorted to the trick of changing the
contracts of their employees to contracts for the provision of services, so that they will not have to pay
social security contributions, or be bind by employment protection regulations. See for example Deakin
and Morris (1995) pp. 193-194. On the effect of franchising on the 'individualisation' of work see
Beck (2000) p. 54.
48
This condition often makes the interests of labour conflicting in themselves, since the aspect of
conflict is often in opposition to the aspect of interdependence. For example, labour on the one hand is
in a constant demand for higher wages and better working conditions (conflictual elements) and on the
other for the continuation of employment (factor that induces cooperation on the basis of
interdependence).
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amenable to a priori hierarchical qualifications49. Their relative importance depends
on the actual conditions of the balance of power between management and labour that
detennine the pursuit of actual and concrete strategies50.
The recognition of the ambivalent approach (an ambivalence that in the last
instance is an outcome of the ambivalence of the relation of employment in
capitalism) of labour towards employment and the divergence of its own interests
delimits a most fundamental aspect of employment in modernity51. Labour has to
coordinate its ends if it is to pursue its interests as a corporate actor. According to
Clauss Offe 'the optimal mix of these contradictoiy ends cannot be calculated by
52individuals but only by organisations.' In this respect we see that the collective
organisation of labour is not only a means for the aggregation of resources in its
confrontation with property but also a means for the 'qualitative definition'' and
'selection' of its legitimate interests; interests to be pursued in persistent strategies
according to priorities that these strategies have set. In this respect we can see in
another context the validity of the Weberian thesis that the right of labour in the free
marker is transfonned from an individual right to the value of the product to a
collective right to a socially detennined standard of living. Labour interests are
collective interests that pertain to a certain group of people and as such can only be
collectively pursued.
This means that we have a condition of extreme complexity in respect to the
issue of the interests of the corporate actors since what we have is not a tripartite
divergence between solidly demarcated actors within distinct interests but rather a
multiplicity of diverging interests, motivations and rationalities at play in the
corporation, that although in the last instance are produced through the ambivalent
nature of the relation between property and labour cannot in the last instance be put
under the single schema of conflict between property and labour. The problem that
emerges as most pressing at this stage is how this divergence can be accommodated
within the corporate system, since a certain degree of integration is an absolute
requirement for any kind functional cooperation53.
49 Offe (1985) p.249
50 For an interesting view on labour interests on the corporation see Ghilardoucci, Hawley and
Williams (1997).
51 For an interesting account of the 'paradoxical interests' of labour in the corporation see Ghilarducci,
Hawley and Williams (1997)
52 Ibid.
53 See Gorz (1989) p.33
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Ifwe want to simplify this schema we can say that employment in the corporation
is a relation of extreme complexity characterised by a multiplicity of conflicting
interests and rationalities as they are derived by the relation between property and
labour as mediated by the role ofmanagement as a 'representative' of the importance
of the role of technical knowledge in late capitalism. Our next step will be to see how
this complexity is reflected in the legal theory of the corporation and especially how
legal theory tried to reduce this complexity by subsuming under normative principles
that reflect the legally dominant perceptions of employment.
3. The legal foundation of the corporation
Two theories can be seen as providing the two basic competing paradigms for
the legal understanding of employment in the corporation. The one that we are going
to review first is the contractual theory of the corporation. This theory perceives the
corporation as a nexus of contractually established relations. According to this
approach the work system is perceived as the sum aggregate of the individual
contracts of employment that the corporation concludes with its employees. This
simple and straightforward at first sight assertion, has major consequences for the
legal reading of the corporate order.
The other theory is the institutional theory of the corporation. This theory
perceives the corporation as an integrated system of action that is based on the
cooperation of actors with the view of the attainment of a commonly accepted goal.
Under this perspective employment in the corporation is seen as a cooperative relation
that is based on the mutuality and community of interests of the parties involved. In
this respect we can say that the contractual theory reflects the economic perception of
the corporation that as we have seen externalises labour whereas the institutional, the
organisational one that integrates it.
3.1. The contractual theory of the corporation
The theory of the corporation as a contractual nexus has as its basis the liberal
doctrine of freedom of contract. In this sense the theory of contractual nexus is the
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neo-liberal legal theory of the corporation and as such is strongly determined by
economic considerations54. In this respect and in view of our critique on neo-
liberalism in chapter two the contractual theory must be seen as a paradigm that puts
emphasis on the property side of the employment relation55. The basic assertion of the
contractual nexus theory is that all the relations within the corporation in the last
instance are relations that derive their legitimacy by virtue of a contractual relation
between the parties involved. It is the implications of this assertion that we are going
to analyse.
3.1.1. The corporation as a nexus of contracts
The legal instrument, through which the enterprise conducts its external dealings
in the market, is contract. According to the logic of the theory, contract as a regulating
principle should be equally valid for both the external and the internal the relations of
the corporation. This latter of course include corporate employment relations.
However and in view of the fact that employment is much more than a market relation
this approach eventually comes up against some insunnountable problems.
As we have seen in chapter one, the contract of employment legally regulates the
exchange between a buyer and a seller of labour power. The first question that arises
is between whom this exchange takes place in the complex corporate structure. On the
one hand we have the employee, but who is the employer in the case of corporate
employment relations? Without the legal figure of the employer as the buyer of labour
power the idea of the free exchange of labour becomes groundless. However, the
substitution of the physical person of the employer through the development of the
law of legal persons by legal figments such as corporate groups (or legal formations
that evade the scope of our research such as company networks, franchise agreements
etc.) the identification of the employer is often a complicated task5 . What is quite
interesting is the way that the contractual theory tries to get its way around this
problem.
54 For the most influential account of the theory of contractual nexus see O. Willliamson (1975) and
(1985). For its economic orientation see Krause (1985).
55 For an account and critique of the 'neo-liberal' contractual theory of the corporation see
Weddernburn (1985) pp.5-10. See also Parkinson (1996) pp. 121-146, Ireland (2003).
56 A. Supiot (2000) p. 323
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The contractual theory in following the logic of property determination of
employment considers the employer as the owner of the undertaking57. Nonetheless,
management as the 'subject' that runs the affairs of the corporation are the ones that
have the power to contractually bind it, as the actual property right holders i.e. the
shareholders in the vast majority of cases have no real say in the running of the
corporation. However, even the most senior and highly ranked managers and directors
are themselves contracted into the company. It is on the basis of this constant
contractual delegation that the corporation is built. This means that every contract of
employment implies a certain delegation of authority that follows the hierarchical
logic of the corporate organisation. Authority according to the model is contractually
delegated according to a hierarchy of positions. However, as we have seen the
autonomy that managers enjoy and the control they exercise over the affairs of the
corporation makes the description of the relation as one of agency as completely
inappropriate.
This brings us to the perception of the legitimacy of interests in the corporation. If
we accept the perception that rights within the corporation are only contractual then
we accept that eventually we have a web of rights and obligations that are delegated
by property. In this respect we have two kinds of rights in the corporation. On the one
hand property rights that are perceived as the only real rights on the corporation and
contractual rights that are exhausted on the performance of the contract58.
Under this prism, the notion of separation of ownership and control is completely
denied. Eventually, the firm comprises only individual members that maximise their
own utility in a strictly competitive setting59. The control that managers exercise is
denied as an imperative functional necessity and is relegated to the status of the
aggregate of a set of high paid employees with more responsibilities that are to be
assessed by the criterion of the efficiency of their individual contracts60. Consequently
the contractual theory reduces organisational associational structures and decisions to
contractual performances. This means that the corporate organisational logic is
renounced as a distinct and autonomous rationality that integrates otherwise diverging
interests.
57 Deakin and Morris (1995) p. 190
58 See Weddernburn (1985) pp. 5-6
59 Christman (1994) p. 144
60 Ibid. See in this respect, particularly R.H. Coase (1937) pp. 386-405.
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Moreover in following the rationality of the neo-liberal doctrine the contractual
theory assumes that only individuals can legally bind themselves into contracts of
employment. The contractual theory individualises the corporation in the sense that it
perceives it as the sum aggregate of individual acts of exchange between natural
persons61. As the corporate order is formed through acts of individuals, non
contractual interests have no place in it. As a result what we have described as the
collective interest of labour into a socially detennined living standard62 cannot
recognised, as it is extra-contractual. The only labour rights that are recognised are
those that are contractually stipulated. As a result collective bargaining as conducted
on the basis of the recognition of collective interests involved is de-legitimated.
Building on our findings so far, we could say that the contractual theory favours
the economically oriented subsystem of the enterprise. Through its application, the
rationality of the impersonal order of the market is imposed as the sole principle of
legitimating norms within the corporation. As a consequence, the only discursive
genre that has a legitimate position in the internal order of the corporation is the
economic. The problem of the incompatibility between the orientation of the
enterprise towards the market and the organisation as an integrated system of relations
is not seen as a problem at all, since the latter is constructed following the rationality
of the former. The dimension of the corporation as a locus where various diverging
interests are invested and goals are pursued is not taken into account at all, since these
interests can be deemed as legitimate only to the extent that they can receive a
contractual content. Moreover, according to the contractual theory, from the moment
of the conclusion of the contract the parties are supposed to have as their sole purpose
its successful performance. From the moment of its conclusion divergence of interests
is not accepted as a condition that can receive legal recognition. Interests that derive
their meaning outside the scope of contract are considered as non-valid. Therefore,
according to the logic of the theory the corporation must be seen as a locus where
legitimate contractually recognised interests exist in a mutually agreed commonality
of purpose. However, as we are going to see in the following section contractual
solutions in the corporation in no way cover the whole breadth of the employment
relation. On the contrary they leave a wide margin of discretion as to the unilateral
61
Teubner (1993a) p. 130
62 See chapter one section 5
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determination of the relation on property. It is this problematic aspect of the
contractual perception that we are going to examine next.
3.1.2. Employment and the contractual nexus theory
We are thus faced with the issue of the normative logic of the contractual nexus
theory. We have seen in chapter one that through the contract of employment the
buyer not only purchases the labour power of the seller, but also the right to use that
power for her/his own purposes. As a result the practice of labour is solely determined
by the economic purposes of property that has the right to command it. In what
concerns the corporation, this means that the employee through the voluntary act of
the conclusion of the contract accedes to the system of authority that is already
established in the corporation. In the first instance, a proponent of the contractual
theory would claim that the right of property to organise and coordinate labour is not
unilaterally taken and therefore does not violate the integrity of the worker since it is
clearly accepted as legitimate by the voluntary act of the conclusion of the contract. In
the second instance s/he would claim that the authority of the corporation as
voluntarily recognised is based on the freely given consensus of the parties involved.
Our next task is to test whether these assumptions have any validity in view of the
actual practice of employment in the corporation.
Our starting point is the generalised system of authority that exists within the
corporation. Our claim is that the authoritative dimension of employment in the
corporation cannot be adequately justified on the premises of contract law. The
hierarchical chain of command within the corporate order is in direct opposition to the
fundamental contractual principles of equality and privity63 of contract. Under the
contractual schema the parties to the agreement maintain their individual freedom and
autonomy towards each other. However, in what concerns the work system of the
corporation, these fundamental principles have no application. The fact that the
performance of the labour contract on the part of the employee, presupposes as its
structural characteristic her/his subordination to hierarchical system of authority, flies
in the face of any notion of equality64.
63
Privity of contract is the principle whereby the contract produces results only between the legal
persons who have concluded it and in no way affects or can be influenced by the interests of third
parties.
64 See Gothold (1985) p.246.
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Moreover, no contract can explicitly cover all the aspects of the relations that are
regulated by it. Especially the contract of employment is left undetermined by design
in order to accommodate the exercise of this authority in view of the specific needs of
the enterprise of the employer65. In this sense 'employers do not purchase a specific
quantity of work, performed through a specific contract, but control over workers
capacity to produce under an incomplete contract,66. Therefore contractual
stipulations acquire their actual legal meaning through the context of the actual
situations that the contract describes only in its very basic terms. This deliberate
indeterminacy works in favour of the employer through the rule of the managerial
prerogative that legally expresses the right of 'management to direct the workforce '61',
as it is supplemented by corporate regulations and company rulebooks. Company
rulebooks comprise a set of rules that regulate a variety of organisational issues68 such
as disciplinary procedures and payment systems69, and thus have a major impact upon
every employee's life, not only in what concerns her/his rights in the corporation, but
her/his welfare in general as well70. In most cases, regardless of the whether the
rulebooks are incorporated into the contract expressly or impliedly (through custom),
they are nonetheless covered by the logic of contract law. The employee is presumed
to have wilfully accepted the web of regulations by virtue of the voluntary conclusion
of the employment contract. In such cases company rules create obligations and
confer rights that are legally perceived as contractual. However, in the more usual
cases that they are not considered as contractual but rather as an exercise of the
managerial prerogative and as such can they be unilaterally altered by management71.
Nonetheless, employees are obliged to conform to them through an implied term to
perform in good faith. Moreover there is a duty to the employee not only to comply
with the rulebook but moreover to interpret the rules in a way that promotes the
objectives of the business of the employer72. In this respect through these regulations
the employer has the right to unilaterally interpret the normative context that contract
65 Collins (2003) p.34
06 P. Marginson (1993) p. 159.
67 Collins (2003) p.34.
68 On the rule book as a code that governs the workplace see Renner (1949) p. 114. On their
authoritative nature see Marx (1976) pp. 423-424.
69 See Collins (1986) p 4.
70 See H. Collins, K D Ewing & A. McColgan (2001) pp. 88-91.
71 Ibid. p. 94
72 Ibid. p. 91 in commenting the decision in Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLF (No.2) [1972]
ICR 19 (CA).
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leaves undetermined. In this way the right of the employer to manage acquires such a
wide scope of discretion that cannot be accepted by the notion of contractual equality.
This is so, since the notion that the two parties in the contractual agreement preserve
their individual autonomy is negated by the fact that the scope of discretion that each
part is allowed as to the interpretation of the agreement is vastly unequal. On the one
hand the employer has the right of unilateral determination over a whole area of the
agreement, whereas the employee can only claim as a right what has been explicitly
conferred to her/him. In this way we have a vast extension of the content of the
managerial prerogative since the employer has the right to unilaterally interpret and
amend the contractual agreement in a way that allows her/him to enhance his/her
interests in anyway s/he sees fit without regard to the interests of the employees and
of course without any prior negotiation with them73.
Legal theory has attempted to give an answer to the problem of indeterminacy
through the concept of implied terms74. The basic idea is that since no contract can
expressly cover all the aspect of the relation some of the tenns are silently applied as
accepted as enforceable obligations by both the parties. Such implied terms that are
particularly useful in cases of long-term employment contracts include the recognition
of the authority of the employer by the employee and the duty of mutual trust and
confidence between employer and employee. It should be mentioned that these
implied tenns through long practice acquire a specific meaning when they are applied
in concrete situations75. In this respect the contract acquires a double dimension as a
'paper deal' and as a 'real deal'76 where the first describes the written tenns of the
contract and the second the actual expectations of the parties as they can be
considered as valid within the context of the contractual relation. The notion of the
implied tenns indeed recontextualises the employment as a relation that is
nonnatively open and as such constantly evolving on the basis of its practice within
the context of action where it takes place77. However, it is based on an idea of contract
that is altogether dismissed by the contractual purists that consider that in this way
individual autonomy as expressed through freedom of contract is substituted by
73 On this issue see particularly A. Fox (1974) pp. 181 -186.
74 On an exposition of the notion of implied terms on corporate employment relations see C. Stone
(1993) pp. 61-90
75 See Collins (2003) pp. 34-37
76 See Macauley (2003) pp. 51-102.
77 See J. Whightman (2003) pp.143-186.
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authoritative judicial interpretations78. However these approaches finally cannot give
an answer to the problem of the legitimation not just of the authority of the employer
but rather of the generalised hierarchical system of authority that exists in the
corporation. Contract does not take into account the fact that power and domination
are determinant factors of employment. As we have already said contract cannot give
a plausible justification for the relations of authority that exist within the
corporation79. The contract of employment rather than regulating exchange provides
the justification for the introduction of the employee to a unilaterally determined
80
nonriative order. It is more a contract of adhesion rather than a contract of exchange .
This is so, since the employee dos not just exchange services for wages s/he is
moreover integrated within a certain nonnative order with an organisationally pre-
o 1
detennined set of rules . It is the logic of these rules that we should examine as parts
of an integrated organisation. As we have seen so far employment relations cannot be
seen outside of the scope of the organizational dimension of the corporation82.
These remarks in a sense delimit the regulatory potential of contract for
employment relations. As we have consistently held in this thesis the problem with
contractual solutions to labour relations lies in the fact that contract albeit an excellent
legal instrument for the legal handling of commercial relations of voluntary exchange
is completely inadequate in itself for the regulation of employment that as we have
seen is a relation that is characterised by the strange dialectic of conflict and
interdependence has an inherent elements the authority and domination of property
over labour. It is exactly a reduction of this dialectical character of employment to
market relations of exchange that contract has to make in order to provide a plausible
legal reading for the economic use of labour. As such and as we have already said
chapter one contract law solutions cannot adequately account for the normative
potential of employment relations as power relations that evolve over time.
78
Campbell and Collins (2003) 46-49
79 Collins (1986) p. 3.
80 Selznick (1969) pp. 53-55, Kahn-Freund (1983) pp. 157-158. However as Kahn-Freund himself has
said contract may be a legal figment it is the cornerstone of labour law (Kahn-Freund) 1997 p. 25. I
think that its indispensability rests with the fact that without contract the employment relation cannot
be initiated since as himself has elsewhere accepted the contract of employment covers only a small
percentage of the actual content of employment. Kahn-Freund (1954) pp. 47-52.
81 See Kahn-Freund in distinguishing the difference between a servant and an independent contractor
(1951) pp. 505-509
82 For a similar view see Collins (1986), (1993).
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3.1.3. An assessment: property and the theory of contractual nexus
We have seen that the authoritative nature of employment in the corporation is
inherent in its structure and we have found the legitimating principle of this authority
is the notion of property. We can see now the contractual perception of employment
in another yet similar context to the one we analysed in chapter one. What we saw
there by analysing the work of Locke was that in the logic of liberal thought property,
(albeit approached in a considerably different way than in late capitalism) is a higher
order value than labour and as such it claims the right to command it. Even the more
so, any understanding of employment as a relation of economic exchange in the last
instance subsumes labour both in the abstract sense and in the person of the labourer
under the determination of property. What we shall see next is how the contractual
nexus theory is in a sense the application of a perception that considers property as the
groundwork of social organisation. In this sense we can see the findings of our
critique in chapter one as applied on a different field. We can see here the logic of the
social development of property as a value that can legitimately dominate labour.
As property provides the primary interest in the corporation it becomes the
supreme value in it. As a result action in the corporation is oriented towards the
attainment of goals that property interests set. Under this prism the profit
maximisation aim of the enterprise could be translated into the enlargement and
enhancement of property rights. In view of the fact that property rights in the
corporation are not identifiable in one person, property loses its tangible character as
right upon a thing and becomes an idea that although economically manipulable and
reducible to calculable quantities, attains a moral character. This moral idea provides
both the source of legitimation of all the norms produced in the corporation and
constitutes a higher order interest and value to be promoted and protected by them. In
this way the hierarchical structure of the corporation loses its main character as a
primarily organisational principle and attains the connotation of a moral order
structured on the basis of an abstract proximity and affiliation to property. This
approach reveals the deep metaphysical origins of liberalism. Property although
eventually becomes ungraspable as a concept nonetheless produces moral rules thus
developing a very strange almost theological hierarchy of values. As traditional
metaphysics, from Aristotle to Aquinas constructs hierarchies of values based on their
proximity on the absolute value of God, liberalism constructs systems of value based
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on their analytical, functional and in the last instance political proximity to the
absolute value, namely property.
In view of this, one could say that corporate hierarchy, besides having a
functional role it also has a clearly ideological dimension, in the sense that it
concretises the notion of a social hierarchy based on the absolute primacy of property
rights. In other words the corporate hierarchy is but an ideological copy of a social
order, based on the moralisation of property rights and on the moral justification of
economically oriented action83. This is what actually delineates the scope of the
exercise of authority within the corporate organisation. It is instrumental to property
and goes as far as it is useful for the protection and enhancement of it. The classical
model thus loses its main argument, namely its claim to its consensual character and
its inherently coercive nature based on the absolute power of property rights becomes
apparent. Every other principle, force or value that might be at play in the
organisation becomes instrumental to the interests of property and as a result when in
opposition to it, has to be suppressed.
However, and in spite of the criticism that it has received, the contractual theory
has attained to a wide degree the recognition of the legal system. The very significant
role that contract has for every liberal legal system has influenced statutory
legislation. So, generally speaking statutory regulations of employment in Europe
have been adapted to the conceptual principles of contract theory. Nonetheless, as are
going to see in the next section this paradigm has been challenged over the last by
another that contests the absolute determination of corporate action by property. This
approach was inspired by a variety of factors. As the most important ones we can
identity the ever-increasing complexity of the corporate order combined with the
gradual awareness of the legitimacy of interests other than the ones of property in the
corporation. This perception that views the corporation as an institution focuses much
more on its social dimension. Moreover, it recognises it as a locus where diverging
interests and rationalities as expressed by different social forces converge on the basis
of their interdependence. In other words we should see the institutional theory as a
competing paradigm to the contractual theory. What our emphasis will be on is the
fact that whereas the application of the contractual approach ensues in the domination
83 The rational character of liberalism is turned on its head and its deep metaphysical character based
on the sanctification and the consequent absolutism of the concept of property is revealed. The
affiliation with neo-liberalism is more than apparent here.
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and heteronymous determination of labour by property the institutional approach by
integrating it and by internalising the oppositions, ambiguities and tensions that
employment brings into the corporation attempts to suppress the representations of the
aspects of domination in favour of a consensual approach that perceives employment
as a cooperative relation. In this respect we will see here again the ideological
dimension of legal constructs. In other words how ideological representations of
reality can socially sustain relations of domination by representing and justifying
them through abstract legal perceptions. We will pursue the ideological function of
this in later sections but before to this we turn to the other major legal theory of the
corporation namely the institutional theory.
3.2. The Corporation as an Institution
The institutional theory of the corporation emerged as an attempt to grasp the
modern corporation not just as an economic actor but moreover in its dimension as an
integrated associational system. The mainstream institutional theory of the
corporation was developed in the first half of this century, by theorists such as G.
Renard8 , G. Gruvitch85 that build on the work of legal theorists such as O.
Kirkheimer. Very significant to the latter development of the institutional theory of
the corporation is the work of R. Savatier86. We will briefly outline their main
positions here especially the work of R. Savatier as it provided the basis for the
modern understanding of the corporation in legal theory. A brief comment will be
made on the work of T. Parsons that developed the sociological side of the
institutional approach of the corporation. Additionally, particular emphasis will be
given to the latter variations of the institutional theory, the most prominent one being
the communitarian approach put forward mainly by P. Selznick87 and A. Etzioni88.
Systems theoretical approach to which references will be made, although has
many similarities to the institutional theory particularly in what concerns the
autonomy of the corporation as a system, provides an altogether different paradigm to
be debated in its own merit.
84 See La theorie de 1' Institution (1930)
85 See Le temps present et l'idee du Droit Social (1931)
86 See Les metamorphoses economiques et sociales du Droit civil d'aujourd'hui (1952).
87 See mainly Selznick (1969)
88 See A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations (1961).
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3.2.1. The institutional theory of the corporation
In its early stages the institutional theory was developed as an answer to the
inability of the contractual approach to grasp the reality of the corporation as a legal
person. The biggest problem that the classical approach could not overcome was
brought forward by G. Renard and developed later on by R. Savatier. This was the
difference in the temporal horizon between corporation and contract. The corporation
was of an open temporally open whereas contractual performance was temporally
confined in the completion of a specific task. Savatier's position was that this problem
could be solved through the concept of the institution. Of course, contractual theories
have come up with sophisticated solutions to the problem89, but their original
incapacity is indicative of a weakness the organisational dimension that characterises
later solutions.
The difference of temporal horizon between institution and contract provided the
basis for the identification of further differences between them. First of all, Savatier
stressed the social dimension of the corporation that takes shape in the form of the
recognition of third party interests that are at stake in its operation and cannot be
perceived by the classical theory90. This is so, since the contractual approach due to
the doctrine of privity considers as legitimate only those rights that are established
through contract, such as the rights of creditors, suppliers etc.91. Under this
perspective the corporation is the centre of multiple acts of exchange and as such is
legally related only to its partners in exchange. On the contrary, under the perspective
of the institutional theory the corporation acquires a new dimension in what concerns
its social aspect. As such it can be seen as bearing responsibility towards the social
sphere in general. This approach has brought about the whole discussion on the issue
of corporate social responsibility that views the corporation as having obligation
towards a series of social actors and dimensions such as its locality, the environment
89 See Macneil (1980)
90 For an account of Savatier's theory see Gottlieb (1983) pp. 586-588
91 Savatier of course worked on the basis of the French legal system. The doctrine of privity of contract
is enshrined in Article 1165 of the French Civil Code.
92 For an account on Savatier's positions see Gottlieb (1983) pp. 586-588.
177
These are the general lines along which the institutional theory was developed.
Of course these original positions by Savatier have been developed further. However,
in what concerns the context of this thesis, the important contribution of the
institutional theory was that it provided legal theory with a new conceptual basis for
the understanding of the employment relation as it is actualised in the modern
corporate structure.
3.2.1. The functionalist approach to institutions- Institutions as integrated
systems of action-T. Parsons
Of fundamental importance to any legal-institutional approach to the issue of the
modern corporation has been the work of the sociologist T. Parsons. Although his
approach was sociological rather than legal Parsons put particular emphasis on
importance of institutions for the process of social integration. The relevance of his
theory for this thesis lies on the fact that Parson's theory of institutions as integrated
systems of action on the basis of commonly accepted values and goals provides the
basis upon which the corporation can be seen as an integrated nonnative system.
Parson's theory of institutions is a continuation of his theory on the irreducible
nonnative character of social action93. As he has noted: 'the elimination of the
normative aspect eliminates the concept ofaction \94. In the context of the corporation
as a system of action, nonnativity must be seen as structural element with an
integrative function. Specifically, Parsons sees the institution as an 'integration of the
actions of a plurality of actors in a specific type of situation in which the various
actors accept jointly a set ofharmonious rules regarding goals andprocedures' 95.
This assertion provides us with a valuable insight into the relation of the
enterprise with the organisation. The organisation thus becomes the system 'where the
imperatives of a functioning process will differ from the logic of exchange'96 due to
the fact that cooperation demands a set of rules more rigorous than a system of
exchange relationships. The logic of cooperation and the set of rules it presupposes
introduce the nonnative into the field of the instrumental and thus establish a new
logic in their relationship. In other words Parsons sees in what we have described as
93 Parsons (1982) pp. 93-95 on the notion of the action frame of reference. For an account and critique
of Parson's theory of action see Habermas (1984) pp. 204-234.
94
Parsons (1982) p.94. See chapter one fn.l 19
95 Parsons (1991) pp. 71-72.
96 Ibid.
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the organisational system the source of the rules that aim at the attainment of
cooperatively concerted action. This means that the organisation has the task of
making what we have identified as different motives and rationalities of action to
converge with the aim of the achievement of a commonly accepted goal. However,
for Parsons institutional integration functions only on the basis of commonly accepted
values. Institutions fulfil the task of specification of values in the sense that they
translate values to specific social functions. Integration in its turn ensures the unity of
97values as they are applied in various social contexts . As A. Melluci has noted on
Parsons 'an institution is the site of social mediation between a cultural totality
(values) which is specified and a presocial multiplicity (Nature, needs) which is
98
integrated'' .
The major contribution of Parsons's theory in respect to our subject of enquiry is
that it provides the theoretical background for the necessity of the accommodation of
this divergence within the corporation. However, Parsons believes that the answer lies
in a shared system of values, whereas this thesis holds that it lies in the factor of the
interdependence of the parties in the employment relation. Our thesis is that although
values undeniably are a most important factor of social cohesion the agreement upon
which of them should normatively guide employment is an extremely problematic
issue. This so, since such an agreement comes up against the conflictual aspect of the
employment relation, as it is expressed by the diverging rationalities of action that are
involved in it. In simple words, in what concerns employment, the divergence of the
discursive rationalities and motivations of property and labour make such an
agreement a complicated task, since through the relation of employment they aim at
the realisation of different interests that as we are going to see further on more often
than not are legitimated on the basis ofdifferent values.
However the notion of values may become a crucial factor that opens the way to
the recognition of this divergence. This is so, since integration presupposes the
recognition of original diversity. In this sense Parsons's theory provides us with a
groundwork on the basis of which we can search for the common values that property
and labour may share within a situation that albeit conflictual, on the basis of
interdependence forces the cooperation of the parties involved.
97
Melucci. (1996) p. 250.
98 Ibid. p. 251.
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What we mean by this is that the organisational imperative of integration permits
an interpretation that supports the recognition of the original diversity. In this respect,
it presupposes the recognition of the multiplicity of discourses that operate in the
corporation. In other words, the integrative role of the organisational discourse
presupposes the mutual recognition of the existence of the diverging discourses as
staking a legitimate claim in the normative pattern of the organisation. And as we are
going to see further role the notion of values can play a key role for the negotiation of
such a pattern.
Keeping this in mind we will try to unfold the basic perceptions of the institutional
theory not as a consistent legal or sociological theory but rather as a current of
thought that despite the diversity of the orientation of the various thinkers that have
supported it persists in the notion of the corporation as an integrated system of action.
What our focus will be on is whether this integrationist approach recognises or
suppresses the original diversity of the actors in the employment relation.
3.2.2. Employment relations and the institutional theory of the corporation
Based on Parsons we are in a position to say that the integrationist logic of the
institutional theory has provided the basis for the recognition of the validity of the
various interests and discourses in the corporation of the integrationist logic of the
organisation. It is the thread of this integrationist approach that we are going to follow
next as it will allow us to unfold the multileveled complexities of the corporate
employment relations.
The institutional approach has allowed labour to emerge as a legitimate corporate
actor and stake its autonomous claim on the orientation of the operations of the
corporation. However, it should not be forgotten that this autonomy has limits that
capitalism and the economic purpose of the firm have set. What we mean by this is
that the claims of labour cannot negate the purpose of the enterprise namely,
economic activity. As P. Selznick has said 'to describe the business corporation as a
social institution is not to deny that it is primarily an engine of capitalist economic
• - ?99
activity.
Probably the assertion that sets the basis for the understanding of the complexity of
employment in the corporation qua institution with a social dimension is that by G.
99 Selznick (1992) p. 352
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Teubner that 'the enterprise interest is directed towards creating reflexive procedural
structures that will allow a mediation between the main social task of the enterprise
and its various contributions to different sectors ofsocial life']0°. It should be stressed
that with the term 'main social task' Teubner does not refer to the profit maximisation
aim of the enterprise, but to the productive contribution that the enterprise makes to
society via its economic activity101. This main social task that Teubner describes with
its contribution to the different sectors of social life is a factor that cannot in any case
be challenged by the work system, since it provides the corporation with its public
dimension that makes it an object of the general social interest. Therefore the
corporate work system by definition has to function within the limits that the above
mentioned premises, i.e. the public dimension and the economic purpose define. In
this respect we can see the affinity of the institutional model with the approach of the
welfare state towards economic action in the sense that they both share the belief that
the latter should always be socially controlled in order to serve the common good. It is
under the heading of the common good that the institutional theory approaches
employment relations.
It is the perspective of the common good that allows the recognition of all the
interests at play in the corporation in their own right. This is so since the institutional
theory sees employment as an indispensable part of an integrated organisational
structure that operates for the general social good. This recognition on the basis of its
contribution to the integrated whole, emancipates employment from the limits that the
contractual approach imposes on it, and allows it to project its demands to the
corporation. Under this perspective the corporation can be seen as a locus where
different motives, interests and strategies intersect and interact. Under this model, the
principle of membership acquires a new meaning in the sense that it can now
encapsulate a valid and legitimate right upon the corporation as a whole.
As a result, collective organisation is seen under a totally different perspective.
Collective bargaining is not seen as a menace that the corporation has to put up with,
but instead has a central role in striking a balance between what should be seen as
equally legitimate interests. The system of authority is no longer accountable only to
100 Teubner (1994) p. 27
101 Ibid. p.35 Therefore for Teubner, the interest of the corporation in itself, is distinct from all the
interests that are invested in it.
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property, but on the contrary it produces rules that through the recognition of the
equality of interests aim at the normative integration of the corporation.
Under the institutional perspective, the normative dimension of any
organisational system becomes of paramount importance. This is so since the notion
of normativity provides the basis upon which cooperation between the actors may be
achieved so that intrasystemic communications can be restored and therefore
subsystemic contributions can be complementary instead of conflicting102. Here we
can see another aspect of the affinity between the institutional theory and the welfare
state approach in the sense of their preference for normative solutions. In this respect
we see again the opposing perceptions of employment that we have described in
chapters two and three. On the one hand we have an economic logic that reduces
labour to the sphere of exchangeable externality and on the other a normative logic
that socially integrates labour on the basis of its indispensability for the attainment of
the common good. We have seen that the economic approach eventually becomes
exploitative and coercive. We have also seen that the welfarist approach offers a
compromise that comes at a cost. It is exactly this cost that we are going to examine
next.
3.3.3. Communitarianism and the limits of the institutional model
At this point a short critique of the institutional model in its prominent
communitarian version will be attempted. The reasons that we have chosen
communitarianism as the paradigmatic version of the institutional model instead of
assessing a more classical welfarist approach are many. The first reason is that
communitarians have given us significant works on corporations. Moreover,
communitarianism at least from the point of view of influence can be seen as the most
vigorous contemporary opposition to the predominant neo-liberal doctrine. Finally
communitarianism can be seen as the contemporary heir of a long intellectual
tradition that focuses on the aim of social coherence; a tradition that starts with
Hegel103 and continues through Parsons104 to Maclntyre105. This tradition holds (as
102
Parsons (1982) pp. 164-165, see also Luhmann (1995) p. 391.
103 It is no accident that some communitarians have attempted to trace back to Hegel the source of their
theory. See Selznick's reading of Hegel in Selznick (1992) pp.65-68. See also Taylor (1975) (1979)
104
Although Parsons was a renounced conservative his theories on the normativity of social action and
on social action as aiming at social integration can be seen as being close to communitarians.
105 See Maclntyre (1980)
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Hegel did) that social (and this also includes economic) action should always refer to
the common good.
Communitarians not only see the corporation as an integrated system of action but
moreover as a factor of social integration that serves the bigger ideal of social
cohesion. According to Selznick the institution is the middle tenn of the tripartite
schema organisation-institution-community that encapsulates the communitarian ideal
of socialisation106.
As a result of its preference for consensual solutions as based on social practices
communitarianism seeks integration on different level than welfarism.
Communitarianism seeks common values rather than authoritative solutions imposed
from above. Hence, of central interest for the communitarian theory is the infonnal
structure of the organisation. According to P. Selznick's seminal work 'Law, Society
and Industrial Justice'' 107, long held non-institutionalised practices preserve a
significant role for a consensual system of private government108, as they create
channels of informal communication between management and labour. This informal
fonn of communication allows problems and grievances to be solved at the lowest
possible level, before being able to disrupt the 'normal' function of the system. It is in
the fonn of non-institutionalised practises that P. Selznick recognises in corporate
organisational particularities, the potential for the creation of a certain individual
'culture', based on the shared values that distinctively characterises them100. Of
particular importance in this model are as we shall see further on, mechanisms of
conciliation and arbitration and internal grievance procedures"0, that in a sense
'normativise' and 'democratise' the system and simulate it to a 'proper' legal system,
since they provide the element of neutrality and fairness that is a prerequisite for the
exercise of authority in democratic societies.
In this respect we can say that in this work by Selznick we find the first
systematic attempt in legal theory for the recognition of an internal institutional
arrangement in the corporation that creates valid legal norms, which provide the basis
for the creation of an internal, private political system1".
106 Selznick (1992) especially pp.231-244.
107 Selznick (1969)
108 The term 'private government' was introduced and developed in this context by p. Selznick, in
Selznick (1969) pp. 75-121.
I0<) See Selznick (1992) pp. 321-322.
110 See Selznick (1969) pp. 154-178.
Ibid. See bellow
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The main weakness of the communitarian version of the institutional theory that
_
• • 112is also the main weakness of its Parsonian version as well lies in its downplaying of
the conflictual element that is inherent in employment. It rather favours a consensual
model of governance, aided by internal grievance resolution mechanisms that have as
their aim the pacification of the internal system of industrial relations. In this respect,
and in spite of the fact that institutional theory was the first to bring to the fore the
diverging interests on the corporation, in a sense it downplays them by neglecting
exactly this divergence. Although communitarians were the first to challenge the legal
and moral primacy of the shareholder interest 'in favour of a more spacious
conception of membership'U3 in the corporation they did so on the basis of an
approach that largely ignores the rationality of employment as an inherently
conflictual relation"4. Eventually, the communitarian version of institutionalism tries
to discover consensual possibilities at the cost of ignoring the conflict mechanisms
that are operating in the corporate structure.
The communitarian critique of the classical model of the corporation attempts to
reveal and embrace the moral dimension of economic action at the cost of a more
critical stance towards the direction that it has taken in capitalist societies. However,
communitarians do not contest the dominance of the economic amongst social
discourses nor do they contest in essence the priority of its imperatives. On the
contrary they try to demonstrate the social dimension of economic action and bring to
the fore its inherent moral dependence"5. In this respect they rediscover the moral
dependencies of economic action so that they can recontextualise it, by making it
adhere to rules as they are derived from socially valid values. However, as we have
already seen, the relation of the economic to the moral discourse is at best problematic
in capitalism, since the moral dimension of action is eventually instrumental to the
preservation of the integrity of the market order116.
Nonetheless, it should not be underestimated that the communitarian critique
provides us with a valuable warning of the social consequences of unfettered
economic action and of the inadequacies of its scientific pretences117. However, under
the communitarian paradigm, social discourses are not seen as opposing unfettered
112 See Melucci (1996) pp.255ff
113 Selznick (1992) p.346
114 On the inability of communitarianism to take into account conflict see Christodoulidis (1997)
115 See Etzioni (1988)
"6 See chapter 2.
117 Etzioni (1988) pp. 114-135.
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economic rationality, but rather as potentially beneficial to the self-referential goals of
economic action. For some communitarians the claims of social discourses are not
tested for their validity against the demands they project on social structure, but rather
against their contribution to the economic system. For example, according to A.
Etzioni workers participation is not assessed on the basis of its nonnative merit as a
claim that should be tested against the social notion of the just, but rather it is
118endorsed as a moral way to enhance economic efficiency . In a sense we could say
that communitarians try to amend the consequences of the unfettered deployment of
economic rationality by claiming that the social recontextualisation of the functionally
autonomous economic action is potentially beneficial for the economic system.
In other words, the alternative proposal of communitarianism suggests a form of
conciliation between the economic and the social that nonetheless concedes that the
rationality and the goals of the fonner can never be challenged as to their validity by
the former. Eventually, this conciliation comes to be detennined by the economic.
The authoritarian demands of the economic system upon social discourses are not
challenged in their essence by communitarianism.
As a result of this consensual ethos of the communitarian approach the
conflictual element in labour relations is not recognised as inherent. On the contrary,
conflict is perceived as an unfortunate eventuality that occurs due to the inability of
two parties to realise the hidden potential for consensus. Conflict is seen either as the
outcome of social blindness and dogmatism or as the result of inexcusable group
egoism that disregards the social consequences of its actions" . For communitarians
as the case was for Parsons it is the common social and moral values that provide the
context for this consensus. It is the ideal of social harmony that is at the root of this
approach towards employment. However hannony cannot be attained when the causes
of social conflict are ignored. As we have already said communitarianism disregards
divergence in favour of integration. In this respect hannony becomes an abstract ideal
that ignores reality. The communitarian perception of the relation between the moral
and the economic which has as its ground a vehemently held, common value
orientation, presupposes an agreement on the content of employment. On the other
hand, communitarianism does not recognise employment as a relation that is ridden
118 Ibid. p. 239.
119 See Etzioni (1988)
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by tensions and ambiguities. It does not recognise that conflict is an inherent,
constitutive aspect of it.
On the other hand communitarianism had a substantial contribution in bringing to the
fore the moral issues that are at stake in employment. What is important is that at least
some versions of communitarianism reminded us that issues such as fair treatment and
moral equality are issues that have to be central in any contemporary understanding of
employment. However the precept ofmoral equality, an idea deeply influenced by the
philosophy of I. Kant, does not touch upon the issues of substantive justice that are at
stake in the corporate system. The whole issue of distribution is being underplayed in
the sense that is seen under a perspective that looks for morally agreed rules of
fairness rather than substantive rules of justice. In this respect the communitarian
demand for moral equality seen as the potential of equal moral competence and
vulnerability of social actors 120 reintroduces the Kantian Golden Rule to always treat
121others as ends in themselves . Communitarianism suggests more than anything else,
a stance, an approach that demands a moral awareness about employment. What
communitarianism has made us aware of -and this is a major contribution- is that
morality should not stop at the factory gates as it happens with the application of the
neo-liberal approach.
This is a most important contribution but it should be our starting point and not our
conclusion. In other words we are looking for an approach that can concretise moral
equality into specific rights and duties with the acknowledgement of the fact that
these rights and duties refer to a relation that is characterised by ambiguities and
tensions that make it impossible for a simple and straightforward solution to be
attained.
Our point on the contrary starts form the recognition of conflict and seeks a
normative approach that does not pretend to overcome conflict altogether but rather to
face it in its ambiguities and contradictions. We can not disregard conflict in the
employment relation on the basis of a moral perception of what employment should
ideally be. The complexity of the relation between property and labour makes it
impossible for them to be solved through their subsumption under a schema of a
common morality, a morality that in the communitarian case, by disregarding
suppression, considers conflict as a sign of moral ignorance or legal non
120 See Selznick (1992) pp. 482-498.
121 On the Kantian Golden Rule see chapter two fn. 33.
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responsiveness. On the contrary this conflictual dimension is an inherent part of
employment, a part that cannot be denied. And it is on the basis of the
acknowledgement of divergence that we should seek the common values that might
allow us to find a unitary nonnative approach to employment. But before we seek the
grounds for this approach we should first understand what we mean by the tenn
multileveled conflict as this will allow us to better understand the complexity that our
nonnative approach has to deal with.
3.3.4. Registering Conflict in the Corporation. A Summary
We have repeatedly said in this thesis that conflict is an essential characteristic
of the employment relation that is created by the ambivalence of the economic use
and the social-human character of labour. What we have done so far in this chapter is
to explore how this conflict between the economic use and social substance of labour
takes shape when labour as an organised force of production is put to use for
economic purposes as a relation between property as ownership of capital and labour
as social and economic force. We have seen that the corporation is characterised in its
rationality as a system by a structural dichotomy between its two 'subsystems',
namely the enterprise and the organisation.
This first distinction has allowed us to delimit the main fields of conflict in the
corporation as they are defined by the diverging demands of competitive exchange
and cooperation. Our point is that cooperation is an imperative demand for capitalist
production that can be induced either through the unconditional acceptance ofmarket
solutions or motivated on the basis of the recognition of the character of the
employment relation as one of conflict and interdependence. The latter approach is
based on certain normative presuppositions the most important being the recognition
that the interests and discursive rationalities of the conflicting parties are of equal
legitimacy and validity. It is on the basis of this background that we can delimit the
fields of conflict within the corporate system.
What we have seen so far is that the two basic models express two different
nonnative understandings of 'corporate complexity'. We saw the rationality of the
contractual model as economically detennined and as in the last instance justifying
the domination and detennination of property over labour. On the other hand we saw
the rationality of the institutional model as one that socially contextualises the
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corporation, at the cost of underestimating the conflictual element of employment thus
advocating a consensual approach that nonetheless, recognises divergence. In this
respect we have the conflict of two different perceptions of corporate employment
relations that is determined by their respective perceptions of these interests,
rationalities and discourses. In analysing the actors in the corporate operations we
saw that not only do we have diverging interests but moreover, a conflict of
rationalities through which these interests perceive their position in the system of
corporate employment relations. Additionally, we saw that this conflict of rationalities
takes the form of a conflict of discourses and on the basis of which they justify the
legitimacy of their claims. In summarizing we could say that the context of the
corporate system (the context that becomes the field where these conflicts receive
their ideal form) conflict is simultaneously expressed as conflict of interests, as
conflict of rationalities and discourses and finally as conflict of competing models as
they express diverging ideological directions of the understanding of employment in
modernity.
In this respect we can say that conflict in corporate employment relations is
multidimensional. Nonetheless as we have seen conflict as a constitutive part of
employment is conditioned by the equally constitutive part of interdependence. What
we are going to argue next is that this dual constitution of employment finds its best
expression in the institution of collective bargaining. We have indirectly addressed the
issue of collective bargaining in the previous chapters of this thesis. However, in this
section we are going to deal with it as the process that bears these characteristics that
best encapsulate the tensions of employment in modernity. Moreover, this analysis
aims at unfolding the normative problems that an approach that wants to go beyond
communitarianism should take into account.
4. Collective Bargaining and the Corporation
4.1. The institution of collective bargaining
What makes collective bargaining fundamental is the imbalance of power that
exists in the employment relation. In this sense collective organisation directly
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challenges the power of property over labour in employment. This is so since the
collective organisation of labour receives its legitimacy by invoking the character of
labour as a social, collective force that claims a socially acceptable standard of living.
Of course we do not hold that the presence of collective organisation magically
restores a balance of power between the social forces of property and labour. On the
contrary organised labour no matter how strong it may be by itself, without active
political support that is materialised through legislative measures and political support
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cannot confront employers .
In the absence of collective bargaining management is unimpaired to impose a
normative system that follows the economic logic of property. Governance systems
constructed unilaterally by management do not have as their aim normative
considerations about fairness; on the contrary they usually create a set of rules with
normative power that are constructed following the rationality of the economic
discourse. In the last instance their function is but an instrument to the promotion
employer's interests through the stabilising, monitoring and controlling of employee
behaviour123.
The particular focus on the institution of collective bargaining is due to the fact
that in it, it is encapsulated in a clear form the ambivalence of employment in the
sense that in collective bargaining not only we can see the confrontation between
property and labour as social forces but moreover that in it is we can see as ideally
expressed this ambivalence at its many levels i.e. the social, the economic and the
legal. As we are going to argue next, collective agreements are not just texts that
express an agreement between management-property and trade unions. They are an
encounter of different logics, of different discursive worlds. In this respect this
analysis will allow us to approach the paradox of employment as it is expressed as a
social an economic and finally a legal relation.
4.2. Collective Bargaining and Collective agreements
The starting point of our analysis will be the institution of collective agreements
and the way we can understand the multileveled tensions that are created through
employment as they unfold through the practice of collective bargaining.
122 Kahn-Freund (1983) p. 19.
123 Edwards (1979) p. 106.
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First of all collective agreements although in many European countries are
considered as contracts, they cannot be easily perceived in all their complexity by
traditional approaches to contract law. Collective agreements have the particularity
that although they are legally assumed under the contractual fonn and although they
have fundamental contractual characteristics they are simultaneously organisational
arrangements about the distribution of power and economic agreements that
determine the distribution of resources within the corporation. It is this dual
organisational and economic significance of collective agreements that defines them
as a legal instrument. As such they cannot be perceived as single acts of economic
exchange and consequently cannot be compatible with the contractual nexus theory.
We have seen in section 3.1 that the contractual nexus theory deconstructs the
corporation to a multiplicity of individual interconnected contractual acts of exchange
between individuals. Hence, the fundamental presupposition of collective bargaining
namely, the recognition of collective actors and collective action is rendered
incompatible with the logic of the corporation. Moreover, another basic
presupposition of collective bargaining, namely the relation of inequality between the
parties -that exists despite the extensive legislative measures that aim at its mitigation
through the regulation of the contract of employment and to a series of employee
protection legislation- is not recognised by the contractual nexus model124.
Additionally, the extension of collective agreements over time, the minimum
standards that they set125 and their erga omnes extension126, make it difficult for the
classical theory to explain them in terms of contract law127. According to P. Selznick
collective agreements emerged due to the inability of the contractual theory to adjust
to the new and continuing institutions, which were created through collective
bargaining such as the bargaining unit and the grievance machinery128. On the
contrary the presence of collective agreements promotes the notion of the corporation
as an integrated body, since the system industrial governance based on collective
124 We have seen in chapter two that bargaining inequality is recognised by the law as a structural
condition between the parties and that extensive legislative measures for its mitigation have been taken
by welfare state policies.
125 Weddeniburn (1992) p. 245
126 The terms denotes the procedure whereby the content of a collective agreement usually by an act of
the administration or the judiciary covers non-unionised workers as well. See Simitis, Die faktischen
Vertragsverhaltnisse cited in Habermas (1992) p. 150.
127 Selznick (1992) p.306.
128 Ibid.
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bargaining creates a web of negotiated rules that can exist in the corporation only if
we perceive it in its institutional dimension.
Our point is that although collective agreements could be conceptually perceived
as contracts in reality they are something far more than that. According to O. Kahn-
129Freund a collective agreement is simultaneously a peace treaty and a legal code . It
is a peace treaty in the sense that it is binding since the parties are under an obligation
to abstain from conflicting action as long as the agreement is in force. On the other
hand as a legal code it is a source of law in the sense that not only it establishes terms
and conditions of individual employment contracts130 but moreover it is the source of
the legitimation of the internal corporative nonnative order.
In the words of the American Supreme Court:
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial
self-government... It is more than a contract; it is a generalised code to govern
a myriad of cases, which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate... The
collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into
beins a new common law - the common law of a particular industry or of a
particular plant.131
In this decision the character of collective agreement not only as a normative
source, but moreover as the foundation of a political institution, namely a system of
self-government is revealed. What our claim is, is that a collective agreement
becomes an ever self-amending constitution of a political community that is based on
the existence of a collective identity132 that finds its foundational principle in the
notion of membership in the corporation. The corporate member is no longer an
individual market actor but rather a member of a collectivity that is recognised as an
active participant in the formation of the wider nonnative structure of the wider
collectivity that the corporation represents.
What is negotiated in collective bargaining is not just the interests of individuals,
but rather the power relation of the parties of employment as collective entities. And
129 Kahn-Freund (1983) chapter 6 pp. 154-199. The dimension of the collective agreement as a legal
code will occupy us extensively this chapter.
130
Rogowski (2001) p. 185
131 Steelworker's v Warrior & Gulf, 363 US 575, 578-579 (1960), cited at Selznick (1992) p. 306.
132 On the issue of the corporation as the source for the fonnation of a collective identity see Teubner
(1988) pp., 130-155
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this negotiation allows us to seek on another level the meaning of the position of
Kahn-Freund as it leads us to the various understandings of employment that we have
so far described.
4.2.1. Legal approaches to collective agreements
What our task will be next is to find a legal approach to collective bargaining that
could explain both the normative function and the political character of collective
agreements as legal foundations of private legal orders. The point of this thesis is that
the answer to their particularity lies in their ability to consensually produce derived
norms that cover a wide range of employment relations. As we have said above,
collective agreements are not contracts they are founding instances of legal codes in
Kahn Freund's sense.
However, as collective agreements have strong contractual characteristics,
especially in what concerns their conclusion through a procedure of negotiation we
are going to continue our analysis by looking at the theories of contract that can best
describe the particularity of this consensual character. For this reason I will use the
contributions of what I consider as the most suitable in the context of our analysis
On the one hand we will deal with what has been described as the communitarian
model of contract as developed by I. Macneil133 under the title of relational
contracting and on the other the reflexive approach of G. Teubner134 as these to
theories will provide the basis of our analysis.
4.2.2. Collective agreements and relational contracting
We will start with the theory of relational contracting as an attempt answer to the
ever evolving normative content of employment. In this respect we can see it as an
effort to give a plausible explanation of the temporal dimension of employment in
contractual terms. What this theory as developed by I. Macneil135 focuses on is the
permanence of the relations that some contracts initiate. Macneil claims that contracts
that establish long term relations should be distinguished from what he calls
transaction contracts, since the former do not exhaust their normative intent in one
133 Macneil (1980)
134 G. Teubner (2000)
135 Macneil (1980)
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single transactional act but rather govern complex long-term relations. Macneil
focuses on what he calls relational contracts that create mutually beneficial relations
for the parties involved over a long time span. The theory of relational contracting as
implied by its name puts emphasis on the aspect of the relation between the
individuals involved in contracting. According to Macneil the approach of the parties
to the application of contractual terms becomes more flexible in the sense that they do
not stick to the letter of the text even when this provides them with rights that could in
the short-term benefit them. On the contrary the emphasis is on the mutually
beneficial unhindered continuation of the relation. In Macneil's own words, long-term
contracts establish mini societies. It is in this respect that we can see its application in
collective agreements. Collective agreements regulate relations that are of pennanent
and evolving character that moreover just as societies are characterised by conflict
and interdependence.
The relational approach to collective agreements has the great benefit that it
captures their character as setting guiding rules of long-term relations rather than as
sets of exhaustive rules of distinct transactional acts. Its weakness however rests on
the fact that with as all communitarian approaches its focus is on cooperation at the
cost of neglecting the inherently conflictual character of employment relations.
According to Macneil conflict in relational contracts occurs when there is confusion
between long term and short-term interests136. This applied in the case of labour
means that the relation of the actor's interests is one of cooperation, which can be
hindered by the non-awareness of their commonality. The model misses the aspect of
conflict by focusing on the aspect of interdependence at the cost of oversimplifying
the complexity of the relation of employment. In other words the relational theory
wants to apply to capitalist relations of production a communal-synergistic model of
relations that appears at odds the character and the actual practice of employment in
modernity137.
4.2.3. Reflexive contracting
The next paradigm that we are going to analyse is Teubner's theory of reflexive
138
contracting as it discovers and confronts the interdiscursive character of contract .
136 Macneil (1980) p. 42
137 Teubner (2000) pp. 405.
138 Teubner (2000) pp. 406-407.
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By drawing an analogy between contract as an institution of private law and the
indiosyncratic character of collective agreements we will attempt to discover a legal
understanding that sheds light as to the latter's particularities as they legally express
the ambiguous characteristics of employment.
According to Teubner, contract brings together two worlds, two discourses always
mediated by a third, namely the legal. For Teubner a 'contract is a text written in
three languages (legal rights and duties, economic costs and benefits, the project of
the work involved, goods and services)'139. Contract from a legal instrument for the
regulation exchange becomes the mediating vehicle of an interdiscursive project140
that involves the instantaneous translation of one discourse into others. However,
according to post-modern philosophy interdiscursive translation is either impossible
or may only lead to an unavoidable 'differend' where one discourse imposes itself
upon the other as the rule of decision of their difference141. Teubner finds his way out
of this paradox through what he calls productive misunderstanding. He starts his
analysis by asserting that no discourse can actually understand the stake of the other
due to the cognitive and operative closure of discourses. The one discourse is closed
in its autopoeitic circle of reproduction and perceives the other as a cognitively open
environment that can provide information that has to be processed according to the
rationality of the processing systemic discourse. As such the other discourse can only
provide information that when detached by the rationality of its own systemic logic is
perceived by the system as environmental noise that has to be translated in the
rationality of the system. This means that the system when meeting information
derived from another discourse has to translate it to its own rationality in order for it
to be an element in its autopoeitic reproduction. However this entails a fundamental
mutation of the informational element. If information is to be a part of the system's
autopoeitic reproductive circle then it has to be an element of the system in its own
terms. This means that information is taken away from one systemic rationality, and
becomes an operative element in another. As such it changes its original meaning. In
other words the system misunderstands it on the basis of its own rationality so that it
can understand and use it. And this of course is a process that takes places
simultaneously in all the systems involved. For Teubner the process of productive
139 Ibid p. 408.
140 Ibid. 407.
141 For the concept of the differend see Lyotard (1988).
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misunderstanding makes possible the use, the exploitation of each other's dynamics
without breaching the autonomy of each other's reproductive circle. In other words
what Teubner claims is that through the notion of productive misunderstanding
contract becomes an extraordinary text with a unique binding power. As such contract
renders compatible -yet without denying their structural incompatibility- diverging
social discourses that albeit momentarily meet in order for the completion of a
specified task that demands the cooperation ofmore than one discourse. For Teubner
it is of vital importance that discourses when they translate they have what he calls the
right of freedom of translation. This means that when translated, the discourse keeps
the right not to be invaded, not to be violated in their integrity in the act of translation.
The right of freedom of translation is essential for the process of productive
misunderstanding: In order for misunderstanding to be productive discursive freedom
should not be violated as it is the principle that protects the integrity of discourses
towards each other142.
As we have seen in chapter two, contract gives legal content to relations that
always have a dimension that is of economic significance. This means that in contract
we always have the application in one way or another of the economic discourse. This
means that the interdiscursive model can be applied from the moment that we have an
'encounter' of the economic with another discourse; an encounter that creates a
relation that has to be legally mediated143. In this case contract regulates the
subsumption of an economic relation under the form of private law through the
creation of legally enforceable rights and duties that appertain to individuals qua
economic actors. In contract we always have two discourses present: the legal and the
economic. Interdiscursivity can be applied from the moment that a third discourse
encounters the economic in a relation that has to be legally mediated. It is this relation
that reflexive contracting model describes. This allows us to see the paradigm of
reflexive contracting under another prism: in view of the predominance of the
economic discourse, we can see that the problem that interdiscursivity through the
principles of misunderstanding and of discursive autonomy tries to solve is that of the
submission of societal discourses to the rationality of the economic. In this respect
productive misunderstanding acquires an additional dimension: it does not only
l4- Ibid. 410-412
143 "... Contract is reappearing as at lest three projects in different social worlds (1) a productive
agreement (2) an economic transaction; and (3) a legalpromise'. Ibid. pp. 403-404.
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answer to a cognitive a problem that concerns the translation of one rationality to
another with the aim ofmutually acquiring a productive benefit but rather becomes a
nonnative attempt to give a solution to the issue of domination of the societal
discourses by the economic one.
This brings us directly to the application of the interdiscursive theory of contract
to collective agreements. In this case we clearly have a case of encounter of different
discourses. On the one hand we have the economic-technical discourse of property
and management and on the other the discourse of social needs and desires as
represented by labour, as both being mediated by the logic of the legal system.
Moreover we have a productive agreement that is imperative to be performed, since
both the parties depend on it. However in the context of employment this bringing
together is not a momentary occasion that will be protected by the systemic closure of
the discourses that converge on an ad hoc basis.
According to a position put forward by Derrida, freedom of translation i.e.
interdiscursive autonomy 'presupposes separation, heterogeneity ofcodes,... the non-
transparence' 144. However systemic closure, the heterogeneity of codes does not
amount to non-transparence in what concerns collective agreements. Collective
agreements are detennined by the substance of the employment relation as one of
conflict and interdependence, in other words by an ambivalent relation that as we
have seen cannot be surpassed within the limits of capitalism. As a result they are
determined by their constant interaction. In this respect it is their relation that
determines the rationality of their respective discourses and not vice versa. What we
mean by this is that the social discourse of labour and the economic one of property in
what concerns employment may be operatively closed to each other but at the same
time they are cognitively open. This cognitive openness is of course achieved under
the presupposition ofmisunderstanding. In other words they understand each other in
their own terms. Moreover interaction and cognitive openness leads to a certain form
of their 'codetermination' in the sense that they are not formed separately of each
other but rather under the condition of the imperative of their relation145. As a result
144 Derrida in 'Theologie de la traduction' in 'Du Droit a la Philosophic' p. 29 cited in Teubner (2000)
p. 410.
145 In a similar vein that refers to contract Teubner says: 'Thus one contract puts at least three
discourses under the obligation oftheir simultaneous self-transformation, toward achieving their
respective projects' Ibid. p. 407. The similarity here is more than apparent in the sense that in
collective bargaining labour property and the legal system converge on the basis of achieving their
separate specific ends.
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the discourses involved in employment mutually draw the limits of the deployment of
the rationality of the other. It is the inevitability of economic imperatives that draws
the limits of labour claims and it is organised labour power that sets the limits on the
demands of the economic discourse. In this respect we have a constant interaction
between systemic logics that derive their identities through their interrelation on the
basis of their opposition, whilst under the mediation of the legal system146. In this
respect we see the multileveled conduct of the dialectic of the employment relation.
The actuality of the interests and their respective power positions detennine the limits
of the deployment of the rationality of the discourses. As such the discourses are co-
formed on the basis of their relation. Their cognitive horizon is conditioned by the
presence of the other part in the dialectical relation that employment is. In other words
through collective bargaining property and labour learn each other and form each
other on the basis of the indispensability of their relation.
A problem that reflexive contracting has to face is that interdiscursivity
presupposes the recognition of the mutual validity of the stakes of the discourses
involved; something that more often than not is not the case in what concerns
collective agreements147. The problem becomes even more acute with the addition of
managerialism as the legitimising ideology of property domination. Although the
problem conditions the normative understanding of employment as a whole, it appears
in a most clear and distinct form in collective bargaining. The problem of domination
here is combined with the scientific pretences of the economic discourse. As we have
already seen, the problem starts from the fact that the economic discourse considers
the validity of its assertions as universal truths deducted from scientific methods.
Through managerialism the social dominance of property is translated into discursive
dominance. Here we can see again the strange dialectic between property and labour.
The rationality of the economic discourse can be curbed only by its dependence on
labour. What can curb it and actually make it a part of a dialectic relation is actually
the collective power of labour. Dialectic starts from the moment that the dominant
part is dependant on the repressed. This means that if the rationality of the economic
can evade the social determination of labour then the dialectic relation cannot stand
146 We should forget the role of the law in monitoring and influencing the process of collective
bargaining whilst setting the limits of the content of collective bargaining.
147 We should forget that reflexive contracting is not a theory of the employment relation. On the
contrary what we say here is that its basic principles can be applied to it as adapted to the particularities
of employment.
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anymore. What we will have instead is a rationality that on the basis of its dominance
will not accept its other-determination. In other words it will try and avoid its
subsumption under a dialectic relation where it will be determined by its relation to
another. This is perhaps the reason why property has tried to subsume labour under its
rationality. If labour as labour power is understood as property then property does not
have to relate, does not have to have an other determination, does not have to
condition itself in its relation to the other, i.e. labour. The dialectic between property
and labour starts from the moment that the dominant part, namely property recognises
labour as the other that is not determined by the same logic, by the same discourse as
property. It is only on this basis that interdiscursivity can be applied to collective
agreements.
Another problem that reflexive contracting has to deal with is the fact that a
collective agreement does not make centrifugal social discourses converge
momentarily but on the contrary forces conflicting yet interdependent discourses to
cooperate on the basis of permanence. In this sense the convergence does not take
place on the basis of the specificity of the actual task to be performed but rather under
the imperative of the establishment and the sustenance of a relation that is
indispensable in its permanence for both parties. In this respect a collective agreement
does not regulate a single project on the basis of which divergence has to converge
but a permanent relation that constantly evolves in the interrelation of its parties.
Therefore it may be described as a project but in reality it is the initiation of normative
'world' as Teubner himself would have it. By transferring the notion of Teubner's
contracting world we can see interdiscursivity as the cornerstone of the normative
world that collective agreements initiate. Reflexive contracting suggests a normative
logic that pertains to the specific relation that contracts regulate. Moreover this
normative logic determines the relation in its specific characteristics. Collective
agreements do exactly the same thing namely, the convergence of difference on the
basis of permanence under ambivalent conditions. It is in this that we can find in
reflexive contracting a description that by analogy can be valid for collective
agreements. A contracting world, just like a collective agreement, is not free of
ambiguities and tensions, perhaps not even of domination. On the contrary it provides
us with a schema that allows us to deal with the convergence of heterogeneity and
divergence as it occurs in employment. It is for this reason that the recognition of
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discursive rights (as Teubner has it) becomes in the last distance the recognition of
autonomy, difference and integrity.
4.3. Collective agreements and managerialism
We have seen in the previous section that the influence on the collective
bargaining process of the predominance of the economic discourse and have
concluded that although it negotiates on the basis of equality it does not abandon the
pretension of the universal validity of its claims. What we are going to attempt in this
section is to re-introduce managerialism in the context of collective bargaining, as this
will allow us to see the premises under which the whole process is conducted.
First of all collective bargaining entails a substantial limitation in the extent of
the managerial prerogative. Many issues that would be unilaterally decided on the
basis of this principle become negotiated on the basis of the power positions of the
parties. However, management negotiates under contradictory premises. Negotiation
is a process, where partial interests converge with the aim of reaching a 'fair
compromise'149. Negotiations become rather problematic when one part claims
universal validity for the claim that it brings forward to be 'negotiated'. In this case
for management we have a truth that has to be compromised. In other words
management negotiate for what on principle they consider as non-negotiable with
those whose claim they consider as irrelevant. This means that from the part of
management the rejection of collective bargaining is not a contingent position that is
based on the redistribution of power that they produce but moreover a position that
stems from the rationality of their role.
Therefore, the big compromise for management lies in that that they negotiate
altogether rather than that they make 'concessions' to labour. This is nonetheless done
on grounds of expediency rather than principle. It was that the fact that coercive
practices were deemed as non-productive and the fact that organised labour is in a
position to incur considerable costs to the enterprise that forced management to
l4S Ibid. pp. 412-414.
149 On bargaining as the process through which conflicting interests reach a fair compromise see
Habermas 1996 pp. 139-141. For a critique see Teubner (1997b).
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cooperate150. Therefore, when management accept collective bargaining they do so
with the view that stable collective bargaining may make a positive contribution to the
stability of the corporation. This explains the fact that when management have the
power to avoid collective bargaining but moreover any form of labour empowerment
in the fonn ofwork control they do so without any hesitation151.
In other words management may have to take into account trade unions and even
recognise them as legitimate negotiators, only to the extent that the latter may be in a
position to damage the corporation, by making use of the sanctions that they have at
their disposal namely obstruction and withdrawal against management. These
sanctions may take a variety of forms, from influencing the workforce to be
uncooperative to management directions up to open industrial action. The effective
use of sanctions of course presupposes strong trade unions that have first of all the
necessary influence upon the workforce but also the resources (economical, political,
institutional etc.) that may allow them to engage in conflicting strategies. Even in the
case of the pluralist model of company152 that is based on the cooperation and the
mutual recognition of the parties, the arrangement of interests is not concluded upon
agreement but rather upon a fundamental compromise. As a rule in these cases
management will be loyal to the system and not undermine the arrangement, only to
the extend that a) labour is strong and can potentially harm the corporation b)
collective bargaining and participation is conducted in a way that management's own
purposes can be promoted and we add here153 c) when the basic premises of
managerialism are not challenged by labour.
The latter means that management can by no means accept a challenge as to the
validity of the cognitive assertions that it makes by using economic methods nor the
normative claims that are deduced on the basis of the above-mentioned assertions. For
150 As W. Benjamin has said ' ...the effort toward compromise is motivated not internally but from the
outside, by the opposing effort, because no compromise, however how freely accepted, is conceivable
without a compulsive character' Benjamin (1979) p.143.
151 As the typical example of this approach is the case in the Volvo factory in Uddevala Sweden. In this
factory labour had an extensive control over its tasks, it was actively involved in the decisions that
concerned production and moreover was conferred with a substantive sets of rights protected through
the internally presence of 'ombudsmen' that were recruited from within the workforce and trained for
this purpose. However, despite is success this was the plant that Volvo choose to close when in the
early '90s when unemployment in Sweden rose from 1.8per cent in 7 percent in 1992 and it was no
longer necessary for management to offer labour attractive working conditions in order to recruit them.
For analysis of the Uddevala case see Gorz (1999) chapter 2.2. In other words labour empowerment is
'conceded' by management only on the basis of expediency and never on principle.
152 See Fox (1985)
153 For a very similar view see Fox (1974) pp.155
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example, in the typical case of the negotiations for the conclusion of a collective
agreement management will come forward with a proposal that will 'offer' labour a
certain level of wages that can be the 'best possible that the corporation can manage'.
Although the term 'best' implies an evaluative element, this element is suppressed,
since this best is presented as cognitively-instrumentally quantified and justified.
Truth as we know is something that is non-negotiable. This 'best' should be accepted
by labour as a datum the violation of which would threaten the corporation and thus
the continuation of employment. However, labour's acceptance is instrumental that is,
based on a calculation of its own self-conflicting interests, whereas management make
a validity claim. Moreover, this validity claim is not only cognitive, it has a strong
normative element normative element, an element that is expressed through the use of
the term 'best.' However in what concerns management the notion of the best possible
implies a rationally constructed social relation. The argument goes that since science
provides the knowledge of how things are, it also prescribes the course of action that
should be taken in order for human goals to be attained. Instrumental rationality does
not consider the question on the way things should be as a valid autonomous demand.
Economic rationality, as we have seen in chapter two derives the nonnative 'ought'
from the cognitive 'is' and subordinates the former to the predetermined by the
latter's ends. However, in our case the action that should be taken is not instrumental
oriented, but concerns an agreement upon the nonnative content of a social relation.
In this case, the cognitive-instrumental stakes a claim upon the nonnative, with the
aim of subjugating it.
In this sense the acceptance of collective bargaining by management is purely
strategic, not oriented towards rational agreement upon the validity of nonns and a
mutual understanding 154 but with the aim of prevailing over them155.
4.4. Collective agreements and the normative corporate order. A
conclusion
We have said that collective agreements ideally reflect the ambiguities and
tensions of employment in modernity as a relation of conflict and interdependence
154 For the concept of strategic action see Habermas (1984) especially pp.273-338.
155 See ibid. pp. 294-295.
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between property, scientific knowledge and technology and labour. In this respect at
this point we are going to summarise our findings so far so that we will be able to see
the multileveled dialectic of employment as it is expressed in the field of its actual
practice.
First of all, collective agreements ideally express employment as a relation
between social forces and rationalities. As we have said the parties in collective
agreements are not individual actors but rather collective forces that converge on an
agreement on the basis of their divergence.
By transferring Teubner's thesis in the field of employment relations we have seen
that in collective agreements we have the encounter of centrifugal discursive genres,
the convergence of centrifugal social worlds. We could say in interpreting Teubner's
theory of contract, that the collective agreement is a text that among other things
provides the normative framework for this encounter, for this convergence. However,
as we have seen a collective agreement is not just a contract, it something far more
than that. First of all, a collective agreement whether at plant, sectoral156 or national
level is the regulation of a power relation. Here the encounter of discursive genres
does not have as its aim the completion of a certain productive task or of a certain
productive project but rather the regulation of a relation that is determined by the
encounter of diverging and moreover conflicting discursive genres on the basis of
their interdependence. In a collective agreement we have the regulation of a relation
as actual interests and rationalities of social action encounter each other in
employment. In this respect what we have is not the encounter of two texts as Derrida
would have it157 but the encounter of two ever evolving contexts of social action that
converge on the basis of their interdependence and as such are codetermined in the
deployment of a multileveled dialectic. Moreover, this dialectic determines a
permanent relation that from thereon is radically determined as a relation of
paramount social significance by the rationality of the legal system. However, the
legal system is not a unified field without its own contradictions and paradoxes. As it
represents an authoritative medium of power it is itself contested by the groups of
interests that are represented in employment. The legal system has to deal with the
competing claims and compromise them on the basis of the common good. This
mediation means that the respective logics of property and labour that determine a
156 For the conclusion of collective agreements at sectoral or plant level see Crouch (1994)
157 Derrida (1987) Psyche: 1' invention de F autre p. 135 cited in Teubner (2000) p. 399.
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power relation of conflict and interdependence 'transfer' their relation to another
field. This means that the parties at any level of employment are not engaged in an
unfettered power struggle but in a legally conditioned one. And as we have seen the
legal system as the immune system of society does not allow conflicts to receive a
form that can actually threaten the balance of the societal system, a societal system
i ro
that is based on the dominant position pf property over labour .
In this respect we find again what we have said in chapter one on the fact that
interdependence cannot negate conflict nor conflict interdependence. The dialectic
that we are dealing cannot be overcome unless we transcend the relation between
property and labour as a relation of domination. This structural condition could only
be sublated through the liberation of labour from the domination of property, a
development that Marx anticipated in its writings. However, as the overthrowing of
capitalist society is not an issue here, what needs to be stressed is the nature of this
relation. What our claim is here, is that collective agreements although they can never
provide a way of transcending this ambiguity provide a way for the negotiation of it
on the basis of the mutual agreement on the existence of the ambivalent relation.
Collective agreements in other words create a dialectic of codetermination of
discourses that cannot touch the character of the relation as one of power between a
dominant and a repressed social force. Moreover, they create a normative framework
that works as a platform for the continuation of the relation by providing the basis
upon which its inherent normative dynamics can be developed. This is their limit.
Collective agreements simultaneously express the conflict inherent in employment as
between social collective forces but on the other they express their conditioning as
contributors to the common good. As we have seen in chapter three collective
bargaining and collective organisation functions under the auspices of the law. This
means that their content cannot evade the rationality of the legal system. Under this
perception conflict should be controlled so that it will not damage the common good
that embraces all the interests that are invested in employment.
In this respect we can now reassess the saying by Kahn-Freund that a collective
agreement is simultaneously a peace treaty and legal code. It is a peace treaty in two
senses: First of all it regulates the conduct of conflict, so that it will not break out into
an open clash between the social forces in employment. Secondly, a collective
158 Luhmann (1995) pp. 393-397.
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agreement imposes on the parties the obligation to respect it while it is in force. In this
respect there is an obligation of peace in what concerns the issues that the agreement
regulates.
What we will focus next is its dimension as a legal code. In this respect a
collective agreement not only stipulates the basic rules of employment but also
provides the basis for the construction of the nonnative web of institutions,
procedures and practices that regulate its conduct. A collective agreement with its
multileveled detenninations is also a foundational act, a constitutional text that sets
the basic rules for the symbiosis of a quite unique form of community; a text with
both a legal and a political significance.
5. Private Government
We have said in the previous section that a collective agreement is a legal code
that brings into being a nonnative web of internal institutions, procedures and
practices that constitute the corporate private government system159. What we are
going to argue is that the constancy and the many levels of the unique dialectic of
employment reveals that its tensions and ambiguities should be seen under a
perspective that accepts them as valid and as ever evolving on the basis of their
relation. In this respect the analysis of collective agreements bring us directly to the
issue of the private government system as a form of an organisational-political
understanding that deals with the paradoxes of employment160. It is private
government systems that emerge as systems of rules that regulate the action of a
political community that is constituted around employment that we are going to
examine next. What should be stressed is that the model that we are dealing with here
is based on collective bargaining, as collective bargaining is the institution that
provides the foundation for the creation of a system of rules that recognises the
validity of all the interests involved in employment.
On this basis we will try to explore private government that has a 'private' legal
system that is an integral part of the political-organisational system of the corporation.
The unique character of private government comes from the fact that it provides us
with an understanding of employment as it takes shape through its actual practice. As
159 For the notion of private government as a systems ofprivate justice see Henry (1983).
160 For versions of the political theory of the corporation see first Kahn-Freund (1954) and (1977),
Selznick (1969) and also Steinmann (1986), Bercusson (1990).
204
such private government systems are not strictly constructed on the basis of the
rationality of the legal system in the sense that they adapt to the particularities of each
corporation161. This means that although they are reflections of a wider legal
1 A9
culture they do not express the rationality of the state but rather the rationality of
the actors in each particular corporation. In this sense private legal systems are the
result of the will of the parties to solve their conflicts on the basis of their
interdependence without the direct intervention and the authoritative solutions of the
State apparatus. However, it should not be overlooked that at the same time these
systems are under the influence of the wider legal culture and therefore they
incorporate -albeit in an indirect fonn- its approach on the legal regulation of
employment. In this respect we have the presence of the rationality of the state
without having its authoritative intervention.
5.1. Private government and membership as citizenship
We have said that systems of private government mediate between the
conflicting interests and rationalities that exist in the corporation. In this way the
conflict that exists between property and labour and between the economic and the
social discursive genres is internalised. Conflict is internally contained within the
corporate structure as a subsystem that exists in contrast and in parallel to the
enterprise interest163. This coexistence delimits the potential of private government.
As A. Melucci has remarked164 there are inherent limits as to the effectiveness of such
systems since they are conditioned by the instrumental character of formal
organisations as systems of representation of dominant social interests. These
dominant social interests are not and cannot be challenged by private government
regimes. This is not their aim. Their aim is to provide through the recognition of
divergence the basis for its containment so that the continuation of the relation (an
aim that all parties embrace) can be achieved and be mutually beneficial.
161 Here we see again Selznick and his notion of corporate culture. See Selznick (1992) pp. 300-310.
162 On legal rationality not being the exclusive characteristic of state law but also a characteristic of
non-hierarchised plural legal orders see Teubner (1992)
163 For the notion of conflict systems as subsystems that are constantly conditioned within the
encompassing social system see Luhmann (1995 pp. 393-404).
164 See R. Melucci (1996) pp.249-255.
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What we will argue next is that the principle that provides us with the key for the
understanding of private government as a consensually, institutionally established
system that deals with the paradoxes of employment within a contained perpetually
operating organisational system is that ofmembership.
Membership should be seen as the basis upon which all individuals are
recognised as legitimate holders of rights and duties within the corporation. In other
words membership should be seen as a form of political subjectivity that recognises
the individual member as a participant in a normative order that is constructed on the
basis of rules that are accepted by all parties concerned as valid. What is important to
be stressed is that membership is devoid of any meaning if we accept it just as a
formal legal principle that defines the individual just as a part of a normative order
without having the rights to actually participate in its determination.
Membership should be seen as a unifying principle that forms an identity on the
basis of the acknowledgement of difference as it is realised through employment in
the corporation. As Wieaker has remarked ' the socio-empirical reality of the social
group types 'association, corporation'... lies in the group consciousness of the
members and their partners and in the specific nature of the group's behaviour' 165.
What we are therefore seeking here is to find an understanding of membership that
can help us understand how the idea of interdependence of interests creates a
collective identity that appertains to the members of the corporation qua members of a
political or quasi-political community. Teubner albeit in a different context of
research provides us with a valuable insight as to the direction of our enquiry. As we
have seen, Teubner by looking for a valid description of the corporate reality
addressed the problem of the corporation qua legal person166. What Teubner asserted
in respect to this issue is that what provides the essence of the corporation as a legal
person is the linkage between corporate actions and a corporate collective identity
through mechanisms of attribution of corporate action167. What is of interest in the
context of this research is how the notion of collective identity is linked to the
attribution of action to the corporate actor.
What we mean by this is that the actions of corporate actors thus become actions
of the corporation. In other words actions acquire their meaning through a corporate
165 F. Wieaker 'Zur Theorie der juristichen Person des Privatrechts' p. 367 in Festschrift fur Huber
(1973) cited at Teubner (1988) p.138.
166 See Teubner (1988) (1994).
167 Teubner (1988) pp. 139-140.
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collective identity that is externally represented (in the market and the legal system)
through the legal person of the corporation. However, if we accept that actions of
corporate actors are attributed as actions of the system to the corporation, then we
accept that we have a higher order, a higher level of integration of action where these
actions refer. As a result the corporation by a creating a collective identity that
represents it externally, becomes the junction, the node that the internal contradictory
relations find their point of expression. This means that actions refer to the
corporation and create relations that acquire their meaning in the context of the
complex corporate reality. It is in this respect that we can see the corporation a
community that is organised on the basis of a collective identity that finds its
foundation in the concept ofmembership.
To make this a bit clearer: One the one hand we have the corporation as an actor
that by participating in the antagonistic environment of the market with other
corporations acquires an identity (the Scmittian friend-foe opposition)168. On the other
hand this identity eventually becomes internalised in the corporation itself. However,
collective identities are not without differences, tensions and conflicts. This means
that these characteristics exist as essential elements of the collective that the corporate
order itself is. Just like the collective identity that a nation-state creates as a higher
order of integration that subsumes conflicts that cannot transcend it, in the same sense
the corporation becomes the locus, the point of reference where conflict and
divergence find a point of reference, a mode of expression. In other words the friend-
foe distinction is internalised as delimiting a conflictual relation that nonetheless
cannot reach the Schmittian schema of radical enmity between absolute foes16 , as the
conflictual aspect is conditioned and moderated by the fact of the interdependence of
the parties.
Therefore membership should not be seen as access to the participation to a
competitive community of market actors where economic interest can create a unity
of goal between corporate actors. This approach would define membership just by the
economic goals of the enterprise and as such would ensue in the one-dimensional
determination of the corporation as an economic actor; under this prism membership
justifiably would be limited to the property rights holders (and as we have seen this
See C. Schmitt (1979)
169 Moreover for Schmitt absolute enmity was a condition that can emerge only between nation states.
Ibid.
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identification is rather problematic). On the contrary membership should be seen as
the participation in a multidimensional community that functions on the basis of
conflict and interdependence of interests, rationalities and discourses as they coexist
within the context of the strange dialectic of employment. Therefore membership
provides us with the basis for the search to a normative approach that can internalise
divergence and conflict as inherent characteristics of the corporation as a community.
In a sense we can see that membership internalises in the corporation the principle of
citizenship as political subjectivity, as the conferment of rights on the basis of the
recognition of the divergence of equally valid interests170.
It is for this reason that membership should mean the conferment of rights to its
members. It is for this reason that political communities recognise to their members
rights that guarantee their freedom to pursue conflicting strategies against each other.
This means that certain conflictual situations are recognised as legitimate realities that
should be contained within the communal normative framework. The most typical
example is the recognition on the part of the state of the right to strike as the legal
recognition of the existence of social conflict as created by the nature of employment
relations.
To return to the issue of the corporation, I consider that membership should be
seen as a political principle that in its dimension as political subjectivity provides the
basis for the institutionalisation of a community. And it can do this only on the basis
of the recognition of equality of interests and the conferment of substantial rights
within the community that employment in its ambivalent character creates. This
means that this community is not an ideal world of content employers and employees
but rather an integral field of struggle that integrates and reproduces its ambiguities
and tensions as they are produced through the practice of employment. It is exactly
the organisation of this community that we are going to deal with next.
5.2. The Presuppositions of Private Government
I consider that the notion ofmembership as citizenship should provide the basis of
democratic corporate governance. If membership is to have any meaning within the
170 On the notion of citizenship as enshrined in the rationality of the labour law see H. Collins, K D
Ewing & A. McColgan (2001) pp. 58-59. See also bellow.
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context of a democratic corporate culture, if it is to be the legitimating principle of
authority in the corporation, it should be justified on a basis that is accepted by all
participating actors. This means that the corporate interest, the collective identity,
should be formed on the basis of a principle that can justify unity within difference,
interdependence within conflict. As we have repeatedly said, for this to be possible
the recognition of the validity of all the interests invested in the corporation is an
imperative. However, if this unity is to be achieved in a non coercive way, then the
notion of the absolute priority of the economic should be put aside as it introduces a
partial and non-generalisable principle that expresses demands of only one of the
parties of the relation as the general rule that cannot be disputed in its basic premises.
However it is exactly the challenge to these premises that provides the justification of
the existence of an autonomous interest of labour in the corporation in its own right.
Therefore if private government is to stand as a normative approach to the
recognition of the ambivalent nature of employment we will have to challenge the
priority of the property interest in the corporation at its root and this means not by
basing the legitimacy of workers interests on the beneficial economic contribution of
labour to the corporation qua economic unit, nor on the abstract notion that the good
moral treatment of workers that promotes cooperative industrial relations eventually
becomes economically useful, as some communitarians would have it. On the
contrary, the starting point of our analysis is based on the premise that the hierarchy
of interests and discursive genres in the corporation is not a logical a priori that stems
from the superior rationality of the economic discourse as some neo-liberal thinkers
would have it, but rather a socially constructed fact that has its origins in the relation
of domination of property over labour that capitalism systematised as a general
principle of social organisation. It is on the basis of this approach that we will attempt
to analytically unpack the legitimation of the corporation as a system of
institutionalised power.
We have argued above that the economic goal of the enterprise cannot be negated,
particularly since in a sense it provides the raison d' etre for the corporation.
However, can this mean that the economic interest of property can nonnatively claim
precedence over the social one of labour? My view is that it cannot. The fact that the
corporation comes into existence as an economic actor cannot negate its dimension as
a productive unit with contributions to various social sectors. It is on the basis of this
definition that we can challenge the predominance of the economic discourse and not
209
on the moralistic assumptions of communitarianism. It is in this social dimension of
the corporation that allows us to see under another light the mutual dependence
between the economic to the social and socially recontextualise economic action.
Economic action as we saw in Teubner's definition on 'enterprise interest' in the last
instance is not a self-referential function since its productive role should be
conditioned by its social contribution, by the contributions that it makes to the
'different sectors of social life,x . In this respect the economic interest of the
enterprise is socially conditioned by the satisfaction of social needs and this of course
includes the needs and desires of labour. In this respect we see that the non-negation
of the economic by labour works in both ways. As the needs and desires of labour
cannot negate the economic purpose of the corporation qua productive unit, the
economic purpose of the corporation cannot negate the needs and desires of labour as
they express the needs and desires of a society that creates an economy that exists
prima facie in order to sustain them. This means that the self-referential reproduction
of the economy has to be tested by its social performance. This means that any
economic premise in the last instance has to be justified by its social approval. The
fact that the free market economy in capitalism becomes the point of self-reference of
the reproduction of society, and consequently becomes a system that imposes its
needs and imperatives on society should be seen as one of the main side effects of
capitalism; a fact that it is ideally reflected in the structure of employment in the
corporation. By this we mean that the primacy of the economic as it expressed in the
domination of labour by property should be challenged on the actual and paradigmatic
field of its application namely, corporate employment relations. In other words, when
we talk about equality of interests in the corporation we do not talk about an abstract
ideal or a social vision but rather about a demand that is actual and real and that can
be justified by the structure of employment itself. The bottom line of this is that the
equality between the interests of the parties is based on their interdependence, an
interdependence that as we have seen is a structural condition of employment and
hence of every society that is based on paid employment. And here we can see the
true meaning of interdependence, namely its application as a principle that should
create a nonnative framework on the basis of mutuality and solidarity within
difference. As we have said in chapter one this relation is dialectical in the sense that
171 See this chapter, footnote 100.
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both parts determine and depend on each other despite their incompatibility. And this
is the real meaning of the notion of unity within difference. And it is this unity within
difference that also gives to the notion of the mutual dependence of social needs and
economic action. Under this model no actor and no discourse can claim a natural right
of sovereignty over the others172.
5.3. Codetermination and its limits.
The most important and influential attempt so far for the creation of an
institutionalised system of democratic private government, that has come as close as
possible to the aim of the recognition of equality of interests, has been the system of
works councils and of codetermination that exists in the Federal Republic of
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Germany . Works councils have existed in many European countries after the
Second World War in an effort to create peaceful industrial relations in order of to
avoid class conflict in view of the gigantic task of the reconstruction of the devastated
economies of the Continent. The system -first established in the years of the Weimar
Republic- was revived initially in 1951 and received its present fonn with the laws of
1972 and 1976. What needs to be stressed is that works council are independent
bodies and in no way are institutionally linked with trade unions. The stance of the
latter towards works councils has been quite inconsistent ranging from the
embracement of their role to open hostility17 .
Works councils are elected by all eligible for that purpose workers and exist in
every firm with over five employees. Their role is to represent the interests of the
workforce in all matters of its concern. The size and the rights of the works councils
depend on the size of the firm. Codetermination rights cover a wide area of matters
and extend amongst others working time, health and safety protection, monitoring of
the workforce performance, pay structures etc. It is important to be stressed that
works councils have nothing to do with collective bargaining. This procedure is
negotiated between trade unions and management.
172 Teubner (1993) p. 140.
17:1 For work councils and issues that they raise that are familiar to the context of this research see
amongst others Weiss (1987), Streeck (1984), Gotthold (1986), Lembruch (1985), and Teubner
(1986).
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Rogers and Streeck (1995) pp. 11-16.
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Moreover, in firms with more than twenty employees, the management needs the
agreement of the works council on all important issues concerning the workforce such
as transfers and job classifications etc. If the works council disagrees with the
decision, the employer must take the case in front of a Labour Court. Moreover, in
cases of dismissals the employer has an obligation to consult the works council. If
s/he omits to do so the dismissal is void. If the council forms an official protest the
dismissal is suspended until the decision of a Labour Court.
Codetermination rights extend to the participation of the workers in the
supervisory board of the firm. Amongst its many powers the supervisory board is that
it appoints and revokes the appointment of the members of the board ofmanagement.
Moreover it has the right to demand information on all company matters. According
to the to the Codetermination Act of 1976 in large firms that employ more than two
thousand workers, the representatives of the workforce participate in equal numbers
with the representatives of the shareholders, the latter however having the decisive
vote in a case of a split vote. What is important is that at all levels of representation
the representatives of labour are directly elected by the workforce.
The underlying principle of this system is the acknowledgement of the fact that
labour and property have conflicting interests that have to be accommodated on the
basis of their interdependence. It acknowledges them as two distinct parts with
conflicting interests that nonetheless have to converge in a common direction of
action. Here relationalism but moreover interdiscursivity acquire a new dimension
that evades their original contractual origins.
Relationism becomes relevant in the sense that codetermination is a system that
evades the logic of exchange and incorporates the individual contract of employment
in a system where collective differences are constantly negotiated with the view of
reaching a fair compromise on the basis of the interdependence of the parties.
Moreover, relationism is even the more relevant since codetermination puts emphasis
in the long term practice of the employment relation and creates an institution, a
forum where the parties involved constantly discuss and review the content of their
relation as it evolves in its concrete practice. Apart from anything else
codetermination creates a constant channel of communication between management
and labour where at least the interests of the parties are known to each other.
Additionally -and here is where the principles of interdiscursivity apply- through
the system of codetermination the discourses involved in employment come into
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contact not momentarily as in a typical contract of exchange but in an institutionally
regulated, permanent system of interest mediation.
Moreover, codetermination has another major effect in the conduct of conflict in
the sense that it internalises it within the corporation. In other words the
institutionalised system of mediation of interests transforms employment relations
form market relations of externality to internal elements of the corporate system. This
means that, as Luhmann has noted, that through codetermination worker's interests
are no longer external cost factors that must be minimised but a legitimate goal for the
intra-organisational process itself'75.
However, and although it certainly has a most positive contribution to the
empowerment of labour and to the creation of a cooperative model of industrial
relations176, codetermination is not a panacea that can magically solve all the
problems that as they stem from the ambivalent nature of the employment relation.
Teubner in describing the enthusiasm of many social and legal theorists on the
effects of codetermination has noted that 'is conceived as a remedy against
alienation... in a number ofvariants co-determination is considered as compensation
for social domination^11. However, this optimism about this institution seems to be
quite exaggerated.
For example W. Streeck has stated that codetermination effectuates a 'mutual
incorporation of capital and labour by which labour internalises the interests of
capital just as capital internalises those of labour, with the result that the works
council and management become subsystems of an integrated, internally
differentiated system of industrial government which increasingly supersedes the
y\ 78
traditionally dualistic class based system of industrial relations' .
This position expresses the fact that through codetermination the interests of
labour become recognised as interests of the corporation that can now emerge in its
dimension as a community. However, we should not forget that the internalisation of
the interests of capital and labour and the surpassing of the conflict between them is
something that by far evades the scope of codetermination179. As we have repeatedly
175 Luhmann (1966) Worker Participation and Decision Making p. 8 quoted in Teubner (1986) p.267.
176 For the codetermination as reflecting the development of industrial relations towards a more
cooperative direction see Krause (1985) pp. 154 ff. cited in Teubner (1993) p. 125.
177 Teubner (1986) p. 263.
178 W. Streeck (1984) p. 35
179 On the opposition between the profit maximisation interest of the enterprise and the interests of
labour representation see Kubler (1984) pp. 429 ff.
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said, this conflict is a structural condition of capitalism and as such cannot be
surpassed as long as the capitalist relation between property and labour persists.
This means that the ambiguities and tensions of employment can only be
accommodated, perhaps suspended, but not surpassed. Labour alienation and
domination cannot be overcome by labour participation through works councils. 1
agree that the loss control over the working process is a fundamental factor of
alienation (as we have seen in chapter one) - a loss that works councils mitigate to a
considerable degree. As we have seen labour alienation is a direct consequence of the
command power of property over labour as it exists in capitalism. However, although
challenged in its exercise and often attenuated in its strength by work councils, this
power cannot be negated in its substance. As we have shown in commenting on
Hegel's Phenomenology the non-alienated self-consciousness of the worker exists in
his/her creation. The alienation of labour is a condition that codetermination cannot
reverse. It substantially mitigates it by giving to labour some control over the working
process. However, it cannot alter the consequences of its commodification nor annul
the power of command that property has over it. Codetermination does not and cannot
transform the corporation to a synergy of equal between themselves producers. What
it does is to give back to labour a considerable part of its power of self-determination
in the form of work control and this only through the mediation of labour elites180.
This means that labour through codetermination does not magically become self-
determined. For this to occur, the whole structure of the relation between property and
labour should change at every level. Nonetheless by reducing the scope of the
unilateral power of management, it does give back to labour some control over the
labouring action.
Despite the critique that claims that the effects of codetermination for the
individual worker are quite limited181, we can see here a most important consequence
on the life of the worker as an individual. Due to codetermination the worker cannot
be treated arbitrarily by the employer as s/he can no longer unilaterally impose his/her
will without restrain. On the contrary s/he employer has the obligation to justify
her/himself to the worker about his/her actions that influence the worker's life and
180
On another level we have the classical problem of the distance between the elites of labour
representatives and the rank and file. See Michels (1959). See also chapter three section 4.2.2.
l8lTeubner (1986) pp. 263-264
214
dignity. We see here again the incorporation of the notion of citizenship in the context
of employment.
However it should be stressed that such an approach on the part of management
is adopted on strategic grounds. Whereas the aim of labour is to reassert its self-
determination through job control the aim ofmanagement -we should not forget that
work councils were imposed by law in a period when the reconstruction of Europe
demanded the attenuation of class conflict182- is to improve production though
183worker's suggestions that could be economically beneficial . We should not forget
that in the Gennan case that we are now discussing, work councils were not the
outcome of a consensual procedure between management and labour. They were
rather the result of a direct intervention by the state, an intervention -and this is
crucial- that did not impose to the parties the content of the employment relation. On
the contrary -and this is indicative of the role that the welfare state can actually play-
what was imposed was the obligation to constantly negotiate under an imposed legal
framework that nonetheless was created in order to empower labour.
With acknowledging its limitations, I consider that the actual task of co-
determination is to consolidate the recognition of the equal validity and legitimacy of
the claims of property and labour to the corporation. This is so since, through it claims
and interests take an active form and are practically translated as rights on the
corporation as the whole body politic. Its most important achievement is that it has
created a nonnative model that perceives the corporation as something that does not
belong exclusively to anyone. Moreover codetermination affirms the nature and the
importance of employment at the societal level. It recognises in a most emphatic way
that the corporation is dependant on employment. Additionally, it recognises the
corporation as a locus where diverging interests have to accommodate themselves on
the basis of their interdependence and most importantly, it creates pennanent
institutions for this purpose. What needs to be stressed is that as the case is with any
community, power relations and conflict of interests do exist within it. However, as
we have already said there are communities that are based on coercion and others that
182 Streeck (1995) pp.313-317.
183 For example as S. Henry has shown the approach between management and labour in the
introduction of health and safety programs Whereas labour's main focus was on improving working
conditions and gaining work control, management's was the improvement of production S. Henry
(1983) Private Justice p. 86.
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are based on recognition of their internal divergence. And the challenge that faces the
modern corporation is exactly the negotiation of this divergence.
5.4. Private government and rights
We have argued that the corporation is not a private concern but a public body.
This means that the corporation is not a money producing machine that operates in a
social void. One of the many consequences of this is that it has to respect and why not
to promote notions of justice. This means that -and this brings us back to the issue of
the substantial issues- any legal approach towards employment should take- the
corporation should encapsulate those values that are considered as guaranteeing
fairness as to the distributive outcome of employment. However, the attempt to
encapsulate these values should start from the recognition of divergence and conflict
within the corporation184. In this respect rights should protect employees in the areas
where they may be vulnerable due to the character of employment as a relation of
domination. In other words employment rights should cover those issues that have to
do with the livelihood and dignity ofworkers.
5.4.1. Rights to welfare
As for the issue of welfare we have extensively talked both in the previous but also
in this chapter we are not going to occupy ourselves extensively here.
What should be made clear is that rights to welfare that are rights to a fair wage, to
good working conditions, to a decent working environment etc., are determined by
many factors and regulated at many different levels. First of all they are determined
by both state regulation and by collective bargaining that as grasping the fundamental
significance of labour for the balance of the whole societal structure cannot allow the
distributional outcome of employment to transcend a certain limit of social tolerance.
As such welfare rights reflect the balance of power between the parties involved in
employment and therefore are being constantly negotiated and renegotiated.
184
Moreover, rights would not have any meaning as a legal safeguard of a value unless someone could
be in a position to threaten this value.
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5.4.2. Procedural fairness
Having addressed the issue of livelihood, we have to address the issue of
fairness. Practically this means that systems of private justice should provide the
guarantees that are enshrined in the principles of the rule of law when at the same
time having the task to accommodate the tensions that the ambivalent nature of
employment produces185. This means that they have to adopt the principles of a
system that is created to be neutral whereas at the same time it is located within the
same system that conflict is produced. In the case of the state labour courts this
neutrality is achieved since they are above the case in front of them and they base
their rule of their decision on the notion of the common good, whereas here the rule of
the decision is based on the good of the corporation itself and to the optimum
continuation of its function with all its diversity. Moreover, since in private
government regimes we do not have the guarantees of the state legal systems, the
integrity of internal legal procedures should be guaranteed by the selfsame parties
involved. This means that conflicting parties have to create a legal system where we
have the problems that the litigants are the judges of their own selves. In other words
we are looking for the magic formula that can consensually solve conflicts the
moment that it operates under conflictual conditions.
The two main forms of those mechanisms are mediation and conciliation,
arbitration and grievance procedures. The case with arbitration in most countries is
quite clear. Arbitration mechanisms guarantee the impartiality of judgement.
Additionally, the fact that the difference is solved privately, in combination to the fact
that the procedure is much cheaper and faster than the official one, has made
arbitration quite attractive as a procedure over the last decades186. The problem lies
with grievance procedures. There are a variety of fonns of existing grievance
procedures. The fact that they operate at the level of every corporation that adopts
them, forces them to adapt to particular needs. Therefore, they reflect a particular
185 On the importance of the safeguarding of the legal principle of due process in private government
regimes see Selznick (1969) pp. 250-257.
186 One might argue that arbitration is not internal to the industrial private government system, since it
is legally established and recognised. However, the fact that recourse to it is not obligatory, that
recourse to it is provided for quite often as obligatory by collective agreements makes its function
totally dependent upon the will of the parties. Additionally, we have stressed that the person(s) who
solves the difference must be a disinterested and neutral third person. It cannot then be a member of the
corporation having an interest in it. See Selznick (1969) pp. 184-185. For the process in the UK see H.
Collins, K D Ewing & A. McColgan (2001) p. 24.
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understanding of employment as it can be expressed in every corporate culture, but
moreover the balance of power between management and labour as it exists within it.
Nonetheless, for grievance procedures to be considered as guaranteeing social
standards of legality their impartiality must be assured. However, if they are alien to
the corporation the advantage of solving problems and grievances at the lowest
possible level and on the basis of the common corporate culture is largely lost. The
practice is that the members of grievance procedures committees are usually members
of the corporation.
This complicates the situation even more, since in the cases to be decided by the
internal legal system the stake is not only the individual interest of the person(s)
directly involved. Every difference that is produced through the 'work system'
eventually reflects the interests of the corporate actors. This means that private
industrial legal systems do not just deal with grievances between individuals but
rather accommodate a constant conflict between the collective interests as they exist
in the corporation.
Apart from procedural fairness another issue has to be raised here and has to do
with its unilateral or not character. Unfortunately, in many corporations particularly
where collective organisation is weak, controlled by the company, or even non-
existing, grievance procedures are totally controlled by management. This of course,
may provide a pretence of fairness in the conduct of the organisation towards its
members, but it cannot be considered as a proper legal procedure that can guarantee
fairness. It has been remarked by theorists in industrial sociology that this model of
grievance procedures, is used by management as an offer to de-motivate workers from
organising collectively. The idea here being that collective organisation is not needed,
since the organisation provides for normative guarantees of fairness. As B. Edwards
has claimed, after the war many companies adopted this procedure, by introducing
company unions in combination to grievance procedures in order to exclude
j • 187
independent union participation . However, in this case grievance procedures are not
a conflict resolution mechanism, but rather an instrument for management to monitor
the degree ofmotivation and contentment of the workforce. It may be used as a forum
for the solution of differences as between the workers amongst themselves, between
workers and supervisors or even managers, but the rationality of the mechanism aims
l87B. Edwards (1979) p. 106.
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at the promotion of management interests on the workforce. The rationality of the
mechanism in other words in the final instance is bound to favour the economic rather
than the normative. Therefore, under such circumstances we cannot say that we have
a proper legal system since first of all it does not provide adequate procedural
guarantees for its fairness and even the more so since it primarily economically and
not normatively oriented. Such a system cannot earn the trust and the support of the
workforce, nor their uncoerced recognition since it inherently suffers from partiality.
Of great importance to systems of private government is what P. Selznick as we
have seen has defined as corporate morality. Selzinck claims that in corporations we
have the establishment of long-term practices that are determined by the dimension of
the corporation as an actor with social and moral responsibility188. In this sense we
have the development of a system of informal rules and practices that quite often
prevail over the strict application formal of rules. In this sense the parties although
they might have the opportunity of recourse to grievance procedures they will abstain
from it with the view that the continuation of the relation is more beneficial to both of
them and would only be damaged by a formal confrontational procedure. In this we
should see a whole system of informal practices that are normatively produced by the
dynamics of the employment relationship.
We see here the validity of the analogy that we drew earlier in this chapter
between collective bargaining as a legal code to the system of the rule of law. This is
so since they both provide a normative framework that guarantees certain legally
recognised rights. In a sense they both provide at different social levels a guarantee
for the freedom of social action so that individual and collectivities can pursue their
strategies.
5.5. Rights and the legal basis ofprivate government
What has emerged from our analysis so far is that the corporation must be seen as a
political system of organised power that through its institutions mediates between the
diverging interests and discursive rationalities existing and interacting in it. This
analysis allows us to develop the basic premises around which the system of private
government should be built.
188 See Selznick (1969) pp. 28-26 also Selznick (1992) pp. 238-244.
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First of all through industrial democracy the authoritative dimension of corporate
employment is transformed. It is no longer an authority that derives its legitimation
solely from the relation of domination between property and labour. It depends on its
social re-contextualisation and on its correspondence with the values that are imported
in the corporation through labour. It is in this respect that the corporation ceases to be
a private concern and becomes a public body. As such it is detennined by its social
role but moreover by the discourse on justice. It is in this context that we should see
the recognition of rights in the corporate order. Rights are the recognition of the fact
that labour is an action with a social dimension and employment a socially significant
relation. Therefore, and as we have already said the notion of citizenship does not stop
at the gate of the factory but continues to be a major normative principle within it as
well. The worker lives within a social context that recognises legally enforceable
rights that the contract of employment cannot possibly violate189. The rights that we
have briefly outlined above have another dimension since they are derived from a
perception of employment as a most important relation for society. A perception that
views the worker not just as private individual, but rather as a citizen who has rights.
In other words we see yet again the dependence of the economic on the social. The
economic becomes socially re-contextualised not on the basis of the beneficial effect
of social values upon its performance, as communitarianism would have it, but rather
in its inherent dependence on these values. The fact that economic action should not
transcend the common social values is expressed on one level in the mutual
dependence of capital on social labour and on the other on the understanding of the
worker as citizen. It is on the basis of this recognition that private government should
legitimate corporate authority if it is to have any meaning at all. It should focus in
other words on the issue of interdependence but this time on the basis of equality of
interests and of equal validity of discursive rationalities that have to coexist without
the dominant economic being in a position to unilaterally determine the social one. In
other words what we are seeking for here is an understanding and a practice of
employment that recognise its dual character.
The notion of rights that we have described should be seen as a fundamental
aspect of employment relations within the corporation. They are rights that are
derived from a certain understanding of the employment relation as a relation of
189 See H. Collins, K D Ewing & A. McColgan Labour Law Text and Materials (2001) pp.58-59. More
extensively on the issue see also Collins (2003) pp. 205-249.
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conflict and interdependence that moreover is determined in the societal level by the
perception of the worker qua citizen. In this respect rights should not be seen as
something imposed by the state legal system on the basis of authoritative definitions
of the common good but rather as an indication of a social legal culture that
incorporates a wider legal perception at the corporate level. It is in this respect that the
law can have an active participation in the affairs of the corporation. In other words
through codetennination the law does not impose unilateral solutions but rather sets a
framework for the negotiation of these solutions. In other words it respects collective
autonomy by creating institutions that allows the parties of employment through a
multileveled process to form the content of employment by themselves. The crucial
point is that employment rights should not be seen as something unilaterally granted
by the state but rather as legal guarantees that derive their validity from the validity of
the social discourses upon which they are embedded and legitimated. The role of the
state as a freedom guaranteeing institution is to recognise and support them. This
means that rights derive their legitimacy from the common conception of what can be
deemed as fair in all the aspects of the employment, a conception that stems from the
normative beliefs that are formed through the experience and the practice of
employment. Additionally, industrial rights in the above-described sense in the last
instance derive their validity as legally enforceable through their exercise in the
context of the political micro-system of the corporation. Moreover it is in the micro-
legal system of the corporation that their enforceability in practice provides them with
a substantial context. In other words their context is determined by the actual practice
of employment on the basis of the recognition of its ambivalent character as a relation
of conflict and interdependence. Industrial rights should start from the bottom and
encapsulate the true interests and the rationality of labour as reflected in the ongoing
social discourses if they are to have any real meaning at all. In this respect we need a
notion of legal pluralism that is not based on a hierarchical model based on the
primacy of state law but rather one that derives its normative validity that from its
responsiveness to the actual relations that it aims regulating190. We will not go in
details into the concept of legal pluralism, as the issue is not within the scope of this
thesis. What we are interested in is to show that corporate (i.e. non-state) legal orders
can produce valid and generally acceptable legal norms and not which is their relation
190 See Teubner (1992)
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to the official legal system. Our position here is that we have a multiplicity of legal
discourses that do not hierarchically refer to the state law nor depend their legitimacy
on its approval. According to Teubner in modernity legal phenomena emerge in the
context of highly specialised discourses that are the sources of social self-
reproduction, which the law then misreads as sources of nonn production191. The
problem as correctly Teubner puts it is not that of the integration of the diffuse and
informal social norms to the legal system under their formalisation as legal rules but
rather the 'recoding ofa bewildering multitude ofotherwise coded communication in
the code ofthe law. '192
In my view this approach provides us with the basis of approaching on the first
level the legal system of the corporation and on the second the legal regulation of
employment.
Our point is that the concept of private government with its internal quasi legal
system, allows us to understand the validity of its internal procedures as deriving from
a socially valid perception of legal rationality as adapted to the problems that the
practice of employment creates. It is in this sense that at corporate level we can have a
more responsive approach to the normative problems of employment rather than the
direct regulatory approaches of state law. The legal recognition of rights is nothing
else but the recognition of the notion that the employment relation is an ambivalent
relation of the outmost social relation that suffers from the paradox of
interdependence and conflict. Moreover, they imply a value judgement in that they
actively support the weakest part in this paradoxical relation i.e. labour. On another
level, industrial rights help us understand the political character of employment since
they provide the basis for the creation of an internal corporate notion of citizenship
that is based on the understanding of the corporation as a community that through the
assistance of the legal system can be self regulated on the basis of the recognition of
identity through the divergence schema. The recognition of conflict is most important
in that conflict is perceived as a structural element of the relation that should not be
artificially suppressed but rather incorporated in it and be allowed to produce its
normative results. Conflict in this way is contained within a certain horizon that does
not negate the interdependence of the parties in the employment relation.
191 Teubner (1992) p. 1457
192 Ibid.
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On another level rights promote the deliberative aspect of employment relations.
Their focus is on the continuation of the relation, on the continuation in other words
of the community that is based on the existence of the recognised collective identity.
However, we should not forger that the notion of identity does not imply homogeneity
of interests but rather introduces a basis for the negotiation of divergence. In other
words if any notion of industrial democracy is to have any meaning employment
relations should be seen as the constant deliberation over a power relation that is
characterised by conflict and interdependence on the basis of rights that derive their
validity from social practices.
It is under this perspective that we should see that values can play an important
role for the support of the notion of the corporation as community that is seen as a
unity based in the recognition of difference. If we manage to see the corporation as a
common concern of property and labour (something that codetermination has to a
considerable degree achieved) then the relation between them can be seen under a
new perspective. They can far more easily cooperate on the basis of the mutual
benefit of both to the continuation of the relation without this cooperation negating
the aspect of their conflict. Therefore and in view of their mutual advantage, tolerance
and why not solidarity towards each other may have a meaning. A meaning that
however is not conditioned by an alleged common good nor by a uniform social
morality but rather on the recognition of the indispensability of the contribution of
each part to the satisfaction of needs and desires of the other. This approach may also
give answers to issues that classical contractual solutions fail to solve in a non
coercive way. For example a worker if s/he knows that s/he is respected as an
individual by his/her company and knows that s/he can rely on an institutional
network to which s/he actively participates then s/he may be willing to perform more
than to work beyond their contractual minimum193. In other words we see how this
multileveled dialectic of employment produces a major legal paradox, a paradox that
is produced from the fact that property and labour although incompatible and
conflicting are interdependent. If interdependence is to produce mutually beneficial
results then it has to acknowledge, recognise and integrate in its normative approach,
its opposite, i.e. conflict. In this respect we can see how interdependence can be seen
193
The oxymoron in this case is that the property side of the relation is the one that receives the
surplus value of cooperation.
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as the cornerstone that can provide a valid normative solution within the confines of
capitalism. In other words whereas conflict pushes us away from capitalism and away
from any perception that the legal system may embrace, interdependence seems to be
the pole around which any normative approach should focus.
At another level, what also needs to be stressed here is that the common moral
framework upon which interdependence may be used as normative principle is not
something that exists somewhere in a diffuse 'social sphere' and as such should
govern employment. The point of view that this thesis suggests is that this moral
framework should be constantly discovered through the development of the particular
dialectic of employment and not imposed on the basis of moral preconceptions. This
means that we should not start from moral values as normative standards and try to
impose them on employment as communitarianism does. For example, solidarity is
undoubtedly a most important and positive moral value. However, we cannot regulate
employment on the basis of the moral argument that solidarity should as an
imperative govern employment whilst ignoring that employment apart from solidary
is also characterised by the equally strong presence of non-solidary elements. This
means that we cannot impose a notion of solidarity without first creating achieving an
institutional framework for it to be expressed194. In other words if solidarity is not to
be an empty ideal we should create the mechanisms and that may create the ground
for its application.
What we suggest here is that on the basis of the knowledge of the ambivalent
character of employment, a character that creates tensions, contradictions, ambiguities
and paradoxes at many levels, we should seek these moral principles as they
themselves participate and contribute to this unique dialectic. In other words the
achievement of the fulfilment of values comes as a result of the unfolding the dialectic
of labour, as the result of the negotiation and the compromise of interests, desires and
rationalities involved in employment. This means that values should not be seen as
abstract moral ideals that have to be imposed as regulating substantive principles of
the employment relation. On the contrary these values have to be the outcome of an
agreement as a result of the unfolding of the unique dialectic of employment.
194
Moreover, as we have shown the non-solidary elements cannot be eliminated and as this thesis has
argued should not be suppressed. Therefore, solidarity in the case of employment should mean the
convergence of conflicting parts on the basis of the agreement of the attainment of a common purpose.
However, this can only be achieved if we have a normative approach that recognises the corporation,
the field of employment as a locus where the divergence and conflict of the parts have to converge on
the basis of their interdependence.
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Moreover, as we have suggested here is that in view of the conflictual character of
employment we cannot have an ab initio agreement on these values. On the contrary
what we have done is to put forward an argument that says that in view of the human
and social character of labour, the legal regulation of employment cannot ignore valid
social perceptions as to the justice of the practice and of the distributional outcome of
employment. However, these perceptions as evolving in their dialectical opposition to
equally valid ones (for example, we can see an antithesis between the demand of
social justice as opposed to the demand economic growth and prosperity, as for
example a neo-liberal would moralise it) have to be constantly negotiated and
renegotiated. And it is the presuppositions of this negotiation that we are trying to
develop here.
5.6. Community and private government. A Summary
What has emerged from our analysis so far is that the corporation must be seen as
a community. However this does not deny the fact that this community is a system of
organised power that through its institutions recognises and mediates between the
diverging interests and discursive rationalities that exist and interact within it.
Nonetheless it should not be forgotten that pluralism and democracy are ways of
controlling power and not of abolishing it.
This means that neither pluralism nor industrial democracy can deny the fact of
domination of property over labour. What they achieve is the social re-
contextual isation of the power and authority of property over labour. Through the
recognition of the validity of all the interests that are invested in the corporation this
authority has to be in correspondence with the values that are either imported through
labour or derived through its dimension as a responsible social actor. Here we see
again the need for a normative approach that perceives the corporation not as a private
concern but as a public body. It is in this context that we can see the recognition of
interests as bearing rights in the corporate order. The corporation has to recognise the
fact that labour is as much as an economic as a socially determined action and
employment a socially detennined as much as an economically significant relation.
What this leads us to is that the political organisation of the corporation allows us to
understand the validity of its internal procedures as deriving from a socially valid
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perception of legal rationality as adapted to the problems that the nature of
employment creates. It is in this sense that at corporate level we can have a more
responsive approach to the normative problems of employment rather than the direct
regulatory approach of state law. As socially conditioned industrial rights focus on the
continuation of the relation within an acceptable social context. In the corporate
context and drawing an analogy with citizenship it is the notion of membership that
provides the basis for the mutual recognition that of rights on the basis of a collective
identity. However, as we have seen identity does not mean homogeneity. On the
contrary it provides a ground for the negotiation of divergence. In other words
industrial democracy re-establishes a balance between property and labour but at a
level and with a rationality quite different to that of the welfare state. Industrial
democracy should not stifle conflict as expressed through employment. On the
contrary it should function on the basis of its recognition. It is an expression of social
autonomy that through the recognition of conflict negotiates the tenns of its
symbiosis. However, despite our critique to the welfare state it should not be forgotten
that no notion of industrial democracy can materialise without active institutional
support. The role of the state as a mediating factor is indispensable in the sense that
only it can provide a pole of power that can condition that of property. In other words
we find again here the strategic alliance between welfare states195 and organised
labour. However in this case the welfare state does not aim at unilaterally shaping the
content of employment but although in this case the welfare state does not aim at the
detennination of the content of employment but rather empowers labour so that it can
be (albeit the repressed one) a pole of the dialectic that forms the ever evolving
content of employment in modernity. However, recent developments in the economy
at global level are threatening the recognition of labour as the other pole of the
dialectic of employment. This brings us to the transfonnations that globalisation has
brought. 6. A footnote on Globalisation and Employment.
195 See chapter 3, section 4.2.2.
226
6. Multinational Corporations and Contractual
Networks.
A last Comment on the Dialectic of Labour
Globalisation is assumed to be a trend that has forever altered our understanding
of employment. In what concerns the main focus of critique of this thesis, I maintain
that it has not. What I am going to argue next is that globalisation has done nothing of
the sort. On the contrary what we are going to see next is how this trend has radically
shifted the balance in the power relation of employment without however affecting its
substance.
6.1. The multinational company as employer
It is a well-known fact that the globalisation of the economy has brought about an
unprecedented mobility of capital. It is this mobility of capital that dramatically
empowers property in its confrontation with labour. It provides it with the ability to
move its operations to any place that provides the most attractive investment
environment for it. This attractive environment could mean amongst others the
availability of a cheap workforce and the existence of capital friendly employment
laws. This ability of capital has as an effect that it unbalances traditional patterns of
work in the countries that it 'invades'.
The fact that the corporation operates in many different countries means that it
has to adapt its operations to different legal systems. There are mainly two ways,
actually complementary to each other, for avoiding the problem that they have to
adapt their operations to different institutional environments. The most common
method for avoiding the complications that ensue from such a situation is that the
multinational corporations develop a very cohesive internal normative code that
harmonises the nonnative framework of their internal operations in partial insulation
from state legal systems'96. This development seems at first sight to enhance the
autonomy of private government systems. However, this has not at all been the case
so far. We have seen that private government systems depend on the existence of a
196 See Robe (1997) pp.52-62, 67.
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relative balance of power between capital and labour. In the case of multinational
corporations this balance is dramatically shifted in favour of capital. In the globalising
economy capital has used its mobility as an instrument for the attenuation of the
strength of collective organisations. In a work system where capital is global but
labour is tied to a locality, capital may move its operations to any place that is more
attractive for it to invest thus emancipating itself from its dependence from any
specific labour market197. In this way we have a major alteration in the balance of the
power relation between property and labour. Capital derives its power from its
resource holding ability. Labour on the contrary through collective organisation.
However, experience has shown collective organisation in order to be effective has
also to establish itself as a source of political influence. This requires the existence of
effective pressure mechanisms and access to a stabilised and favourable to them
political environment. In the case where the multinational corporation moves its
operations around the globe these weapons that labour has created for itself are lost.
Quite often we have the situation where workers are being faced with the
dilemma to either accept terms and conditions of employment or lose their jobs due to
the reallocation of its operations to another place. The responses that labour has to this
advantage of capital are limited. In the case where a trade union threatens the
multinational with industrial action the multinational can simply close the factory and
establish it elsewhere. Of course, this is not something that happens every day, but is
an indication that corporations can easily move (and the trend is that they are actually
doing so) their operations to countries where labour is cheap and disorganised.
Additionally, this means that the determination of wages and working time is more
and more left to the discretion ofmanagement. Even the more so, the insulation of the
normative order of the enterprise from state law, means that in third world countries
were this model is becoming very common, workers can easily be left outside the
scope of statutory protection.
This of course does not mean that the multinational corporation has completely
prevailed over labour. However, it means that labour is in a detrimental position in the
internal organisational system, since management have attained through globalisation
a strategic advantage over them. The problem lies in the ability of the strongest part,
in our case management to unilaterally impose it will. In J. Alteson's words: ' Unions
197 See Beck (2000) pp. 27-28.
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find themselves dealing increasingly with conglomerates and multi-national
corporations that can more easily weather economic struggles, conceal information,
and transfer, or more credibly threaten to transfer work to other locales, or, indeed,
198other countries than could their predecessor counterparts'
The second way multinationals deal with legal systems is to try and influence
them in their favour. This means among others pressure upon international
organisations to introduce pro-capital labour regulations, codes of practice and upon
governments to introduce legislation in that direction199. As Third World countries are
in need of their investments, they are amenable to their pressure. Under these
circumstances it seems imperative that the law should intervene and focus on the issue
of the containment of the social power that multinational corporations are acquiring.
However, as multinationals operate in many countries there is a need for the
harmonisation of national legal approaches. Nevertheless, the convergence of legal
culture in international level and the increasing importance of International
Organisations make such a task feasible.
On another level, the consequences of the globalisation of capital for the private
government system are devastating. We have seen that multinationals establish
internal normative systems, but in this case we may talk of an internal normative
order of the corporation but we cannot possibly talk about a private government
system. In this case (especially in the absence of strong trade unions and of collective
bargaining) labour has not a recognised interest in the corporation. Even the more so,
since multinational enterprises have used their mobility to overcome the obstacle of
collective organisation. As C. Craypo has shown, in multinational corporations,
management have the upper hand and have used it in order to diminish the strength
and the influence of collective organisation200. We have said that in principle
management are opposed to collective bargaining. In the age of global capitalism they
seem to be in a position where they can simply avoid it. As the trend appears to be
deploying, it seems that labour lacks the mobility, the resources and the organisational
capacity, to confront capital as effectively as it did during the 20lh century. However,
the direction that the world work system will take, I believe, depends basically on the
ability of labour to use the potential for mobility and flexibility provided by the
195 See J. Alteson (1985) pp. 841-842.
199 On the issue ofmultinational enterprises as law making communities see P. Muchlinsci (1997)
200 See C. Craypo (1975) p. 3, 7.
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technological advances to its advantage. This will depend on its ability to create a new
basis for solidarity that will allow it to adjust collective organisation to the challenges
of the global society.
6.2. New forms of organisation of employment
This new situation combined with the emergence of new organisational forms of
employment. Contractual networks201, franchises and new forms of employment such
as home working and tele-working create new condition of work that allow employers
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to avoid both collective organisation but moreover labour protection legislation" .
Some claim that the notion of subordination and control is in these cases is gradually
being replaced by a new form dependency that has been termed as neo-
feudalisation . The term denotes that networks that have adopted a non-pyramidical
form of organisation demand from their employees their initiative as well as their
loyalty to an unprecedented degree204. We can see the resemblance with vassalage in
the sense that this kind of loyalty implies the conscious undertaking of action for the
benefit of another to whom the person is dependant as to his/her well-being. In this
respect we can say that domination through employment takes another form. In these
cases it becomes not directly confrontational but rather is based on consensual
dependence. What we may say is that we have through these patterns is a new
ideological perception of domination since they imply the attachment to the interests
of the employer as if they were ones own. In this respect we have both a practical but
moreover an ideological advantage of property over labour. However the substance of
domination as it stems from the relation between property and labour remains
unaltered. We do not have here an alteration to the relation but rather a change in its
balance that in this case has shifted in favour of the property side of it. What
moreover should not be forgotten is that these trends although expanding they do not
suggest that the traditional model of subordination and control has been surpassed. On
the contrary this new form of domination exists alongside the old one. Moreover, as
against these new forms of employment we have not yet have an organised reaction
" For contractual networks see Teubner (1993b) (2000b) (2003/2004a)
202 See Collins (1990a) p.360 ff., (1990b) p.744.
203 See Supiot (2000) pp.342-343.
204 Ibid. p. 342.
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especially in what concerns their social consequences. As I believe that as these new
patterns are by their nature inimical to collective organisation the reaction will come
in reference not so much from employment itself but rather from a society that sees its
structures of reproduction being unsettled by the demands of the economic
discourse205. In other words globalisation alters the form of the expression and the
balance of the ambiguities and tensions of employment. It does not alter their
substance and it does not eradicate them. In the first instance we have a significant
advantage of one part over the other through its unprecedented mobility. In this
respect the other part has to find the resources and the new sources of solidarity in
order to be able to react. In the second instance we have a dislocation of the field of
confrontation between property and labour. It is not anymore the integrated
corporation the field of struggle but rather the competing claims of the economic and
the social discourses over the content of employment. However and this should be
remembered that it is the structure of employment (the capitalist mode of production
as Marx would have it?) that produces these tensions. And this structure that stems
from the relation of labour to property (capitalism in other words) is not altered by
globalisation. On the contrary is confirmed in a most emphatic way in its aspect of
domination. In other words the dialectic relation as a power relation between property
and labour has shifted its balance towards the strongest part, namely property. Our
point here is that we have yet another reading another shift in the dialectic between
property and labour that nonetheless cannot alter its substance as a power relation of
conflict and interdependence.
7. By Way of Conclusion. The Community and the
Insoluble Paradox ofEmployment
This analysis brings us back to our findings at the end of chapter one: on the
institution of a community through employment as an interaction system and on the
political character of this relation. On the basis of our analysis so far we can say that
this community is constituted at all social levels and cannot be surpassed by
perceptions that ignore the complexity of the relation as one of conflict and
205 Beck (1992) especially pp. 127-138.
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interdependence. What we mean by this is that this relation is expressed at the micro
social level as between an employer and an employee that is expressed as relation of
domination that ensues in a continuing dialectical relation of conflict and
interdependence. We can see now how on the meso-level we have the institutionally
organised community of the corporation, as a multileveled relation between
conflicting yet interdependent forces, discourses and rationalities. Additionally we
have seen that this community is mediated by relation between labour and property as
social forces that are mediated by the compromise between the market and the welfare
state that in a competitive way attempt to determine the substance of the relation
according to their respective rationalities.
In this respect we can see the understanding of this community by diverging
paradigms that compete as to the determination of the substance of the relation.
Liberalism and libertarianism deny the existence of any form of community under the
figment of employment as free economic exchange. The welfare state acknowledges
this community but suppresses its conflicting dimension. We can see now how these
perceptions compete and find their expression in competing paradigms as to the
determination of the practice of employment as organised in the corporation. On the
one hand the contractual nexus paradigm denies any associational dimension on the
corporation. With rationality quite similar to that of the welfare state the institutional
theory especially in its communitarian version reveals the community of employment.
In its most fruitful contribution that is Selznick's 'Law, Society and Industrial Justice'
communitarianism has allowed us to see the organisational dimension of employment.
Moreover this organisational dimension of the corporation brings us back to our
findings as to the dependence of property on its social recognition. Organisational
logics of employment are based on the notion of the corporation as a public institution
that has as its raison d' etre its social contribution. In it as the case was with the
Hegelian state property cannot develop its own logic unfettered. It is socially
conditioned by the notion of the common good. The corporation in this respect
becomes a social locus where diverging rationalities intersect and interact on the basis
of their contradictory relation of conflict and interdependence. As we have repeatedly
said, this contradictory relation cannot be transcended as long as capitalist property
relations persist. This has led us to look for employment as a relation that is constantly
negotiated on the basis of a community that regulates and recognises conflict as a
structural condition of employment. As a result employment relations have to assume
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a form of a constant negotiation under the institution of collective bargaining, an
institution that is pervasive at all levels of employment and encapsulates its
contradictory nature. Collective bargaining brings the diverging rationalities of
employment under a condition of constant negotiation. Of course this condition
cannot negate the nature of employment as a relation of social domination but at least
it can empower labour as a social force to lay a claim on the fruits of social wealth on
the basis of its indispensable yet silenced role as a most important expression of social
human creativity. In this respect we have an ever-evolving relation that at any social
level cannot be transcended in our historical horizon as to its contradictory nature. It
is in this respect that we can see employment as having a character that is political in
its nature. The political character of employment is not derived by the similarities of
its organisation to that of a political community. It mainly has to do with the
continuation of a relation of an integrated whole that in a deliberative way negotiates
its differences and conflicts on the basis of the interdependence that is mediated by
the existence of a collective identity. Moreover this negotiation is based on the
recognition of divergence of interest and moreover on the creation of an institutional
pattern that guarantees the continuation in time of the relation. In other words the
similarity lies in the pluralistic and deliberative negotiation of difference on the basis
of perpetuity. We have found a most fruitful paradigm in the case of codetermination
where we encountered a mode of negotiation that through the recognition of conflict it
creates a normative web that derives its legitimacy from the actual and specific
practice of employment. As we have seen the importance of codetermination is that it
addresses these problems and creates law, in the sense of the conferment of rights and
the assumption obligations from at 'lowest' level of employment. Moreover, we have
seen codetermination as a form of negotiation of the structural ambivalence of
employment and of the tensions that it creates. Codetermination is a most valuable
institutional approach in that it provides us with a paradigm that attempts to integrate
the interests of property and labour on the basis of their interdependence whilst
recognising their conflict. Moreover it has made clear that the content of employment
is an issue that is constantly contested and negotiated.
This means that all efforts to subsume it under one-dimensional descriptive
schemata that project just one aspect of the relation as determinant ignore these
tensions that provide the character of the employment relation in modernity. What we
mean by this is that we do not project an image of employment that claims that it has
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provided an absolutely exact description of it. Far from it. On the contrary we say that
its political character can best express its contradictory nature. It is not an
authoritative cognitive definition on the basis of which employment should be
regulated. It is just a perpetual schema that refuses definitions of employment as a
relation that has to subsume into authoritative logics whether these come from the
market or from the state. On the contrary we strongly believe that employment
presents us with a paradox that cannot be comprehended in all its complexity by the
legal system. What we suggest here is a reading that understands employment exactly
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as an ever-evolving paradox. Moreover, employment is not just legal paradox" . It is
a paradox of the outmost social significance that assumes a legal form and thus
becomes a legal paradox exactly due to its significance. The market and the regulatory
approach have attempted to suppress the paradox by projecting dimensions of the
relation that they consider as dominant. What we have showed is these perceptions
suffer from fundamental cognitive flaws that ignore the ambivalent nature of
employment. However, regardless of its dominant social perception this ambivalent
nature persists and receives contradictory definitions by the legal system. And as
Luhmann remarked paradoxes may be suspended or even repressed but cannot be
eradicated. They are paradoxes exactly because they express relations that cannot be
grasped by dominant cognitive schemata. As such 'paradoxes have a fatal inclination
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to reappear''
We have described employment as a relation that creates ambiguities and
tensions that lead to a legal paradox. What should not be forgotten is that employment
is not a static relation. It constantly changes as its determining factors evolve in
relation to each other in a dialectic that is expressed as a power relation between a
socially dominant and a socially repressed social force. This means that its actual
content is constantly evolving on the basis of this dialectic, constantly evolving,
constantly adapting to the power structure and the strategies of the parties involved
and reproduces itself productively on the basis of this ambivalence. And it is exactly
this evolution that we should allow to be developed.
It cannot be denied that this thesis has taken an overt stance in favour of labour
on the basis of its creative power. In this we accept the responsibility for an implied
value judgement as to the way in which the paradox of employment should be
206 See Teubner (2003/2004b) on legal paradoxes and on their creative potential.
207 Luhmann (1988) p.156
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addressed. This thesis holds that the paradox of employment can be productive as
long as the creativity of labour expresses itself through the different guises and forms
that employment takes. This can be achieved only if society, as a labouring society
reclaims the rights that its creativity bestows to it. In other words the evolution of
employment should be deemed as productive to the extent that it can give back to the
realm of social needs and desires what it has itself produced for the economic system.
And this can be achieved through the empowerment of the discourses through which
labour receives its legitimacy. In other words we accept the paradox, we reject
authoritative perceptions of the paradox and we want it to express itself as authentic
social relation in the direction of social empowerment through the creativity of labour.
In other words the question that confronts us now, but which we can pose rather than
answer, is how by acknowledging the contradictory nature of employment can we
rediscover and realise the creative force that labour is for humanity.
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